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This study is concerned with Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae and the 
relation between his works on mnemonics and philosophy. The hermeneutic 
hypothesis that will be explored is that it is Giordano Bruno’s works on the 
mnemonic arts that first reveal his new elaboration of the concept of order, 
which will then be completed in his philosophical works, especially those 
focusing on the concepts of Nature, Language and praxis developed therein. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters that explore the research 
statement into more detail on three levels. The first level concerns a 
historiographic approach that assesses the most effective method of 
investigation to determine the place of Bruno’s works on mnemotechnics in 
the development of his philosophy as a whole. The method will be defined 
by comparing Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology (Metaphorologie) and his 
interpretation of Bruno’s thought and the role he played in the transition 
from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age. This in turn leads to a more 
accurate definition of the subject of this research, namely the role that the 
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metaphor of inner writing plays in Giordano Bruno’s works on ars 
memoriae. The second level analyses the metaphor of inner writing in a 
metaphorological way and compares this with another essential metaphor in 
order to understand Giordano Bruno’s philosophy, that is to say the 
metaphor of the shadow. Although the third level remains in the 
background, it provides a framework for the first two levels in the 
Introduction and Conclusion, and advances another research hypothesis that 
examines whether the absolute metaphor of inner writing, which is closely 
related to the concept of order, can be further explored as a paradigm in 
order to gain a better understanding of the history of philosophical and 










Das Thema der Doktorarbeit sind die ars memoriae von Giordano 
Bruno und das Verhältnis zwischen den mnemotechnischen und den 
philosophischen Werken des Nolanus. Nach der hermeneutischen 
Hypothese, die in der Dissertation thematisiert wird, ist es in seinen 
mnemotechnischen Werken, dass sich Giordano Bruno zum ersten Mal der 
Neubearbeitung des Ordnungsbegriffs widmet, die er später in seinen 
philosophischen Werken vervollständigt, besonders jenen die sich auf die 
Begriffe Natur, Sprache und praxis fokussieren.  
Die Dissertation enthält sechs Kapitel, die die Forschungsfrage auf 
drei verschiedenen Ebenen untersuchen. Die erste Ebene bezieht sich auf die 
historiographische Perspektive, die die nützlichste Methodologie zur 
Interpretation von Bruno’s mnemotechnischen Werken in der Entwicklung 
seiner Philosophie abzuwägen sucht. Diese Methode wird definiert durch 
die Gegenüberstellung von Hans Blumenbergs Metaphorologie und seiner 
Interpretation von Brunos Gedanken und seiner Bedeutung für den 
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Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit. Das wiederum führt zu einer 
präziseren Definition des Forschungsobjektes, nämlich der Rolle der 
Metapher des Inneren Schreibens in den Werken von Giordano Bruno über 
die ars memoriae. Die zweite Ebene analysiert die Metapher des Inneren 
Schreibens aus einer metaphorologischen Perspektive und vergleicht diese 
Metapher mit einer anderen zur Deutung der Philosophie von Giordano 
Bruno wesentlichen Metapher, nämlich der Schattenmetapher. Auch wenn 
die dritte Ebene im Hintergrund bleibt, bildet sie den Rahmen für die ersten 
beiden Ebenen in der Einleitung und in der Schlussfolgerung und avanciert 
eine weitere Forschungsfrage und zwar ob die Metapher des Inneren 
Schreibens, die dem Konzept von Ordnung nah verwandt ist, als Paradigma 
untersucht werden sollte, um ein besseres Verständnis der Geschichte der 
philosophischen und wissenschaftlichen Interpretationen bzw. Theorien des 
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Figure 1. Johannes Romberch, Congestiorum artificiose memorie, 1520. Diagram of the 
faculties of the soul arranged within the brain. 
 
Figure 2. Cosma Rosselli, Theasurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579. Diagram of the faculties 
of the soul arranged within the brain. 
 
Figure 3. Cosma Rosselli, Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579. 
 
Figure 4. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. The human body 
used as locus for a mnemonic system. 
 
Figure 5. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. The shops in a city 
as a set of loci for the creation of an artificial memory system.  
 
Figure 6. Cosma Rosselli, Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579. Hell as a set of loci for 
the creation of an artifical memory system.  
 
Figure 7. Cosma Rosselli, Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579. Heaven as a set of loci 
for the creation of an artificial memory system. 
 
Figure 8. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. An example of 
images that may be used to count or assign an order to both the loci and imagines.  
 
Figure 9. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. An example of the 
choice of images to create an artificial memory system.  
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The titles of the works by Giordano Bruno are abbreviated as follows:  
Cant. Circ.  Cantus Circaeus 
Cena   La cena de le Ceneri 
Clavis   Clavis magna 
De mon. num. et fig. De monade, numero et figura 
De umbris  De umbris idearum  
Furori   De gli eroici furori 
Sig. sigill.  Sigillus sigillorum 
 
 
The editions of the works by Giordano Bruno that have been consulted are identified with 
the following initials: 
OMN I Giordano Bruno, Opere mnemotecniche, Volume I, edition directed by 
Michele Ciliberto, edited by Marco Matteoli, Rita Sturlese, Nicoletta 
Tirinnanzi, Milan, Adelphi, 2004. 
OMN II Giordano Bruno, Opere mnemotecniche, Volume II, edition directed by 
Michele Ciliberto, edited by Marco Matteoli, Rita Sturlese, Nicoletta 
Tirinnanzi, Milan, Adelphi, 2009. 
DFI Giordano Bruno, Dialoghi filosofici italiani, edited by Michele Ciliberto 
with an introductory essay, Milan, Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, 2000.
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Note regarding translations 
The original quotations are always included within the text and their translation is 
provided in the footnotes. When I translate the text myself, I add “translation mine” in 
parentheses in the footnote. 
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Prelude 
Descent Into Hell 
 
Deep is the well of the part. Should we not call it bottomless? 
Indeed we should, if-in fact, perhaps only if-the past subjected to 
our remarks and inquiries is solely that of humanity, of this 
enigmatic life-form that comprises our own naturally lusty and 
preternaturally wretched existence and whose mystery is quite 
understandably the alpha and omega of all our remarks and 
inquiries, lending urgency and fire to all our speech, insistence to 
all our questions. And yet what happens is: the deeper we delve 
and the farther we press and grope into the underworld of the past, 
the more totally unfathomable become those first foundations of 
humankind, of its history and civilization, for again and again they 
retreat farther into the bottomless depths, no matter to what 
extravagant lengths we may unreel our temporal plumb line. The 
salient words here are “again” and “farther”, because what is 
inscrutable has a way of teasing our zeal for placing it under 
scrutiny; it offers us only illusory stations and goals, behind which, 
once we reach them, we discover new stretches of the past opening 
up-much like a stroller at the shore whose wanderings find no end, 
because behind each backdrop of loamy dunes that strives to reach 
lie new expanses to lure him onward to another cape. 
Thus some origins are of a conditional sort, making both in 
practice and in fact the primal beginning of the particular tradition 
kept by a given community, people, or family of faith, but in such 
a way that memory, even when advised that the well’s deeps can 
in no way be considered earnestly plumbed, may find national 
reassurance in some primal event and come to historical and 
personal rest there. 
For example, … 
 










1. I take a tablet and read a book. 
The initial experience is exhilarating but at the same time it is 
disorientating. The page I am looking at is not a defined space that dictates 
the rules of composition and univocally establishes what the text looks like, 
as is the case in a paper book. The programme I open to read the book 
allows me to change the visualisation mode at any moment and as many 
times as I want: you only have to change the font size or the direction of the 
tablet. If I wanted to, I could even do two things together, or change the 
configuration of each page, depending on what happens while I am reading: 
the light intensity changes, I’ve left my glasses in another room and I can’t 
be bothered to go and get them, but even – following some unspecified 
aesthetic criteria – I find reading a page that is either not full enough of 
characters or too full unsatisfying. 
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 At first, I enjoy playing with the different possibilities that the 
reading programme offers me; but at the end, I realise I am lost. If I try to 
remember what page I read something on, I find it really hard because the 
digital page does not have the same fixed reference coordinates that readers 
have with a printed or handwritten page. In fact, the digital sheet respects 
neither spatial coordinates nor the geometry of a piece of paper, with the 
result that I am unable to create a mental map of the text with the reading 
coordinates I am used to. 
I try to find something to jog my memory: I go back over the text in 
my mind, but it no longer belongs to one page but to another. I realise that 
my memory is going backwards, just like in the incipit in Joseph and his 
Brothers by Thomas Mann, but it can’t find a place to hang on to and use as 
a starting point to remember: in my mind I can’t see the part of the text I am 
looking for, I can’t find the part that can act as a stimulus. In fact, it is as if 
that point no longer existed, or at least as if its rediscovery no longer 
responded to the rules I am used to, which are based on the assumption that 
there is a connection between memory and space – I remember what has 
been ordered and called to mind more than once, following a succession of 
what has been arranged in a specific order in an imaginary space – and, as a 
consequence, a connection between memory and time – if it is true that the 
first element that allows one to perceive the passing of time is the ordered 
arrangement of phenomena in succession. 
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2. In De Oratore1 Cicero narrates that the poet Simonides of Ceos had 
been invited to a banquet by a nobleman from Thessaly called Scopas, and 
composed a poem in his honour. In this composition, Simonides had also 
included an ode to Castor and Pollux. The nobleman, who did not appreciate 
the fact that other people should be praised in a poem in his honour, told the 
poet that he would pay only half the fee and he would do well to get the rest 
from the Dioscuri. The twin gods did not make Simonides wait long at all 
and even paid him with his life. No sooner had Scopas uttered that sentence 
than Simonides was summoned outside the palace where he was told two 
young men were waiting for him; he took his leave from the banquet, left 
the building, but found nobody waiting for him. At that precise moment the 
ceiling of the room where the banquet was being held collapsed and all the 
guests died in the rubble. The corpses were unrecognisable and they could 
not be able to given their rightful burial unless Simonides was able to 
remember where each of the participants had been sitting at the dining table 
before the ceiling collapsed. Cicero notes that, according to tradition the 
poet reflected upon what had happened and realised that an orderly 
arrangement is indispensable for a good memory and it is owing to the 
importance of this observation that Simonides is attributed with the 
discovery of the rules of the mnemonic arts. 
In Cicero’s time, mnemonics was one of the most frequently used 
rhetorical techniques amongst orators, who used it to reinforce their 
																																								 																				
1  Cicero, De oratore, II, LXXXV. 350 – LXXXVIII. 361, trans. by E. W. Sutton, 
Cambridge (MA) – London 1948 (1942), The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 462 – 473. 
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mnemonic faculty, thus facilitating the memorisation of the speeches they 
were to hold. The technique consisted in a few, very simple rules and was 
intuitive to use. The teachers of rhetoric taught that, when one wanted to 
learn something off by heart, first of all one had to associate each thing that 
one wanted to remember with an image; then one had to place this image in 
a mental place, taking care that the images for the objects were placed in an 
order that corresponded to the order in which the objects appeared in the 
discourse. Going over the series of images in that order repeatedly, 
guaranteed effective memorisation. 
 
 
3. In the conclusion of the chapter on the origins of mnemonics, 
Cicero remembers that, in addition to this tale, tradition also passed down an 
analogy to facilitate the understanding of the rules of the ars memoriae: the 
act of giving each object an image and arranging it in a specific order in a 
mental space is similar to what we do when we are writing and associate 
each word with an object, arranging the words in a precise order with the 
aim of communicating something. 
The experience of reading with a tablet underlines how the analogy 
between memory and writing is neither naïve nor without consequences for 
the understanding of the phenomenon of memory, even if only intuitively. 
Reading a digital text leads me to reflect on the fact that, when my 
experience of writing and reading changes, the way in which I memorise 
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information and the way in which I understand the concept of order also 
changes. The sense of disorientation that I experience when reading an e-
book arises from the fact that this text, unlike a printed text, does not belong 
to a place that has already been given to the reader, since the minimum unit 
of meaning, which is the page, is missing. In fact, a page of printed text or 
the piece of paper one writes upon define the first level of order within 
which the words of the text are placed. This minimum unit of meaning is the 
reference unit for memory as well: the page is the space where the visual 
memory orders what it wants to remember of the text contained there. 
The difficulty one comes up against when reading a digital text can 
certainly be overcome. For example, I could define the criteria for the 
configuration of the digital page format in advance, basing myself on the 
conditions I need for memorisation that I experienced when using a non-
digital text. Once again, however, a profound difference remains between 
the two experiences because there is no possibility to have a shared memory 
of a text, unless beforehand one takes care to share the configuration criteria 
for the page format with the readers before they begin reading, together with 
any later modifications made whilst reading. 
Apart from the difference between the two reading experiences and 
the expedients that can make it easier to re-establish the previously known 
reading conditions, the experience of reading an e-book leads me to 
question a memory that is not adequate – it does not move – within a pre-
established order and following a specific sequence. The sense of 
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disorientation arises from the fact that the memory I experience is much 
more creative and is no longer only selective and reproductive. 
 
 
4. I suggested the possibility of overcoming this disorientation by 
defining the configuration of the digital page and sharing these parameters 
with the readers before they begin reading and whilst they are reading. This, 
however, is not the only way of overcoming this disorientation. We have 
seen that the use of new technical instruments and habit can induce 
cognitive modes that lead to a redefinition of the notion of order and the 
understanding of the memory.  
With this, I am not trying to say that the evolution of writing 
techniques is something negative and I am not attempting to tackle the 
subject of the impact of new technologies on man – even if the problem of 
technology is in the background, it is not dealt with philosophically in this 
research project. What does attract my attention, however, is the recurrence 
and reciprocal implication of several historical phenomena that seem to be 
interrelated. I am referring to the fact that the history of writing techniques 
seems to be linked to the history of philosophical and scientific theories on 
memory and the history of the mnemonic arts, through the conceptual 
elaboration of our experience of writing. 
This conceptual tie between the experience of writing, the mnemonic 
arts and memory theories is evident if one analyses the leading paradigm of 
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the conceptual formation in the two fields of study on memory. The 
paradigm that guides the methodological reflections of the mnemonic arts 
and the philosophical reflections of the philosophical reflections of the 
memory theories is the paradigm of “inner writing”. This is the research 
hypothesis that I will discuss in the thesis and on which I have based my 
reflections. My research object, which is the analysis of Giordano Bruno’s 
mnemonic arts, will discuss this hermeneutic principle. 
The importance of the research hypothesis that will be discussed in 
this thesis emerges if one reflects upon further, possible research. Once the 
research hypothesis has been discussed and confirmed, one could try to 
argue that, despite the differences belonging to the history of memory 
theories, the paradigm has been able to preserve its general underlying 
criteria because the evolution of writing techniques has never modified the 
relationship with writing and the space it is in written in. Should this 
hypothesis also be confirmed, one could hypothesises that the experience of 
reading and writing with a tablet could decrease the validity of the paradigm 
or could force it to reconsider one of its fundamental elements, that is the 
concept of spatial order. In fact, the experience of writing and reading on a 
tablet eliminates the absoluteness of the space given to the writing. I shall 
return to this hypothesis, which is not discussed in the thesis, in the 
conclusion when I comment on the results that have been achieved and 
formulate a further discussion of the theme of the links between the history 
of writing, history of memory theories and history of the mnemonic arts. 
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5. The invention of writing brought an awareness of the interaction 
between writing and memory with it immediately. Philosophers have often 
underlined this interaction, at times more with agitation than with 
enthusiasm.   
We know that Plato was disturbed by the implications of the use of 
writing on memory. Plato’s Phaedrus is a work that is essential and still a 
source of enlightenment on the subject today, if one takes care to underline 
certain aspects that might be ignored because they are understood as an 
expression of literary style and not as a philosophical argument. Let us look 
at one of the first scenes.2 Socrates is admonishing young Phaedrus who, 
after a day indoors listening to the new rhetorical theories, feels the need to 
move around and does so, taking with him a book, with the intention of 
continuing to exercise himself in the declamation of speeches. Socrates tells 
Phaedrus off precisely because the young man, afraid he will not be able to 
remember everything that is set out so faithfully in the book, never lets it 
out of his sight. 
What we are witnessing here is a dramatic portrayal of Plato’s 
criticism of writing. The key point in this lies in the fact that writing forces 
the soul that, according to Plato, has its primary faculty in memory, to move 
in a specific space once and for all, and this induces it to believe that this is 
recollection. According to Plato writing and the kind of memory that 
develops immobilises the soul, whereas by its very nature it needs to be 
																																								 																				
2 Plato, Phaedrus, 227 A – 228 E, trans. by Harold North Fowler, Cambridge (MA) 
– London 1971 (1914), The Loeb Classical Library, pp. 412 – 419. 
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allowed to move freely so that it can take part in the ascension to the world 
of Ideas, which is the objective of true recollection. Phaedrus’ restiveness, 
feeling the need to move around after a long day indoors listening to the 
same speech being repeated endlessly and, what is more, a recited speech 
reading a written text, thus not allowing the slightest variation, is the 
dramatic portrayal of the intolerance of the soul when it tries to force the 
memory inside an artificial ordo, hindering it from tracing the dialectic link 
in reality on its own, in which the ordo of truth is expressed, which is the 
ideal image of the cosmos (κόσµος, kósmos: the meaning of this Greek 
word, which is of great importance in the history of philosophy, is both 
‘order’ and ‘nature’).3 
This is why the scene that Plato describes is so violent, almost 
catastrophic. For Phaedrus it does not suffice to leave the house he has been 
in all day, sitting down and concentrating on repeating a single speech; the 
young man needs to stretch his legs, he needs to walk a lot, leaving the city 
walls behind him, which, for Plato, represent the entire political and cultural 
order, intent on walking far. For Plato, the use of writing as a replacement 
for the oral memory must have therefore seemed extremely dangerous, 
something that was capable of overturning and distancing the soul from all 
																																								 																				
3 Plato’s criticism of writing follows the same logic as his criticism of the figurative 
arts and it would therefore be more correct to say it is a criticism of logography. According 
to Plato, writing was not so much a problem of reference to reality but rather one that was 
linked to the possibility of representing reality figuratively. For more, see the interesting 
essay by Marie-Pierre Noël, “Plato, Alcidamas, and Isocrates on logography,” in Laurent 
Pernot (ed.), New Chapters in the History of Rhetoric, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2009, pp. 91 – 
107. 
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the orders, not only the gnosiological but also the political-civil, which was 
represented by the city and its walls. 
While Plato believed that the order and fixedness that writing imposed 
on thoughts was harmful for the soul and weakened its ability to remember, 
therefore denying the possibility of true knowledge, Aristotle and the Greek 
and Latin rhetoricians thought otherwise.  Being able to guarantee an order 
in the composition and declamation of speeches, not only by resorting to 
writing but also through the definition of a topic or arguments that can be 
used in a given context, also meant providing an aid for memorisation. A 
similar aid must have been believed to be of considerable importance in a 
culture that had no technical instruments at its disposal to guarantee the 
storage of data or that guaranteed it in a very limited manner.4 
What is striking is that the difference between Plato’s and the 
Aristotelian-rhetoric position also lies in the consequences that they 
believed the use of writing could have on the nature of the soul: while Plato 
believed the use of writing changed it profoundly, according to Aristotle and 
the rhetoricians, writing had absolutely no effect on the nature of the soul. If 
one thinks of Aristotle’s interests in rhetoric and his opinion as regards the 
relationship between philosophy and rhetoric, which was very different 
																																								 																				
4 The situation today is very different, with problems that are linked to the subject of 
memory and the infinite potentiality of storage offered by new means of communication. 
See: Lorraine Daston (ed.), Science in the Archives. Pasts Presents Futures, Chicago, The 
University of Chicago Press, 2015; Id., “The sciences of the archive,” Osiris, 27(1), 156-
187, 2012; Luciano Floridi, The Fourth Revolution How the Infosphere Is Reshaping 
Human Reality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016; Id., The Ethics of Information, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013; Id., The Philosophy of Information, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2013; Id., Information: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2010; Paolo Rossi, Il passato, la memoria, l’oblio, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
2001. 
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from Plato’s, his position is hardly surprising. Furthermore, it is not 
surprising if one bears in mind that Aristotle belonged to a generation that, 
unlike Plato’s, had already assimilated the cultural novelty of the invention 
of writing. 
The two philosophers’ conceptions of the soul and the history of their 
reception aside, there is, therefore, another interesting aspect from the point 
of view of the history of idea, which has, until now, been studied very little: 
how the conception of the soul and the function that the memory has in the 
two systems of thought is linked to the technical invention of writing and 
the attitude that the two philosophers had towards it. 
 
 
6. I would like to look more closely at this connection between 
memory theories, the mnemonic arts 5  and experience of reading-writing 
(development of memory theories and the mnemonic arts, development of 
the technique of writing and reading). What I would like to do is study this 
enduring connection of phenomena throughout the history of philosophy 
from a historical-philosophical perspective, arriving at a hermeneutic 
hypothesis, that is, that the analogy between writing and memory guided the 
conceptual formation of philosophical theories on memory and the 
mnemonic arts. 
																																								 																				
5  I define how the mnemonic arts and memory theory are to be understood in 
Chapter one, §1. 
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The objection could be made that other analogies were used to explain 
how memory functions – for example, that of the seal or the ark, to name 
just some of the most renowned; and there is no doubt that this is true, but I 
believe it is not only easy to show that these analogies can be led back to the 
semantic field of writing, but also that the analogy with writing was the 
most productive in terms of the development of theories and their 
conceptuality. 
One of the particular aspects in this matter is that historically an 
undisputed priority between memory theories and the mnemonic arts has 
never been established; on the contrary, as we shall see in the definition of 
the field of research,6 the two lines of research took it in turns to stimulate 
first one and then the other in the development process of understanding 
memory. Writing provided the leading paradigm for the conceptual 
formation in the two fields and the evolution of writing techniques in this 
movement, modifying the leading paradigm, gradually led to (or made 
comprehensible in a different way) conceptual changes in the theories of 
memory and the mnemonic arts. 
 
 
7. The Renaissance and Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae offer a vast 
variety of stimuli for reflection on the relationship between these themes. In 
studies on the history of the mnemonic arts it is usually Giordano Bruno 
																																								 																				
6 See literature review for sources on the history of the mnemonic arts, Chapter one, 
§ 2. 
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who is cited as the author who combined the various notions of the soul of 
the ars memoriae in the sixteenth century; in other words, before its decline 
in an age in which the diffusion of printing made its function superfluous, 
and before it partially merged in late seventeenth and eighteenth century 
studies on combinatorial analysis and language. 
What I would like to demonstrate is that Bruno’s importance in the 
history of the mnemonic arts and in the understanding of the development of 
the philosophical theories on memory also lies elsewhere. First of all, Bruno 
expresses with force and in an innovative fashion both the awareness of the 
connection between technical development and conceptual development of 
the ars, that is, between the mnemonic arts as such and memory theories, 
and the awareness of their conceptual dependence on the evolution of 
writing techniques. Furthermore, it was with his reflections on the ars 
memoriae that Bruno develops a philosophy in which human creativity, 
prassi, plays a key role in dismantling the previous orders – the 
gnosiological, the physical and the ethical – laying the foundations for the 
modern ones. Thus, from this perspective it is the ars memoriae itself that 
Bruno forces into a philosophical theory of the soul, seeking an ontological 
foundation of the mnemonic arts, which plays a role in the transition from 
dismantling of medieval philosophical conceptuality to the formation of the 
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modern one, if Bruno’s role in the historical development of philosophical 
thought is accepted.7 
This is why, to use Thomas Mann’s words, I have decided to “find 
rest in this beginning” and to establish Giordano Bruno’s works on the 
mnemonic arts as the research object of this thesis, with the underlying 
philosophical problems cited earlier, that is: the understanding of memory 
as the faculty of the soul; the effects of the experience of writing in the 
understanding of the relationship between man and the world from the 
perspective of the problem of memory; the concept of spatial and temporal 
order in the understanding of memory function. 
 
 
8. Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works have always posed a challenge 
to interpreters, who were torn between regarding them as works that 
testimony nothing more than his participation in an aspect of contemporary 
																																								 																				
7 See, for example: Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft der neuren Zeit. Erster Band, in Ernst Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke. 
Hamburger Ausgabe, Band 2, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1999, pp. 225 – 261; Id., 
Individuum und Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance, Leipzig, G.B. Teubner, 1927; 
Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988 (the 
second, revised and expanded edition includes both volumes in a single volume: I. 
Säkularisierung und Selbstbehauptung. Erweiterte und überarbeitete Neuausgabe von “Die 
Legitimität der Neuzei,” erster und zweiter Teil, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1983 (in 
turn, revised edition of the first separate edition of the small publication, 1974), II. Der 
Prozeß der theoretischen Neugierde. Erweiterte und überarbeitete Neuausgabe von “Die 
Legitimität der Neuzeit,” dritter Teil, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1980 (in turn, second 
edition of the first separate edition of the small publication, 1973), III. Aspekte der 
Epochenschwelle: Cusaner und Nolaner. Erweiterte und überarbeitete Neuausgabe von 
“Die Legitimität der Neuzeit,” vierter Teil, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1982 (in turn, 
second edition of the first separate edition of the small publication, 1976)], trans. by Robert 
Wallace, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, Cambridge-London, MIT Press, 1985. In the 
thesis I shall not deal with the question of the legitimacy of this interpretation of the role of 
Bruno’s interpretation in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age. 
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culture, destined to decline without having any great influence on the 
history of thought, and the attempt to undertake a systematic study of 
Bruno’s production. It was a long time before scholars were able to find a 
way to interpret the role played by Giordano Bruno’s studies, as they were 
also related to magical practices and the Cabale. For a long time opinion 
wavered between regarding them as the bizarre expressions of a fashion at 
that time, such as magical practices and the Cabale, and the attempt – which 
often failed -  to create a space for them in philosophical works, interpreting 
them as an expression of a spirit of their times – Copernicanism – and a 
Kant-like prelude to the history of modern rationality.  
In such a context, the history of the interpretations of Bruno’s 
mnemonic works is significant if one is to understand how the historical 
comprehension of the mnemonic arts itself was affected by the conception 
of rationality that inspired the historiography on which this research was 
based. As long as the historiographic model was that of the Enlightenment, 
which saw in modern rationality the destination for all previous history, the 
mnemonic arts, magical practice, and cabalistic interpretations could only 
be seen as errors that had to be overcome along the path towards the mature 
expressions of modern rationality. From this historiographic perspective, 
Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works were thus also considered expressions 
of a modern but immature spirit that was inclined to “dreams of reason” at 
the moment in which it was proceeding towards the eighteenth-century 
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modern rationality that would triumph by overcoming its historically 
imperfect expressions. 
The possibility of interpreting the mnemonic works from a perspective 
other than the historiographic ones from the Enlightenment became possible 
from the middle of the twentieth century on, coinciding with the definition 
of new lines of research on the history of thought and Renaissance culture; 
the objective of these lines of research was the revival of those aspects of 
the Renaissance that had been revised by its interpretation in the perspective 
of modern history philosophies that had originated during the 
Enlightenment but had disappeared in the last century. 
The most systematic and authoritative attempts at understanding 
Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works against the background of the culture of 
his times were those by Paolo Rossi8 and Frances A. Yates.9 Paolo Rossi 
highlighted the fact that Bruno continued Llull’s thoughts of the ars 
memoriae in the sixteenth century, that is, he was included with those who 
attempted to define the clavis universalis, a universal science that would 
enable one to access complete knowledge of the universe and make it 
accessible to everyone. Frances A. Yates, on the other hand, included 
Renaissance mnemonics and Bruno’s ars memoriae in the history of the 
Renaissance Hermetic tradition. By doing so, the English historian included 
																																								 																				
8 Paolo Rossi, Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Llull 
a Leibniz, Bologna, Il Mulino, 20003 (first edition, Riccardo Ricciardi Editore, Milano-
Napoli, 1960); Logic and the Art of Memory. A Quest for a Universal Language, trans. with 
an introduction by Stephen Clucas, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2001. 
9  Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory, Chicago-London, The University of 
Chicago Press-Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1966. 
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the mnemonic works in another field that was essential to a better 
understanding of the Renaissance, but that also resulted in the texts being 
more difficult to understand and interpreted as initiatory. This was in total 
contrast to what Paolo Rossi had tried to do, both by proposing a semiotic 
interpretation of the mnemonic images devised by Bruno, and by attempting 
to include the history of the mnemonic arts in the history of the 
development of the modern method. 
Although these two research projects are still indispensable for an 
understanding of the position of Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works in the 
history of the mnemonic arts and thought in the sixteenth century, the 
question regarding the relationship between Bruno’s mnemonic and 
philosophical works remains unanswered, as they concentrated on the 
relationship between Bruno’s ars memoriae and the culture of his time. 
Whilst from a historiographic point of view I am interested in 
evaluating the validity of a hermeneutic hypothesis – the interaction 
between the experience of reading-writing and the understanding of 
memory, from the point of view of the history of ideas, what I aim to do is 
to illustrate the role that the mnemonic works actually have in the Nolanus 
corpus. I intend to illustrate how one can affirm that the ars memoriae 
works are the workshop in which Bruno developed the three philosophical 




9. The thesis develops two parallel lines of argument: a 
methodological one and a textual analysis. As regards the methodological 
argument, my intention is to identify the most effective hermeneutic 
paradigm for the understanding of Bruno’s mnemonic works in relation to 
the development of several themes of his philosophical works. My starting 
point is Hans Blumenberg’s interpretation of Giordano Bruno, because the 
former is the interpreter who highlights Bruno’s efforts to rethink the 
concept of order. By means of a critical comparison with this interpretation, 
I shall define the borders or a possible metaphorological analysis of the 
mnemonic works, which will become the perspective from which I will 
begin my discussion on the use of the metaphor of writing in Bruno’s 
mnemonic works. The hypothesis I shall be discussing in the textual 
analysis is that this is the leading paradigm of the conceptual formation of 
mnemonics in general and it is also the paradigm that allows us to 
understand Bruno’s ars memoriae within the philosophical corpus.  
The two lines of discussion are developed in six chapters. 
The first chapter defines the area of research, beginning with the 
distinction between philosophical memory theories and mnemonics. I shall 
then illustrate the rules and principles of the mnemonic arts. I shall 
demonstrate that these elements, which are partially technical and partially 
of philosophical origins, remain unchanged throughout the history of 
mnemonics despite the change in function of mnemonics as regards the 
system of knowledge and philosophical memory theories. 
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The second chapter illustrates and discusses the reasons underlying 
the decision to carry out a study on the relationship between Bruno’s 
mnemonic and philosophical works, by studying the use of the absolute 
metaphor of inner writing, which I understand, in accordance with 
Blumenberg’s terminology, as an absolute metaphor (absolute Metapher), 
that is, as a metaphor that is irreducible to the concept and that acts as a 
paradigm for the conceptual formation of the mnemonic arts and memory 
theories. More specifically: I identify Giordano Bruno’s works as my 
research object; by means of an analysis of three methodological 
approaches, I acknowledge the need to define a different methodological 
approach that is able to interpret both Bruno’s mnemonic and philosophical 
works; finally, the choice of Blumenberg’s metaphorology as my study 
methodology leads to a redefinition of the research object as the use of the 
metaphor of inner writing in his mnemonic works. 
In the third and fourth chapter I introduce and justify my 
methodological choice. The third chapter is an interpretation of Die 
Legitimität der Neuzeit 10 which highlights how his critique of the historical 
interpretative category of “secularisation” and the assumption of the 
historical of “self-assertion” as an interpretative category of the Modern 
Age result in Han Blumenberg interpreting the transition from one period to 
another as a rearrangement of the order established by the theories. From 
this perspective, together with Cusano, Bruno bears testimony to the 
																																								 																				
10 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit. 
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epochal transition, through his reformulation of the concept of order. The 
fourth chapter deals with Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie 11 , Hans 
Blumenberg’s first work on metaphorology as an auxiliary discipline of the 
history of ideas (Begriffsgeschichte), in which Blumenberg offers a 
convincing illustration of how the rearrangement of order (and therefore 
also of historical periods) occurs through the substitution or metamorphosis 
of metaphor-guides in conceptual formation. 
The fifth chapter looks at Die Lesbarkeit der Welt 12 , in which 
Blumenberg analyses the absolute metaphor of the world as a book, which 
can be understood as a metaphor of the concept of order itself, and I shall 
illustrate how Blumenberg’s interpretation of Bruno is limited but 
surmountable if one studies further the metaphor of the world as a book, 
tracing it back to the more general field of the metaphor of writing. The fifth 
chapter is a transition chapter from the methodological discussion to the 
interpretation of the research object, in which I distance myself from 
Blumenberg’s interpretation of Bruno as a philosopher of Copernicanism 
and establish the modalities of my metaphorological research. More 
specifically, in the fifth chapter I discuss the thesis that the metaphor of 
inner writing can be interpreted as the paradigm of the conceptual formation 
of the mnemonic arts and memory theories; by focusing on Giordano 
Bruno’s mnemonic works, the use he makes of this metaphor can aid our 
																																								 																				
11 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Bonn, Bouvier, 1960 
(first published in “Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte,” vol. 6, 1960, pp. 7 – 142, and reprinted 
by Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1998), trans. by Robert Savage, Paradigms for a 
Metaphorology, Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press, 2010. 
12 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1981. 
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understanding, not only in reference to the history of mnemonics or the 
history of logic, but also Bruno’s own philosophy. In fact, even if 
Blumenberg also interprets Bruno as a philosophical vulgariser of 
Copernicanism, thus stripping one of the protagonists of his critique of 
secularisation of any legitimacy as a critique of The Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age, by looking more closely at his interpretation of the metaphor 
of the world as a book, it is possible to re-establish Bruno’s independent 
thought, which brings him closer to Copernicus. 
In the sixth chapter I focus only on Giordano Bruno, with a 
presentation and clarification of Bruno’s ars memoriae, illustrating its 
consistency, continuity and excess in the history of mnemonic tradition. 
This textual analysis will show how the metaphor of inner writing aids 
the comprehension of these figures and shows, by paying particular 




10. In conclusion, this thesis makes two contributions: first of all, the 
formulation of a hermeneutic paradigm for the history of the philosophical-
scientific theories on memory, in which the metaphor of inner writing is the 
absolute metaphor for our understanding of the faculty of memory; then, by 
applying the hermeneutic paradigm to Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works, 
I will interpret these works, allowing us to understand their role within the 
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corpus of Bruno’s works and, more specifically, in the development of his 
philosophy, paying particular attention to the three central themes in the 
latter: nature, language and creativity; lastly, the application of the 
hermeneutic paradigm to his mnemonic works will allow us to verify the 
feasibility of the actual hermeneutic paradigm, which could then be more 










 […] this circumstance suggested to him the discovery of the truth 
that the best aid to clearness of memory consists in orderly 
arrangement. He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty 
must select localities and form mental images of the facts they 
wish to remember and store those images in the localities, with the 
result that the arrangement of the localities will preserve the order 
of the facts, and the images of the facts will designate the facts 
themselves, and we shall employ the localities and images 
respectively as a wax writing tablet and the letters written on it. 




ABSTRACT The field of research – mnemonics in the sixteenth century – is easier to 
understand if one starts with the distinction between the philosophical theories of the 
memory and mnemonics. In fact, the rules and principles of mnemotechnics are partially 
technical elements and partially of philosophical origins, which remained unchanged 
throughout the history of mnemotechnics. What did change throughout the centuries, 
however, is the function of the mnemonic arts compared to the system of knowledge and 
philosophical theories about memory. To define the field of research, I shall therefore 
distinguish between philosophical theories of memory and the mnemonic arts; I shall then 
offer an overview of the development of the history of the mnemonic arts up to the 
sixteenth century; finally, I shall show how the memory theories and the mnemonic arts 
interacted with one another through this course. 
 
 37 
1. Definition of the field of research (1): the mnemonic arts and 
memory theories 
The history of the mnemonic arts, understood as techniques to aid 
memory that were widespread in the ages prior to the diffusion of moveable 
type print, covers a temporal span that goes from Ancient Greece until the 
seventeenth century, if not later. However, despite the endurance of the 
rules and many other characteristics of the mnemonic arts, the history in 
question is extremely long, complex and multiform, involved diverse 
disciplines and touched on many theoretical problems throughout its 
development; it is therefore opportune for those wishing to look more 
closely at its comprehension and meaning in the history of thought, to be 
able to distinguish between the mnemonic arts and memory theories. 
Ever since Antiquity, philosophy has tried to define and explain the 
different functions of the soul, or rather, the different ways in which it 
interacts with reality. The function that enables the soul to preserve in some 
form or another what has been experienced once, making it available for 
other functions at a later moment, with the passing of time, and without the 
presence of the stimulus in reality that produced what has been preserved, is 
memory. 
Memory theories are the philosophical interpretations that studied the 
role and functioning of memory as part of a theory of the soul; in other 
words, they are the theories that have studied the functioning of the memory 
as part of a theory of knowledge, which also studied the other functions of 
the soul. This theory of knowledge had to be able to give a holistic 
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interpretation of all or multiple functions of the soul, with the aim of 
understanding how man relates to the world and is able to function in it. The 
mnemonic arts (ars memoriae) or mnemotechnics, on the other hand, 
traditionally comprise the whole of the precepts that originated in the 
rhetorical field in Ancient Greece, and were aimed at reinforcing the natural 
memory by means of the use of images placed in order and sequence in 
mental locations; these could either be images of real places or invented 
ones based on real ones. 
The difference between memory theories and the mnemonic arts is, 
therefore, their relationship with the theory of knowledge and with the 
theory of the soul in which they are included. Memory theories are part of 
the theory of knowledge and contribute to the understanding of how the soul 
functions, whereas the mnemonic arts are the techniques that, although they 
implicitly refer to a theoretical model for the functioning of the memory and 
soul, do not discuss the principles and doctrine, only allowing an occasional 
glimpse of them in the painstaking work of their discussions. 
 
 
2. Definition of the field of research (2): selection of the sources for the 
history of the mnemonic arts 
If we consider the history of the mnemonic arts from the perspective 
of the role they had in the system of the knowledge of the western world 
and in the ages prior to the diffusion of printing, the historical development 
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model proposed by Frances A. Yates 13  is still valid; it is outlined in a 
parabolic trajectory that: starts in Ancient Greek and develops in the Roman 
age (rhetorical use of mnemotechnics); it undergoes significant revision in 
the Middle Ages with the revival of Aristotelian theories on memory (the 
ethical use of the artificial memory); the late Renaissance, on the one hand 
marks the period of its greatest theoretical development and production of 
works on the ars memoriae whilst on the other, it marks the beginning of its 
decline in the face of the growing diffusion of printing, which is now 
making the function of any support for the natural memory obsolete (ars 
memoriae and universal knowledge). 
If, on the other hand, we do not consider the mnemonic arts in 
reference to the role they had in the system of knowledge, but in a broader 
cultural framework, one can only agree with Paolo Rossi when he speaks of 
the persistent presence of the mnemonic arts until today in the form of 
“intellectual fossils (fossili intellettuali).”14 In fact, frequently do we see 
posters on our city walls advertising courses to develop our memories or 
read articles – whether scientific or less so – recommending a more suitable 
																																								 																				
13 Here I am following the outline by Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory, op. cit. 
Although Frances A. Yates’ interpretation of the ars memoriae was the subject of 
considerable debate and is currently believed to be outdated, I believe that some of paths 
that the British historian proposed, isolated from the widespread hermeticism in which 
Yates places Renaissance and Bruno’s mnemonic arts, are still didactically valid as an 
introduction to the study of the history of the mnemonic arts in relation to the philosophical 
theories on memory. It is therefore only from this perspective that I am referring here to the 
course of the history the mnemonic arts, as outlined in the work of 1966 whilst I have no 
intention of using the English historian’s conclusions.  
14 Paolo Rossi, Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Llull 
a Leibniz, op. cit., pp. 5 – 6. On the subject of the “intellectual fossils” also in relation to 
the meaning and study modes of the history of ideas, see: Paolo Rossi, Il passato, la 
memoria e l’oblio, op. cit., pp. 59 – 62.  
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lifestyle or a better diet to reinforce our memory and preserve its 
functioning over the years. Anyone who has studied the history of the 
mnemonic arts will have no difficulty in recognising many of the precepts 
of the ancient rhetorical discipline in all of this; the criticism it was 
subjected to over the centuries; at times even the development of 
prescriptions from other disciplines, for example medicine, the aim of which 
was the memory and its preservation. However, we call them “fossils” 
because, however, their cultural function is no longer the one they had at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, that is, in the centuries prior to the 
diffusion of printing;  neither is it the one they had during the seventeenth 
century, which marks without a doubt the decline of the mnemonic arts as 
an independent discipline but it allows us to follow their final developments 
while they merge with the reflections that are to lead to the encyclopaedism 
of the Age of Enlightenment, to combinatorial analysis or the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century treatises on language. 
It is unimportant here to choose one position or the other and to 
establish the borders of the history of the mnemonic arts, that is, to which 
point the descendent line of the trajectory is to be followed. What should be 
underlined here is that, throughout this trajectory, the definition of the 
mnemonic arts remains unchanged, as does the nucleus of rules, as can be 
seen with a brief overview of the main sources of the mnemonic arts and its 
developments up to the sixteenth century, which I will present below. 
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The sources were selected by choosing the most representative for 
each period using the following criteria: sources that defined the discipline, 
the rules and problems related to them (Latin rhetorical sources); memory 
theories that, despite not belonging to the direct mnemotechnical sources, 
contributed decisively to the revision of some of the aspects of its classical 
conception, especially as regards its development in the Middle Ages and 
Renaissance (Aristotle’s memory theory); the medieval sources that resulted 
in the convergence of the mnemonic tradition and that of the Aristotelian 
philosophical one on memory (Albertus Magnus and Thomas of Aquinas), 
and those that will result in the sixteenth century in the attempt to define a 
universal science that can be communicated to everyone (Augustine and 
Raimondus Llull). 
The selection I am presenting is very limited and I realised that this 
means a loss in the wealth and nuances that define the multiform overview 
of the history of the mnemonic arts. The selection, however, is functional to 
the objective of the review, in other words, the definition of the field of 
research: the clarification of what the mnemonic arts is and how it differs 
from the philosophical theories on memory; the explanation of the rules and 
principles of the mnemonic arts; demonstrating how this nucleus of the 
mnemonic arts, made up of technical elements (mnemotechnical rules) and 
elements of philosophical origins (mnemonic principles), remains 
unchanged, despite the change in the function of mnemotechnics in regard 
 42 
to the system of knowledge and as regards the philosophical theories on 
memory that mnemonists referred to. 
 
 
2.1 Latin sources for the mnemonic arts 
In the classical world memory was not only an object of philosophy, 
as one of the functions of the soul, but it was also an object of rhetoric to 
which one of its five parts was dedicated.15  The mnemonic arts, or ars 
memoriae, which belonged to the rhetorical interpretation of memory and 
even comprised its nucleus, were a set of rules through which the orator was 
able to improve the memorisation of the many, lengthy, articulate discourses 
he would have to recite from memory. 
The sources for ancient mnemotechnics come exclusively from Latin 
rhetoric. The three manuals of Latin rhetoric that are usually cited as 
sources for classical mnemotechnics are: the anonymous text Rhetorica ad 
																																								 																				
15 The five parts of ancient rhetoric were: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, 
pronuntiatio and Cicero defined them as follows: “Quare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae 
videtur artis ea quam Aristoteli visam esse diximus; partes autem eae quas plerique 
dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. Inventio est excogitatio 
rerum verarum aut veri similium quae causam probabilem reddant; dispositio est rerum 
inventarum in ordinem distributio; elocutio est idoneorum verborum ad inventionem 
accomodatio; memoria est firma animi rerum ac verborum perceptio; pronuntiatio est ex 
rerum et verborum dignitate vocis et corporis moderatio”; “Therefore the material of the art 
of rhetoric seems to me to be that which we said Aristotle approved. The parts of it, as most 
authorities have stated, are Invention, Arrangement, Expression, Memory, Delivery. 
Invention is the discovery of valid or seemingly valid arguments to render one’s cause 
plausible. Arrangement is the distribution of arguments thus discovered in the proper order. 
Expression is the fitting of the proper language to the invented matter. Memory is the firm 
mental grasp of matter and words. Delivery is the control of voice and body in a manner 
suitable to the dignity of the subject matter and the style”, Cicero, De inventione, De 
optimo genere oratorum, Topica, I, VII. 9, transl. by H. M. Hubbel, Cambridge (MA) – 
London, The Loeb Classical Library, 1976 (1949), pp. 18 – 21. 
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Herennium 16 , De Oratore 17  by Cicero and the Institutio oratoria 18  by 
Quintilian. As far as the possible Greek sources for ancient mnemotechnics 
are concerned, they have not been passed down to us, even though the Latin 
sources testimony an important and authoritative mnemonic tradition from 
Greece, which the compilation of the Latin rhetoric manuals also draws 
upon.19 
To sum up what is explained in the three Latin works of rhetoric, we 
can say that the classical precepts of mnemotechnics are: a) impressing on 
the memory a series of real or imaginary places (loci); b. associating each 
object (res) or word (verbum) of the discourse one wants to remember with 
an image (imago); c. arranging the images in places according to the order 
(ordo) in which the objects or words are found in the discourse that is to be 
memorised; d. exercising the memory by mentally going back over the 
places to become accustomed to seeing the images located there. 
In addition to these precepts are the five general principles they are 
based on. These principles, in which it is possible to recognise many 
conceptions of ancient Greek philosophical thought, are premises in each 
																																								 																				
16 [Cicero], Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), transl. 
by Harry Caplan, Cambridge (MA) – London, The Loeb Classical Library, 1981 (1954). 
17 Cicero, De oratore, op. cit. 
18 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, transl. by H. E. Butler, Cambridge (MA) – London, 
The Loeb Classical Library, 1979 (1922). 
19 See, for example: Ad Herennium, XXIII. 38, op. cit. pp. 220 – 223; Cicerone, De 
oratore, LXXXVIII. 360, op. cit. pp. 470 – 471; Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XI. II. 22, op. 
cit. pp. 222 – 225. Even Aristotle, as we shall see in this chapter, refers to the Greek 
mnemonic tradition and mnemonists. It is permissible to hypothesise that the same Platonic 
criticism of the Sophists, who must have been mnemotechnic scholars, were inspired by the 
diverse conception and use of memory in their educational programmes. While the Sophists 
promoted a concept of “notional” memory, we could say, Plato gave the memory a central 
role in the dialectic definition of the man-world relationship, founding upon it the 
possibility of truth as the result of reminiscence. 
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mnemotechnic interpretation that has been passed down to us. The authors 
make explicit reference to the different principles without discussing them 
and, on the contrary, either take them as generally accepted or, at the most, 
refer to their interpretation in a most pertinent discussion. 
The first principle concerns the distinction between the natural 
memory (memoria naturalis) and the artificial memory (memoria 
artificiosa). The memoria naturalis is the natural faculty of the soul, by 
virtue of which it preserves the sensations experienced as images and can 
evoke them even when the physical sensation that produced them is no 
longer present. The memoria artificiosa is the product of the application of 
the mnemonic precepts, in other words, the memory system that is 
constructed with the use of mnemonic loci and imagines. The simplest 
artificial memory system that can be constructed is the one that helps us 
remember a list of things. For example, if I want to remember in the 
following order: horse, dog, eagle, shoe, book, cork, first of all I have to 
choose a place where I can put the images of these objects. To simplify 
memorisation, I imagine a room with six niches, each of which is big 
enough to house the image I want to place inside it, so that it can be clearly 
seen inside the niche. At a second moment I will then place each object in a 
niche, following the order in which I want to remember each object. 
Returning mentally to this room and going back over the path that takes me 
from the first to the last niche guarantees that I will be able to memorise the 
list of the things I want to remember. 
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The second principle underlines the actual importance of the order 
(ordo), both in the phase of creating the artificial memory (construction of 
the memory system composed of loci and imagines and its fixation in the 
mind), and in the phase of retrieving what has been entrusted to the artificial 
memory (in other words, when I go back inside the mnemonic locus to 
retrieve the things I have entrusted to the imagines placed there). Here, 
order is the principle that guarantees the technique functions: the 
memorative faculty is asked to preserve and reproduce an order that exists 
in reality and that is possible thanks to the fact that the soul is able to order 
the facts of experience. 
The third and fourth principles are interconnected. One affirms the 
superiority of the sense of sight over the other senses while the other, as a 
consequence, underlines the centrality of marvel in both the learning and 
memorisation process. These three principles clearly express the origin of 
the mnemonic arts in the ancient philosophical system, in which sight was 
superior to the other senses, since it was possible to learn about the cosmos 
(κόσµος, kósmos) through conceptual forms such as ideas, but also sensorial 
ones, such as the images derived from sensible experience. 
Finally, the fifth principle, which was also linked to the last two, 
recalls the centrality of the analogy in the creation of the artificial memory 
system. The analogy should be understood here in the broader meaning of 
an imitation of nature and is applied to both the choice of the mnemonic 
images and the general conception of the soul-nature relationship. Since the 
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artificial memory system has to help the natural memory, the choice of the 
images will be based on their similarity to the objects or words that are to be 
remembered. However, this is possible thanks to the fact that the mnemonic 
rules to construct the memoria artificiosa are based on the principles that 
dictate the functioning of the memoria naturalis, and imitate them by means 
of analogy.  
 
 
2.1.1 Rhetorica ad Herennium 
Rhetorica ad Herennium is the most detailed and complete treatise of 
the sources on mnemotechnics; it was also the most influential throughout 
the history of the ars memoriae, and it is for this reason that I shall look at 
this text in closer detail to illustrate the precepts of the mnemotechnics and 
demonstrate how the treatise writers of ars memoriae have adopted its 
principles. 
Rhetorica ad Herennium is an anonymous text, probably written 
between 86 AD and 82 AD and for a long time attributed to Cicero.20 It is a 
																																								 																				
20 In the Middle Ages it was still attributed to Cicero and, in fact, this text was 
referred to as rhetorica nova or secunda to distinguish it from De Inventione, which was 
known as rhetorica vetus o rhetorica prima. In 1491 Raffaele Remigio demonstrated that 
this attribution was incorrect and proposed another two names, including Cornificio: 
Raphael Regius, Utrum ars rhetorica ad H. Ciceroni falso iscribatur, in Duecenta 
problemata in totidem institutionis oratoriae Quintiliani depravationes, Venezia, 1491. I 
have taken this information from Paolo Rossi, Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e 
logica combinatoria da Llull a Leibniz, op. cit., note 15, p. 36. Paolo Rossi refers to the 
introduction by F. Marx in the Leipzig edition of Ad Herennium, 1894, p. 1, for the period 
of composition, and on p. 52 for the position of medieval scholars as regards this text. 
According to Frances A. Yates, Rhetorica ad Herennium is the text that passed the 
mnemonic arts not only down to the Middle Ages, but also to the Renaissance: Frances A. 
Yates, The Art of Memory, op. cit., p. 5. For an introduction to the history of the reception 
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manual on rhetoric and the part devoted to memory21 can be divided into 
two sections: one deals with general questions linked to the distinction 
between the natural and artificial memory (Rhet. Her., III, XVI); the other 
goes into the details of the precepts of the mnemonic arts, discussing some 
of the difficulties linked to the study and gives suggestions to make it more 
effective for rhetoric practice (Rhet. Her., III, XVII – XXIV). 
The section on memory begins with the question whether a natural 
memory and an artificial memory exist, as each mnemonic art claims. The 
author declares that, although this was not the place to deal with the 
problem – which he clearly regards as a philosophical and not rhetorical 
one22 - he sides with this distinction, taking it as the starting point for his 
interpretation. He then goes on the definition of the natural memory and 
artificial memory according to rhetoric tradition, stating that the natural 
memory is innate in the soul, as is thought; the artificial memory, on the 
other hand, is a memory that one acquires by exercising a technique (ars).23 
Whilst accepting as a fact the existence of the two memories, the 
author of Ad Herennium explains the relationship between them and 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
of Rhetorica ad Herennium in the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance, see: Virginia 
Cox, John O. Ward (ed.), The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval and Early Renaissance 
Commentary Tradition, Leiden – Boston, Brill 2006. 
21 [Cicero], Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, 
XVI. 28 – XXIV. 40, op. cit., pp. 204 – 225. 
22  It is a problem concerning the theories of memory and not the mnemonic arts, 
according to the categories I introduce here in Chapter one, §1. 
23 Cicero, Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, XVI. 
28, op. cit., pp. 206 – 207: “Sunt igitur duae memoriae: una naturalis, altera artificiosa. 
Naturalis est ea quae nostris animis insita est et simul cum cogitatione nata; artificiosa est 
ea quam confirmat inductio quaedam et ratio praeceptionis;” “There are, then, two kinds of 
memory: one natural, and the other the product of art. The natural memory is that memory 
which is imbedded in our minds, born simultaneously with thought. The artificial memory 
is that memory which is strengthened by a kind of training and system of discipline.” 
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clarifies that there is a pre-eminence of the natural over the artificial 
memory. Although it is true that technique and constant practice can make it 
possible for the artificial memory to compete with the natural one, without a 
natural memory that is already suitably prearranged, technique and practice 
cannot do much. 
Coming to the presentation of the rules of the ars memoriae, the 
elements the artificial memory is constructed on are introduced: the places 
(loci) and mental images (imagines) that are defined as follows: 
Locos appellamus eos qui breviter, perfecte, insignite aut natura aut manu sunt absoluti, ut 
eos facile naturali memoria conprehendere et amplecti queamus; ut aedes, intercolomnium, 
angulum, fornicem, et alia quae his similia sunt. Imagines sunt formae quaedam et notae et 
simulacra eius rei quam meminisse volumus; quod genus equi, leonis, aquilae memoriam si 
volemus habere, imagines eorum locis certis conlocare oportebit.24 
The effectiveness of the technique to reinforce the natural memory 
depends entirely on the choice of the places and mnemonic images, and this 
is why it is necessary to follow highly precise criteria that are based on the 
natural characteristics of thought and memory.  
As regards the choice of the locations (Ad Herenn., III, XVII – XIX),  it 
is recommended that: there are many; they are arranged in series (because it 
is easier to recall something that is arranged in order); consistent in the 
																																								 																				
24 Cicero, Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, XVI. 
29, op. cit., pp. 208 – 209: “By backgrounds I mean such scenes as are naturally or 
artificially set off on a small scale, complete and conspicuous, so that we can grasp and 
embrace them easily by the natural memory – for example, a house, an intercolumnar 
space, a recess, an arch, or the like. An image is, as it were, a figure, mark, or portrait of the 
object we wish to remember; for example, if we wish to recall a horse, a lion, or an eagle, 
we must place its image in a definite background.” 
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memory system – to avoid creating confusion by combining, for example, 
places that differ too greatly from one another; they must be inserted in an 
empty, tranquil context – to avoid, for example, that the memory of the 
presence of many people passing through might disturb the memory; they 
must be well-defined – so the memory is not deceived; of the right 
dimensions so that they are constantly dominated by sight; they are 
illuminated in such a way as to guarantee that one part is not more so than 
another; and finally, they must be chosen in such a way that there is never 
more than thirty feet between them so that the passage from one place to the 
other is both easy and rapid, ensuring the interruption of the flow of images 
does not disturb the attention. Furthermore, the places can be either real or 
invented; however, if one decides to invent the mnemonic places, it is 
recommended that the imagination of the person who is going to use them is 
sufficiently strong to allow such an operation, to avoid running into 
difficulties with the aforementioned requirements. 
As regards the rules for the choice of the images (Ad Herenn., III, XX), 
the author explains that, as they have to be similar to the things that are to 
be memorised, they must be chosen on the basis of the similarity principle 
(similitudo).25 Since there are two types of things that one can remember, 
similarities can be of two kinds: similarities of objects (rerum similitudines) 
																																								 																				
25 Cicero, Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, XX. 
33, op. cit., pp. 212 – 213: “Quoniam ergo rerum similes imagines esse oportet, ex omnibus 
rebus nosmet nobis similitudines eligere debemus;” “Since, then, images must resemble 
objects, we ought ourselves to choose from all objects likenesses for our use.” 
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and similarities of words (verborum similitudines),26 where the objects (res) 
are both the objects and the physical reality that has an equivalent in the 
sensible world, and the subjects of the discourse and the words (verba) are 
the individual terms of the discourse. It is the nature of the soul that 
prescribes which images should be chosen to guarantee effective similarities 
for memorisation. For example, we know that something unusual attracts 
our attention much more than something that is commonplace, and we know 
that what attracts our attention is easier to remember; mnemonic images 
therefore have to be unusual or extraordinary, to humour the soul and thus 
reinforce the natural memory function. 
The memoria artificiosa, therefore has to imitate nature. This 
underlying assumption of mnemonic precepts must always be born in mind 
when reading mnemonic treatises. As a result, not only the mental places 
and images have to imitate the natural ones, but one must also use general 
criteria that concern the nature of thought and its functioning to define rules 
of artificial memory composition that are analogue to those of the natural 
memory. As we have seen earlier, whereas the choice of the places has to 
respect the criteria of order and regularity, the choice of the images favours 
																																								 																				
26 Cicero, Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, XX. 
33, op. cit., pp. 214 – 215: “Rerum similitudines exprimuntur cum summatim ipsorum 
negotiorum imagines comparamus; verborum similitudines constituuntur cum unius 
cuiusque nominis et vocabuli memoria imagine notatur;” “Likenesses of matter are formed 
when we enlist images that present a general view of the matter with which we are dealing; 
likenesses of words are established when the record of each single noun or appellative is 
kept by an image.” 
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the unusual, what is horrid, anything that is out of the ordinary and, in 
general, anything that is able to arouse marvel and thus attract attention.27 
The importance of the analogy but also the difficulties that arise from 
its use in the construction of the artificial memory system can also be seen 
in the distinction between rerum similitudines and verborum similitudines, 
that is, in the distinction that in medieval and Renaissance tradition was to 
become the distinction between the memoria rerum and memoria verborum. 
This is not only one of the most controversial and criticised questions in the 
mnemonic arts, but it is also the one where the greatest efforts have been 
made to make the discipline progress. Let us therefore analyse the examples 
for the choice of the imagines agentes offered by the author of Rhetorica ad 
Herennium. 
The choice of the images for the memoria rerum does not pose any 
great difficulty. The word res refers to the subjects and themes of the 
discourse, to the “objects of the discourse” and, as the material in question 
is legal, these are either concrete or at most, refer to situations that can 
easily be represented by images. 
 Let us suppose, for example, that we have to intervene in a court case 
in which the accused has poisoned a man, that the motive for the crime was 
the hope of inheriting, and that there are many witnesses and accomplices.  
We are forming a memory system about the whole case and we shall wish to put in our first 
memory locus an image to remind us of the accusation against our client. This is the image: 
“We shall imagine the man in question is lying ill in bed, if we know him personally. If we 
																																								 																				
27 See fig. 9. 
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do not know him, we shall yet take some one to be our invalid, but not a man of the lowest 
class, so that he may come to mind at once. And we shall place the defendant at the 
bedside, holding in his right hand a cup, in his left, tablets, and on the fourth finger a ram’s 
testicles. In this way we can have in memory the man who was poisoned, the witnesses, and 
the inheritance [Ad Herennium, III, XXIII. 39].” The cup would remind of the poisoning, the 
tablets, of the will or the inheritance, and the testicles of the ram through verbal similarity 
with testes – of the witnesses. The sick man is to be like the man himself, or like someone 
else whom we know (though not one of the anonymous lower classes). In the following loci 
we would put other counts in the charge, or the details of the rest of the case, and if we 
have properly imprinted the places and images we shall easily be able to remember any 
point that we wish to recall.28 
As Frances A. Yates clearly shows in this extract, it is not difficult to 
construct a memory system for the memoria rerum and its utility is clear. In 
fact, without even wanting to construct a memory system according to the 
rules of mnemonics, when we wish to remember a series of events or the 
elements of an occurrence, we resort naturally to analogies that create a 
relationship between them and allow us to remember them. The memoria 
rerum simply exploits this natural characteristic and makes it a conscious 
process through the use of codified rules that reproduce and perfect the 
functioning of the natural memory. 
It is worthwhile underlining that this point shows how a very specific 
but also minimal performance of the artificial memory in the ancient 
mnemonic arts, that is, that it guaranteed the memory function by means of 
the technical consolidation of the natural memory laws. This minimal 
performance demanded of the artificial memory is not surprising; on the 
																																								 																				
28 Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory, op. cit., pp. 11 – 12. 
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contrary, it can help understand the relationship that exists between the 
natural and artificial memory in greater detail and, more generally speaking, 
the relationship between the ars and nature. We have already said that the 
artificial memory does not substitute the natural one, but helps to make it 
more efficient. The instrument for this reinforcement exercise is the ars 
which, if it is to be effective, has to use and exalt the natural characteristics 
of the faculty of memory. The ars must therefore in an analogue 
relationship with nature, because it must neither substitute it nor correct it 
by modifying it, but rather exalt it through the perfection and guide of its 
very characteristics. 
The choice of the images becomes complicated when it is a matter of 
exercising the memoria verborum, that is, when one wants to construct a 
memory system to remember every single word of a speech. In fact, first 
and foremost, the memoria verborum requires the memorisation of a greater 
number of images compared to the memoria rerum.29 Furthermore, one must 
be able to find – or more simply, must succeed in finding – the phonetic or 
linguistic associations that are able to stimulate the memory, as Frances A. 
Yates once again so clearly shows in his comments on the example from Ad 
Herennium (III, XXI, 34) 
We are setting out to memorise this line of verse: “Iam domum itionem reges Atridae 
parant (And now their homecoming the kings, the sons of Atreus are making ready).” (…) 
It is to be memorised through two very extraordinary images. One is ‘Domitius raising his 
hands to heaven while he is lashed by the Marcii Reges’. The translator and editor of the 
																																								 																				
29 The relationship between words and images has to be one to one at least – if not 
greater, as we shall soon see. 
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text in the Loeb Edition (H. Caplan) explains in a note that ‘Rex was the name of one of the 
most distinguished families of the Marcian gens; the Dominitian, of plebeian origin, was 
likewise a celebrated gens’. The image may reflect some street scene in which Domitius of 
the plebeian gens (perhaps bloodstained to make him more memorable) is being beaten up 
by some members of the distinguished Rex family. It was perhaps a scene which the author 
himself had witnessed. Or perhaps it was a scene in some play. It was a striking scene in 
every sense of the word and therefore suitable as a mnemonic image. It was put on a place 
for remembering this line. The vivid image immediately brought to mind ‘Domitius-Reges’ 
and this reminded by sound resemblance of ‘domum itionem reges’. It thus exhibits the 
principles of a ‘memory for words’ image which brings to mind the words which the 
memory is seeking through their sound resemblance to the notion suggested by the image. 
(…) The other image for memorising the rest of the line is ‘Aesopus and Cimber being 
dressed for the rôles of Agamennon and Menelaus in Iphigenaia’. Aesopus was a well-
known tragic actor, a friend of Cicero; Cimber, evidently also an actor, is only mentioned 
in this text. (…) In the image these actors are being dressed to play the parts of the sons of 
Atreus (Agamennon and Menelaus). It is an exciting off-stage glimpse of two famous 
actors being made up (to smear an image with red paint makes it memorable according to 
the rules) and dressed for their parts. Such a scene has all the elements of a good mnemonic 
image; we therefore use it to remember ‘Atridae parant’, the sons of Atreus are making 
ready. This image immediately gave the word ‘Atridae’ (though not by sound resemblance) 
and also suggested ‘making ready’ for the home-coming through the actors making ready 
for the stage.30 
Although this example is particularly apt, because the author of 
Rhetorica ad Herennium has little difficulty in finding phonetic analogies or 
references to moments of the cultural life of his time that can arouse 
attention and help the soul remember, it is immediately clear that the 
discovery of similar analogies is not always immediate; on the contrary, one 
might come up against difficulties in having to exert more memory than one 
would with the natural memory, if one simply wanted to memorise the 
passage without constructing an artificial memory system. 
																																								 																				
30 Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory, op. cit., pp. 13 – 14. 
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It is on the difficulties linked to the memoria verborum that the main 
criticism of the use of the mnemonic arts concentrate, as we shall now see 
with both Cicero and Quintilian. The most common argument against 
mnemotechnics was directed at none other than the utility of a technique 
that, to memorise a speech with a certain number of words, requires of the 
memory an effort that makes it not only memorise a number of images that 
exceeds the number of words in the speech, but also makes it create 
analogies that I might not remember, and which could elude me because 
they have no basis in reality.  
As an indirect response to this criticism this might be why the part of 
Rhetorica ad Herennium dedicated to the ars memoriae ends with several 
practical recommendations concerning the study of the technique that has 
just been illustrated. In particular the first recommendation is that the pupil 
must be left free to choose his own places and his own images. The author 
of Rhetorica ad Herennium criticises the general didactics of the authors of 
Greek rhetoric manuals, which consisted in providing long lists of 
previously codified images that were ready to use. This pedagogical 
approach to the mnemonic arts is considered to be wrong because it does 
not take into account the nature of attention and memory that, as we have 
seen earlier, are kept awake by the things and associations that strike them 
the most and arouse a sense of marvel in each of us. By providing a list of 
mnemonic places and images, the pupil is really being made to exert his/her 
memory with results that might prove unproductive, should these images 
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not be able to arouse his/her attention and the natural memory faculty. 
Finally, the last recommendation, which is still directed at overcoming the 
criticism of the memoria verborum, concerns the need for daily mnemonic 
practice. Both those with a strong natural memory and those who have an 
expert artificial memory cannot avoid dedicating time to exercising the 
artificial memory every day because it is only by returning each day to the 
places of memory and going back over the places and images placed there 
with an internal view that one assures the memorisation that must guarantee 
the orator the mastery of the discourse he is to recite from memory. Daily 
exercise is also fundamental for the memoria verborum because it is through 
habit that the less immediate analogies become more obvious and, as it 
were, one becomes used to recognising and “seeing them” straight away. 
 
 
2.1.2 Cicero, De Oratore 
The De Oratore was written in 55 BC and represents Cicero’s mature 
conception of rhetoric as a discipline that must not only be based on the 
rules of the school, but also on a broader cultural education of the orator that 
also includes philosophy and history. The work, which is presented as a 
Platonic philosophical dialogue, includes not only the precepts of rhetoric 
but also, and above all, reference to the general principles these are based on 
This approach can also be seen in his treatment of memory, so that of 
all the Latin sources, it is Cicero’s that dwells more on the general and 
 57 
philosophical principles that we have said are: the distinction between 
natural and artificial memory, the concept of order, the function of marvel in 
learning, the analogy as an imitation of nature, and the superiority of sight 
over the other senses. However, just like the anonymous author of Ad 
Herennium, Cicero does not make the principles of the mnemonic arts the 
object of his treatise either, and limits himself to highlighting that it is 
thanks to these that mnemonic rules constitute a valid aid for the orator. 
Taking into account Cicero’s importance in the diffusion of Greek 
philosophy in Rome, this choice of his is a valid example of the distinction 
that was introduced between the memory theories and ars memoriae. 
Cicero begins the section on memory31 by explaining its advantage, 
use and importance for the orator and says that, even if nature is the main 
source for memory, there is no doubt that it can also be reinforced and 
improved by practice. In response to those who believe that the ars 
memoriae does not help the natural memory because it burdens the natural 
faculty, Cicero says that mnemotechnics are not a substitute for the natural 
faculty, but are able to strengthen it if it is weak.32  
																																								 																				
31 Cicero, De oratore, II, LXXXV. 350 – LXXXVIII. 360, op. cit., pp. 462 – 473. 
32 Cicero deals with this criticism in reference to the opportunity to speak of ars 
referring to the mnemonic arts, and not of the natural characteristics of the faculty of 
memory, Cicero, De oratore, II, LXXXVIII. 356, op. cit., pp. 468 – 469: “Quare confiteor 
equidem huius boni naturam esse principem, sicut  earum rerum de quibus ante locutus 
sum, omnium: sed haec ars tota dicendi, sive artis imago quaedam et similitudo est, habet 
hanc vim, non ut totum aliquid cuius in ingeniis nostris pars nulla sit, pariat et procreet, 
verum ut ea quae sunt orta iam in nobis et procreata, educet atque confirmet;” “And 
consequently for my own part I confess that the chief source of this endowment, as of all 
the things I have spoken of before, is nature; but the efficacy of the whole of this science, 
or perhaps I should say pseudoscience, of rhetoric, is not that it wholly originates and 
engenders something no part of which is already present in our minds, but that it fosters and 
strengthens things that have already sprung to birth within us.” 
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Cicero therefore also accepts and places the distinction between the 
memory as a natural faculty and the artificial memory as the fruit of the 
application of an ars as the foundation of mnemonics. Unlike the author of 
Ad Herennium, what Cicero is trying to do is justify the utility of the ars 
and, in doing so, recalls and illustrates the fundamental principles of the 
mnemonic arts, which concern the nature of the soul and knowledge. The 
two fundamental principles he refers to are the principle of order, thanks to 
which the memoria artificiosa constructs a copy of the real order, and the 
principle of the superiority of sight over the other senses, founded on a 
theory of perception, according to which sensorial experience must be 
deposited in the soul in the form of images. 
The two principles are placed in relation to one another and illustrated 
by the story that attributes the invention of the mnemonic arts to the poet 
Simonides of Ceos. According to the story, Simonides is in Thessaly, in 
Crannon, invited to dinner at the house of Scopa, a wealthy, noble man. It is 
precisely in honour of his illustrious guest that Simonides had composed an 
ode, which he wanted to embellish with numerous references to Castor and 
Pollux. Annoyed by the fact that the ode in his honour does not only speak 
of him, he tells him that, instead of paying the sum they had agreed upon in 
advance, he would only give him half and he should make Tyndarids give 
him the other half. Shortly afterwards, Simonides was summoned outside 
the palace, where he was told that two young men were looking for him and 
waiting at the door. He got up and went out, but saw nobody. In the 
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meanwhile the room where the banquet was being held collapsed, and 
Scopa and his countless relatives all died. Simonides was the only one who 
was saved, summoned away by two young men who could not be seen. 
When the relatives of the dead wanted to bury them, they were unable to 
identify them. It was only with Simonides’ help, who remembered the 
seating arrangement of the guests in the room, that they were able to 
identify the corpses. 
It was this tale that gave the poet the idea that order was a 
fundamental element in remembering33 and Simonides’ merit lies in having 
understood that memory is based on the use of order because it uses sight, 
which is the sharpest of all the senses. This also explains the importance of 
mental places that are suitable to house the images. In fact, according to the 
theory of perception that Cicero refers to, images of the objects transmitted 
by the senses are deposited in our mind and, since the images are of bodies 
and the bodies can be recognised if they are inside a place, it is appropriate 
and correct to use a system of mental places where mental images can be 
placed.34  
																																								 																				
33 Cicero, De Oratore, II, LXXXVI. 353-354, op. cit., pp. 466 – 467: “[…] hac tum re 
admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxime, qui memoriae lumen afferret. Itaque eis, 
qui hanc partem ingeni exercerent, locos esse capiendos et ea quae memoria tenere vellent 
effigenda animo atque in eis locis collocanda: sic fore ut ordinem rerum locorum ordo 
conservaret, res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret […];” “[…] and that this circumstance 
suggested to him the discovery of the truth that the best aid to clearness of memory consists 
in orderly arrangement. He inferred that persons desiring to train this faculty must select 
localities and form mental images of the facts they wish to remember and store those 
images in the localities, with the result that the arrangement of the localities will preserve 
the order of the facts, and the images of the facts will designate the facts themselves […].” 
34 Cicero, De Oratore, II, LXXXVII. 358, op. cit., pp. 468 – 469: “His autem formis 
atque corporibus, sicut omnibus quae sub aspectum veniunt sede opus est, etenim corpus 
intellegi sine loco non potest;” “But these forms and bodies, like all the things that come 
 60 
As regards the rules of mnemotechnics, Cicero evokes – in varying 
detail – the precepts as they were set out in Rhetorica ad Herennium and it 
is therefore of little use looking into them here. What is interesting, 
however, is what he says on the subject of the memoria verborum and the 
memoria rerum.  
Sed verborum memoria, quae minus est nobis necessaria, maiore imaginum varietate 
distinguitur; multa enim sunt verba quae quasi articuli connectunt membra orationis quae 
formari similitudine nulla possunt; eorum fingendae nobis sunt imagines quibus semper 
utamur; rerum memoria propria est oratoris; eam singulis personis bene positis notare 
possumus ut sententias imaginibus, ordinem locis comprehendamus.35 
The memory of things is the own part of the orator’s discourse, to 
which the precepts of the mnemonic arts are applied to perfection. In fact, 
the orator has to compose and recite discourses, the object of which are 
concrete examples of everyday life, for which there is no difficulty in 
finding images in the sensitive reality. The memory of words, on the other 
hand, is the more difficult part of the mnemonic arts because there are 
words that cannot be represented analogically by any object. Here Cicero is 
not thinking of abstract words and refers, for example, to parts of discourse 
such as conjunctions. For these words, which cannot be represented 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
under our view require an abode, inasmuch as a material object without a locality is 
inconceivable.” 
35 Cicero, De oratore, II, LXXXVIII. 359, op. cit., pp. 470 – 471: “But a memory for 
words, which for us is less essential, is given distinctness by a greater variety of images; for 
there are many words which serve as joints connecting the limbs of the sentence, and these 
cannot be formed by any use of simile – of these we have model images for constant 
employment; but a memory for things is the special property of the orator – this we can 
imprint on our minds by a skillful arrangement of the several masks that represent them, so 
that we may grasp ideas by means of images and their order by means of localities.” 
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analogically by images, Cicero recommends using a certain number of fixed 
images that can be repeated in each new memory system.36  
Here Cicero perceives a limit of the artificial memory that is 
intimately linked to the principle of the pre-eminence of the sense of sight 
and the fact that the possibility of a spatial memory is based on this. The 
problem is that natural images for each word do not exist because there are 
words that do not refer to objects in the physical reality. Therefore, to 
represent the words that have no reference in nature, one has to adopt a 
conventional number of images that will be attributed with the same 
meaning in the different artificial memory systems that the mnemonist will 
create. 
Cicero’s solution is both valid and logical, but from a philosophical 
point of view it brings to the fore a problem that is destined to erode the 
reliability of the mnemonic arts as an ars that is able to imitate nature and 
guarantee an order amongst the mental images that corresponds to the order 
of the perceived reality. In other words, Cicero leaves unanswered both the 
question regarding the reference of the words to objects they represent and 
the question of the correspondence of the natural order with the perceived 
reality. As we shall see, it is the latter problem that is to reappear clearly 
during the Renaissance and it will be one of the difficulties of the mnemonic 
arts to whose solution Bruno will try to associate his name with. 
 
																																								 																				
36 This type of expedient refers to the birth of stenography, which Plutarch attributes 
to Cicero: Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory, op. cit., n. 16, p. 15. 
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2.1.3 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 
Institutio oratoria is Quintilian’s main work (probably started in 93 
AD and published in all probability in 96 AD) and in it, the maestro of 
rhetoric presents his programme of cultural and moral reform. Of all the 
classical sources, Quintilian’s treatise on the ars memoriae is the one that 
presents the greatest number of doubts and criticism against the pedagogical 
use of mnemonics. Its importance as a source lies in this aspect and this is 
what I shall look at in more detail, to reveal the criticality of the ars 
memoriae, that is, the points on which efforts to improve the technique 
concentrate on. 
The chapter on the ars memoriae37 can be divided into three sections: 
memory as a natural faculty (Inst. or., XI, II, 1 – 10); critical description of 
the ars memoriae (Inst. or., XI, II, 11 – 26); some suggestions and 
recommendations for memorising the texts that are beyond the precepts of 
classical mnemonics (Inst. or., XI, II, 27 – 51).  
Quintilian begins book XI with extolling memory, which most – 
rightly so – regard as a gift of nature, but which one can  - and an orator has 
to – consolidate through practice. One has to understand, however, what 
kind of exercise is more effective in pursuing the consolidation of the 
memory. Quintilian, here in the guise of a maestro of rhetoric and interested 
in its pedagogical aspects, is highly sceptical as regards the use of the 
mnemonic arts, that is regards the use of imposing an artificial memory 
																																								 																				
37 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XI, II. 1 –  51, op. cit., pp. 210 – 243. 
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system on the natural memory; instead, he is more inclined to exercise and 
directly strengthen the natural memory itself. As we shall see, however, this 
does not stop Quintilian from presenting the teachings of the mnemonic arts 
and he encourages students of rhetoric to learn and use this technique, albeit 
only in the measure that each may find it useful.  
According to Quintilian, memory is the fundamental element in the 
process of learning and knowledge because it makes it possible to keep 
together the individual lessons given by teachers to their pupils together as a 
systematic whole and because it allows one to have a reserve of examples, 
laws, sayings, and all those elements that a good orator needs when 
composing his discourse. Memory, however, is not considered to be a 
passive faculty: together with thought (cogitatio), memory is intent on the 
composition (inventio) and arrangement (elocutio) of the subjects of a 
discourse.38 Memory is an extraordinary faculty that, on the one hand acts 
																																								 																				
38 Quintilian links this active aspect of memory to Plato’s criticism in Phaedrus, 275 
A, op. cit., pp. 274 – 275: perhaps Plato meant that once we have entrusted what we want to 
say to pen and paper, we are no longer involved in the first person: “Quod et ipsum 
argumentum est subesse artem aliquam iuvarique ratione naturam, cum idem docti facere 
illud, indocti inexercitatique non possimus. Quanquam invenio apud Platonem obstare 
memoriae usum litterarum, videlicet quoniam illa, quae scriptis reposuimus, velut custodire 
desinimus et ipsa securitate dimittimus. Nec dubium est quin plurimum in hac parte valeat 
mentis intentio et velut acies luminum a prospectu rerum, quas intuetur, non aversa. Unde 
accidit, ut quae per plures dies scribimus ediscendi causa, cogitatione ipsa contineamus;” 
“This fact may even be advanced as an argument that there must be some art of memory 
and that the natural gift can be helped by reason, since training enables us to do things 
which we cannot do before we have had any training or practice. On the other hand, I find 
that Plato asserts that the use of written characters is a hindrance to memory, on the ground, 
that is that once we have committed a thing to writing, we cease to guard it in our memory 
and lose it out of sheer carelessness. And there can be no doubt that concentration of mind 
is of the utmost importance in this connection; it is, in fact, like the eyesight, which turns 
to, and nota way from, the objects which it contemplates. Thus it results that after writing 
for several days with a view to acquiring by heart what we have written, we find that our 
mental effort has of itself imprinted it on our memory,” Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI, 
II. 9 – 10, op. cit., pp. 216 – 217. 
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almost autonomously, since it is not always possible to decide what should 
be remembered (very often we find it easier to remember things that 
happened in the distant past than in more recent times) and at times, on the 
contrary, it is the case that it is memory itself that presents us with a 
memory without us recalling something from our memory. In addition to 
this spontaneous characteristic of memory, however, our experience shows 
that memory and reason help each other reciprocally and, this might be a 
demonstration of the fact that there must also be an aspect of memory that is 
not natural, one that is entrusted to an ars, and one that is able to make this 
collaboration more fruitful. 
According to Quintilian, one can certainly make suggestions and 
recommendations to strengthen the natural memory and without a doubt 
great concentration and a perceptive eye, as well as repeated, constant 
practice can also help memorisation, as Simonides’ story showed. The 
veracity of attributing this invention to Simonides aside,39 it would appear 
that this event resulted in the observation that memory can be assisted if one 
uses places to memorise things. Unlike Cicero, who found justification in 
the principle of the superiority of sight over the other senses, Quintilian 
refers to common experience to justify the use of loci and says that this is 
something we all have knowledge of: indeed, how many of us have 
experience returning to a place after much time has gone by and 
																																								 																				
39 Quintilian starts the second section of book XI by telling the story of Simonides, 
the inventor of the ars memoriae, as handed down from Cicero; he also adds a philological 
comment and concludes that he believes it is a myth because Simonides never mentions 
this occurrence and he would surely have spoken about it if such an extraordinary event had 
actually happened: Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, XI, II. 11 – 16, op. cit., pp. 217 – 221. 
 65 
remembering people and things, but also speeches made in that place? This 
is therefore at the origin of the technique of the ars memoriae.40 
According to Quintilian this technique is invaluable if one has to 
memorise long lists of words, for example when we have to remember a list 
of objects;41 however, when it is a case of memorising a speech, it is of very 
little use and even risks compromising the natural memory. First of all, 
because ideas do not have the same images as objects and this means having 
																																								 																				
40 Quintilian is the only author who describes in detail of how rhetoric students were 
taught the ars and this is why is testimony is of such importance. Quintilian, Institutio 
oratoria, XI, II. 18 – 20, op. cit., pp. 220 – 223: “Loca deligunt quam maxime spatiosa, 
multa varietate signata, domum forte magnam et in multo diductam recessus. In ea 
quidquid notabile est animo diligenter adfigunt, ut sine cunctatione ac mora partis eius 
omnis cogitatio possit percurrere. Et primus hic labor est non haerere in occursu: plus enim 
quam firma debet esse memoria, quae aliam memoriam adiuvet. Tum quae scripserunt vel 
cogitatione complectuntur aliquo signo quo moneantur notant, quod esse vel ex re tota 
potest, ut de navigatione, militia, vel ex verbo aliquo; nam etiam excidentes unius 
admonitione verbi in memoriam reponuntur. Sit autem signum navigationis ut ancora, 
militiae ut aliquid ex armis. Haec ita digerunt: primum sensum vestibulo quasi adsignant, 
secundum atrio, tum impluvia circuevunt, nec cubiculis modo aut exhedris, sed statuis 
etiam similibusque per ordinem committunt. Hoc facto, cum est repetenda memoria, 
incipiunt ab initio loca haec recensere, et quod cuique crediderunt reposcunt, ut eorum 
imagine admonentur. Ita, quamlibet multa sint quorum meminisse oporteat, fiunt singula 
conexa quodam choro, nec errant coniungentes prioribus consequentia solo ediscendi 
labore;” “Some place is chosen of the largest possible extent and characterised by the 
utmost possible variety, such as a spacious house divided into a number of rooms. 
Everything of note therein is carefully committed to the memory, in order that the thought 
may be enabled to run through all the details without let or hindrance. And undoubtedly the 
first task is to secure that there shall be no delay in finding any single detail, since an idea 
which is to lead by association to some other idea requires to be fixed in the mind with 
more than ordinary certitude. The next step is to distinguish something which has been 
written down on merely thought of by some particular symbol which will serve to jog the 
memory; this symbol may have reference to the subject as a whole, it may, for example, be 
drawn from navigation, warfare, etc., or it may, on the other hand, be found in some 
particular word. (For even in cases of forgetfulness one single word will serve to restore the 
memory). However, let us suppose that the symbol is drawn from navigation, as, for 
instance, an anchor: or from warfare, as, for example, some weapon. The symbols are then 
arranged as follows. The first thought is placed, as it were, in the forecourt; the second, let 
us say, in the living-room; the remainder are placed in due order all round the impluvium 
and entrusted not merely to bedrooms and parlours, but even to the care of statues and the 
like. This done, as soon as the memory of the facts requires to be revived, al these places 
are visited in turn and the various deposits are demanded from their custodians, as the sight 
of each recalls the respective details. Consequently, however large the number of these 
which it is required to remember, all are linked one to the other like dancers hand in hand, 
and there can be no mistake since they join what precedes to what follows, no trouble being 
required except the preliminary labour of committing the various points of memory.” 
41 See fig. 8. 
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to devise a different sign for each idea.42 By saying this Quintilian has no 
intention of starting a philosophical reflection on the existing relationship 
between the content of thought and what it refers to in the sensible reality. 
What interests the maestro who is working on the definition of more 
effective pedagogical instruments to teach rhetoric is simply to highlight a 
difficulty that lies in the unwarranted multiplication of images to be 
memorised. This difficulty alone would suffice as an argument against the 
true usefulness of the artificial memory; however, Quintilian also harbours 
doubts about the possibility of memorising efficiently even the structure of a 
discourse by resorting to the loci system – once again, he is convinced that 
the only thing one is doing is overloading the natural memory with elements 
to be memorised.43  
The book ends with further suggestions and recommendations to 
memorise texts (Inst. or., XI, ii, 27-51) that are based on exercising the 
natural memory and not on a complex construction of an artificial memory 
system. For example, Quintilian recommends working on the composition 
																																								 																				
42 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI, II. 24, op. cit., pp. 224 – 225: “Minus idem 
proderit in ediscendis, quae orationis perpetuae erunt. Nam et sensus non eadem imaginem 
quam res habent, cum alterum fingendum ist […];” “It will, however, be of less service in 
thoughts do not call up the same images as material things, and a symbol requires to be 
specially invented for them […].” 
43  It is interesting to observe how Quintilian does question the possibility of 
constructing an artificial memory system using the rules of mnemotechnics, but is only 
interested in evaluating and discussing the true utility of the ars. He is not interested in 
whether there are two memories, a natural and an artificial one and, on the contrary, he 
seems intent on accepting the real possibility of creating an artificial memory. It is because 
he is considering the difficulty of mnemotechnics only from the perspective of its utility 
that he deems the difficulty highlighted by Cicero regarding conjunctions and all the other 
parts of discourse that cannot immediately be associated with images, as a difficulty that is 
easy to overcome. As Cicero suggested, one only needs to establish a fixed series of images 
that act as symbols for the parts of discourse that have no correlate in the sensible reality. 
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of the discourse text itself and on its structure, to facilitate memorisation. If 
the discourse is well-structured, the rhetoric maestro says, and made up of 
independent sections, each of which corresponds to just one subject and is 
easy to identify compared to the others, it will be easier to train the natural 
memory to remember this discourse because it will remember the thematic 
blocks rather than the entire text. 
According to Quintilian, this expedient alone, which is accompanied 
by the recommendation to compose well-structured discourses, is more 
effective than daily practice at guaranteeing the orator will be able to 
memorise the discourses he is to recite from memory or the knowledge of 
the subject being studied, without having to resort to the construction of an 
artificial memory system.44 
 
 
2.2 Greek philosophical sources for the mnemonic arts: Aristotle’s doctrine 
of the soul 
Aristotle is an authoritative witness of the diffusion of the mnemonic 
arts in ancient Greece. The four steps in which he refers to the use of rules 
for the creation of an artificial memory system are:45 De anima, 427b, 18; 
																																								 																				
44 The suggestion and implicit objection appear obvious; however, one could also 
interpret something else in them. I believe that Quintilian does not realise that what he has 
suggested is linked to the spatial precepts of mnemotechnics and, on the contrary, shows 
how this practice has already even pervaded and influenced composition and the writing of 
texts. 
45 Richard Sorabji, Aristotle on Memory, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press 
20042 (1972), p. 22. 
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De imsomniis, 458b20 – 22; De memoria et reminiscentia, 452a12 – 16; 
Topica, VIII. XIV, 163b, 17-29. 
In the first two passages Aristotle offers as an example of mental 
image what the mnemonists say should be done when creating an artificial 
memory system. 
 […] for it is possible to call up mental pictures, as those do who employ images in 
arranging their ideas under a mnemonic system [πρὸ ὀµµάτων γὰρ ἒστι ποιήσασθαι, ὧσπερ 
οἱ ἐν τοῖσ µνηµονικοῖς τιθέµενοι καὶ εὶδωλοποιοῦντες] […]46 
These images, he says, are similar to the ones we find in the 
imagination as a product of sensorial experience, but they are also similar to 
the images we have when asleep 
And so in sleep we sometimes have other thoughts besides the mental pictures. This will 
become obvious to anyone if he concentrates and tries to remember his dream immediately 
upon rising. Indeed some men have seen such dreams, e.g., those who think that they are 
arranging suggested subjects according to some principle of memorizing [ἢδη δέ τινες καὶ 
ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα οἷον οἱ δοκοῦντες κατὰ τὸ µνηµονικὸν παράγγελµα τίθεσται τὰ 
προβαλλόµεωαι]; for they often find themselves envisaging some other imaginary concept, 
apart from the dream, into position.47 
Aristotle wants to underline that, just like the mental images of the 
mnemonists, the images that are in our imagination or that we see in our 
																																								 																				
46 Aristotle, De anima, III. III, 427 b, 18, in Id., On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On 
Breath, trans. by W. S. Hett, Cambridge (MA) – London, The Loeb Classical Library, 1986 
(1936), pp. 156 – 157. 
47 Aristotle, De insomniis, I, 458b, 19 – 22, in Id., On the Soul. Parva Naturalia. On 
Breath, trans. by W. S. Hett, Cambridge (MA) – London, The Loeb Classical Library, 1986 
(1936), pp. 350 – 351. 
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sleep, do not have a correlate present in reality at the moment we see them, 
but still enable the soul to carry out mental operations on them. 
In the other two passages in which Aristotle discusses the example of 
those who practice mnemotechnics, the philosopher is discussing the 
importance of the ordered arrangement in both the recollection and 
construction of the argumentation of a discourse. 
This is why acts of recollection are achieved soonest and most successfully when they start 
from the beginning of a series; for just as the objects are related to each other in an order of 
succession, so are the impulses. Those subjects which possess an orderly arrangement, like 
mathematical problems, are the easiest to recollect; ill-arranged subjects are recovered with 
difficulty. It is in that the difference between recollecting and learning afresh lies, that in 
the former one will be able in some way to move on by his own effort to the term next after 
the starting-point. When he cannot do this himself, but only through another agency, he no 
longer remembers. It often happens that one cannot recollect at the moment, but can do so 
by searching, and finds what he wants. This occurs by his initiating many impulses, until at 
last he initiates one such that i twill lead to the object of his search. For remembering 
consists in the potential existence in the mind of the effective stimulus; and this, as has 
been said, in such a way that the subject is stimulated from himself, and from the stimuli 
which he contains within him. But one must secure a starting-point. This is why some 
people seem, in recollecting, to proceed from loci. The reason for this is that they pass 
rapidly from one step to the next; for instance from milk to white, from white to air, from 
air to damp; from which one remembers autumn, if this is the season that he is trying to 
recall.48 
The ability of the soul to recall  what it has experienced in the past is 
not the result of a single particular mental act; instead, it is the result of a 
concatenation of mental acts aimed at identifying and choosing what one 
																																								 																				
48 Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscentia, II, 452a, 2 – 16, in Id., On the Soul. Parva 
Naturalia. On Breath, transl. by W. S. Hett, Cambridge (MA) – London, The Loeb 
Classical Library, 1986 (1936), pp. 302 – 305. 
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wants to recall in one’s memory. The emphasis of this procedural and not 
punctual aspect of the memory faculty characterises Aristotle’s theory of the 
soul as being more interested in the temporal than the spatial aspect of the 
memory 
You ought thoroughly to learn arguments dealing with questions of frequent occurrence 
and especially primary propositions; for answerers often become discouraged in dealing 
with these. Moreover, you should have a good supply of definitions and have those familiar 
and primary ideas ready to hand; for it is by means of these that reasonings are carried on. 
You should also try and grasp the categories into which the other arguments most often fall. 
For just as in geometry it is useful to have a ready knowledge of the multiplication table up 
to ten times helps much to the recognition of the other numbers which are the result of 
multiplication, so too in arguments it is important to be prompt about first principles and to 
know your premisses by heart. For just as to a trained memory [καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ 
µνηµονικῷ µόνον] the mere reference to the places in which they occur causes the things 
themselves to be remembered, so the above rules will make a man a better reasoner, 
because he sees the premisses defined and numbered. A premiss of general application 
should be committed to memory rather than an argument, since it is pretty difficult to have 
a first principle or hypothesis ready to hand.49 
Likewise, when we want to reconstruct an argument, it is better to do 
so by placing each part of the latter in the general rule, thanks to which we 
confirm its validity. In fact, it is easier for us to remember general rules than 
specific cases; but if we place a specific case within its rule, as if the rule 
were a mnemonic locus, it will also be easier to recall a particular case, 
starting with the general one. 
																																								 																				
49 Aristotle, Topica, VIII. xiv, 163b, 17-29, in Id., Posterior Analitics. Topica, trans. 
by E. S. Forster, Cambridge (MA) – London, The Loeb Classical Library, 1966 (1960), pp. 
734 – 735. 
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In addition to being testimony to the diffusion and importance of 
mnemonics in the ancient Greek world, Aristotle is one of the most 
important philosophical sources for the history of mnemotechnics, in 
particular for the mediaeval period, as we shall see in the following 
paragraph. The texts mediaeval mnemonists refer to in their works are the 
two Aristotelian treatises of psychology, De Anima, and its appendix, De 
Memoria et Reminiscentia.50 
Aristotle’s De Anima is a treatise on the functions of the soul and is 
where he presents his theory of knowledge. According to the author, all 
knowledge comes from the sensorial impressions that the five senses send to 
the mind. The perceptions, which are introduced into the mind through the 
senses, are elaborated by the imaginative faculty and transformed into 
images. These images are the material of the intellectual faculty that 
therefore always thinks in images. 
With this theory of perception as his starting point in De Memoria et 
Reminiscentia Aristotle explains that the memory (µνήµη, mnéme) belongs 
to the same part of the soul as the imagination. The latter is therefore also a 
collection of mental images that are derived from sensorial impressions but, 
as such, it is not something that is characteristic of man since animals also 
have a memory. The singular aspect of the human memory is that thought 
can act upon it and thus retrieve either a sensation or knowledge that it had 
earlier (ἀνάµνησις, anamnesi), making a deliberate effort that is based on 
																																								 																				
50 Aristotle, De anima, op. cit.; Aristotle, De memoria et reminiscentia, op. cit. 
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the association by similarity and the principle of order. Therefore, the 
characteristics of the mental images that define the specific memory of man, 
anamnesis, is that they contain a temporal element, in as much as they are 
derived from the perception of things in the past.51 
 
 
2.3 Mediaeval sources for the mnemonic arts (1): Albertus Magnus and 
Thomas Aquinas 
The history of the reception of the Aristotelian doctrine on the soul 
and memory is interwoven with the history of the mnemonic arts in the 
Middle Ages, producing that change in function of the mnemonic arts 
within the system of mediaeval knowledge so that the ars memoriae goes 
from being part of rhetoric to being part of ethics; it thus also becomes an 
instrument of predication in the greater religious orders.52  
This change in function is owing to an error of attribution in the 
reception of Rhetorica ad Herennium and the comprehension of the 
principles of the mnemonic arts it describes through Aristotle’s works on 
the soul. In the Middle Ages it was believed that Rhetorica ad Herennium, 
also known as rhetorica secunda, was the completion of Cicero’s De 
																																								 																				
51 A profound difference between mnemotechnics and memory theories emerges 
here. By virtue of this principle the mnemonic arts can be defined as “spatial memories”, in 
as much as they underline to a greater degree the spatial aspect of the artificial memory, 
while the philosophical theories of memory, starting with Aristotle, underline to a greater 
degree the temporal aspect of the memory function, that is, of the memoria naturalis. For 
more about the distinction between “spatial memory” and “temporal memory” see: Mary 
Carruthers, The Craft of Thought. Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400 - 
1200, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003 (1998), pp. 12 - 13. 
52 For more about the role of the ars memoriae in the ars predicandi see: Paolo 
Rossi, Clavis universalis, op. cit., pp. 38 – 43. 
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Inventione, which was therefore called rhetorica prima. The erroneous 
attribution of Rhetorica ad Herennium to Cicero meant that the two rhetoric 
works had to be read together, as if one was a complement of the other; in 
fact, De Inventione, Cicero’s first rhetoric work, is an uncompleted one in 
which great attention is paid to ethics and virtue. According to this 
interpretation, Cicero had written rhetorica secunda to complete rhetorica 
prima, presenting the rules for a technique to remember the ethical subjects 
discussed in the first work. Rhetorica ad Herennium and its analysis of 
memory thus became where Cicero had looked at the subject of memory in 
closer detail in reference to the system of virtues and ethics he had 
discussed in De Inventione. 
This is the first moment in the history of the mnemonic arts and the 
history of memory theories in which the two fields intersect tangibly and for 
the first time the mnemonic arts are explicitly connected to philosophical 
interpretations on memory and, in particular, to the Aristotelian conception 
of the soul. In Aristotle’s philosophy, the greatest philosophical authority in 
the Middle Ages, we have seen that there were doctrines that could easily be 
led back to the principles of mnemotechnics and used to found precepts 
philosophically. There were four Aristotelian doctrines that were referred to. 
The first is the conception of a double memory, which was made to coincide 
with the mnemonic distinction between the natural memory and artificial 
memory (where the former was the memory in the proper meaning of the 
word or mnéme and the artificial memory was the anamnesi). The second is 
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the doctrine of images (φάντασµα), according to which the image is a sort 
of weakened sensation, because it lacks material, and is the condition of 
possibility of the memory, which is understood as the ability to recall 
sensations to the mind, that is, what we experienced. This doctrine implies 
that there is a very close tie between sensation, imagination and memory. 
The third doctrine concerns the fact that memory (ἀνάµνησις) is facilitated 
by order and regularity. Finally, the fourth regards images and the fact that 
they are associated to ideas according to relationships of similarity, 
opposition and contiguity. 
The convergence of the mnemonic arts and the Aristotelian theory of 
the soul following this erroneous attribution of Rhetorica ad Herennium was 
the work of Albertus Magnus, and then reinforced by Thomas Aquinas, 
whose treatises make explicit reference to Rhetorica ad Herennium and 
Aristotle’s De Memoria et Reminiscentia. The starting point for both works 
is what Cicero says in De Inventione, when he says that the memory is part 
of prudence53 and, because he believes that art and virtue add perfection to 
nature, the precepts for the mnemonic arts were of fundamental importance 
in the discussion on memory as part of rhetoric. 
																																								 																				
53 Cicero, De inventione, II. 53, 160, in Id., II. De Inventione. De optimo genere 
oratorum. Topica, trans. by H. M. Hubbell, Cambridge (MA) – London, The Loeb 
Classical Library, 1976 (1949), p. 327: “Prudentia est rerum bonarum et malarum 
neutrarumque scientia. Partes eius: memoria, intellegentia, providentia. Memoria est per 
quam animus repetit illa quae fuerunt; intellegentia, per quam ea perspicit quae sunt; 
providentia, per quam futurum aliquid videtur ante quam factum est;” “Wisdom is the 
knowledge of what is good, what is bad and what is neither good nor bad. Its parts are 
memory, intelligence, and foresight. Memory is the faculty by which the mind recalls what 
has happened. Intelligence is the faculty by which it ascertains what is. Foresight is the 
faculty by which it is seen that something is going to occur before it occurs.” 
 75 
In De Bono 54  Albertus Magnus starts with Cicero’s definition of 
prudence and deals with all the precepts in Rhetorica ad Herennium. His 
attempt to combine Aristotle’s text with the pseudo-Cicero one can already 
be seen in his definition of prudence 
Dicimus, quod memoria est pars prudentiae, secundum quod memoria cadit in rationem 
reminiscentiae. Cum enim prudentia eligat ea quibus adiuvatur, ab his a quibus impeditur in 
opere, oportet ipsam procedere inquirendo et sic necesse est eam progredi a principio 
determinato et per media probabilia devenire in propositum operabile; et ideo cum 
proceditur ex praeteritis, utitur memoria, secundum quod est pars reminiscentiae.55 
And in his interpretation of order and arrangement 
(1) Dicendum ergo, quod repetere ea quae fuerunt, dupliciter contigit, scilicet ex potentia, 
et haec repetitio est in potentia tantum et imperfecta, eo quod non habeat habitum, unde 
procedere debet. Et est repetitio ex habitu, qua repetitur praeteritum, quando vult repetens. 
Et haec potest esse in habitu cognitivo, et tunc est theoretica et potest esse in habitu morali, 
et tunc est practica et est virtus pertinens ad prudentiam.56 
																																								 																				
54  S. Alberti Magni, De Bono, Tractatus quartus, Quaestio 2. De partibus 
prudentiae, Art. 1 Quid sit memoria – Art. 2 De arte memorandi, in Operum omnium, 
Tomus XXVIII, Monasterii Westfalorum in Aedibus Aschendorff, 1951, pp. 245 – 252. 
55 Albertus Magnus, De Bono, op. cit., p. 245 – 246: “Let us say that memory is a 
part of prudence, in as much as it is part of the essence of reminiscence. In fact, as prudence 
chooses what facilitates and not what hinders its action, one must proceed following a 
specific principle and through the possible one arrives at a possible action; and therefore, 
since it proceeds from things from the past, it uses memory, as it is part of reminiscence” 
(translation mine). 
56 Albertus Magnus, ivi: “‹1› One must stay that recalling past things occurs in two 
ways, that is, owing to a potentia, and this revocation is only in intensity and imperfect, 
because it does not have instructions for how it is to proceed. Then there is revocation on 
the strength of an instruction, with which, if one wants, one remembers the past. And this 
remembering can be a cognitive instruction, and then it is theoretical, and it can be a moral 
instruction, and then it is practical, and is a virtue that concerns prudence” (translation 
mine). 
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Similarly, in Summa theologiae57 , II, II, Quaestio XLIX, Art. 1 Thomas 
Aquinas sets out the four rules of the artificial memory taken from rethorica 
secunda and comments them referring to Aristotle. The first rule concerns 
the creation of images, which must not be ordinary, so they are able to 
arouse attention and awaken the memory; and one must seek similarities 
with the bodies, since human knowledge is more suited to the sensible 
objects (and this is also why the memory is in the sensitive part of the soul). 
The second rule deals with the principle of order: if one is to have no 
difficulty going from one memory to another, what we want to remember 
must be arranged tidily, and this is why what we want to recall in our mind 
is stimulated by the place it is in. The third rule claims that one must apply 
oneself with alacrity to mnemonic practice and the fourth rule that one must 
often re-examine what we want to remember, so that the habit this results in 
is almost a second nature of the memory. 
 
 
2.4 Mediaeval sources for the mnemonic arts (2): Augustine and Ramon 
Llull 
There is another mediaeval philosophical current that intersects with 
the ars memoriae and which must be mentioned if one is to understand the 
different souls of the mnemonic arts in the Renaissance. It is a tradition that 
developed in the Augustinian field and originated from none other that the 
																																								 																				
57 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II, II, Quaestio XLIX. De singulis partibus 
quasi integralibus. Articulus 1, Utrum memoria sit pars prudentiae, Marietti, Taurini 
Romae, 1952, pp. 248 – 249. 
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interpretation of memory that the philosopher and rhetorician Augustinian 
presented in his famous book X of the Confessions.58 
The memory model Augustine bases his reflections on is the 
mnemonic model, as is clear to see in the following passage 
Transibo ergo et istam naturae meae, gradibus ascendens ad eum qui fecit me, et venio in 
campos et lata praetorian memoriae, ubi sunt thesauri innumerabilium imaginum de 
cuiuscemodi rebus sensis invectarum. Ibi reconditum est quidquid etiam cogitamus, vel 
augendo vel minuendo vel utcumque variando ea quae sensus attigerit, et si quid aliud 
commendatum et repositum est quod nondum absorbuit et sepelivit oblivio, ibi quando 
sum, posco ut proferatur quidquid volo, et quaedam statim prodeunt, quaedam requiruntur 
diutius et tamquam de abstrusioribus quibusdam receptaculis eruuntur, quaedam catervatim 
se proruunt et, dum aliud petitur et quaeritur, prosiliunt in medium quasi dicentia, “ne forte 
nos sumus?” et abigo ea manu cordis a facie recordationis meae, donec enubiletur quod 
volo atque in conspectum prodeat ex abditis. Alia faciliter atque imperturbata serie sicut 
poscuntur suggeruntur, et cedunt praecedentia consequentibus et cedendo conduntur, iterum 
cum voluero processura. Quod totum fit cum aliquid narro memoriter.59 
																																								 																				
58 Augustine, Confessions, X. 8, in Augustine, Confessions, Books 9-13, ed. and 
trans. by Carolyn J.-B. Hammond, Cambridge (MA) – London, The Loeb Classical 
Library, 2016, pp. 86 – 89 
59 Augustine, ivi: “So I shall transcend even my natural life force, and climb in 
stages to him who made me. I come to the fields and spacious palaces of my memory, 
where there are treasure stores of countless impressions brought there from every 
imaginable kind of thing that my senses perceived. Stowed away there is everything we 
reflect upon either by accentuating or depreciating it or in any way whatever modifying the 
actual things which our sense apprehended; and anything else that has been preserved and 
deposited and that forgetfulness has not yet consumed and buried. When I am there, I call 
for whatever I want to be produced: some things are immediately forthcoming; others take 
longer to look for, and are, as it were, unearthed from more inaccessible places; and yet 
others cascade out in a rush, and while one particular item is searched and hunted for, they 
thrust themselves forward en masse as if saying “Can we be the ones?” With the hand of 
my heart I drive them away from the forefront of my recollection, until what I am after 
emerges from obscurity and comes out of hiding into plain sight. Other things are produced 
in the correct order as required, easily and without any fuss: and the earlier things make 
way for those that come later, and by making way they return into storage, ready to come 
forth again whenever I want them. This is exactly what happens when I recite something 
from memory.”  
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This passage is extraordinary because we have very few descriptions of 
what a mnemonist’s experience must have been when applying the ars.60 
What is striking is the fact that Augustine describes his memory system as if 
it were a real place he was drawing a map of. This leads us to understand 
that the mnemonic experience also meant one had to pay great attention, 
similar to meditational practices or prayer.61 It is therefore no surprise that 
the practice of artificial memory not only led Augustine to reflect on 
memory as a faculty of the soul, but also actually led him to see God in this 
faculty of extraordinary abilities. 
Augustine manages to see God in memory, and this is one of the main 
themes in book X of Confessions, distinguishing what is found in memory. 
If, for example, one names an animal or a stone, in our mind we can find an 
image of that reality outside us, even if it is not present in the senses at the 
																																								 																				
60 There are descriptions about how Thomas Aquinas worked, another great scholar 
of the mnemonic art as we have already seen, but there are no direct testimonies. Mary 
Carruthers cites this extract from a biography on Thomas Aquinas, written shortly after his 
death by Bernardo Gui: “Of the subtlety and brilliance of his intellect and the soundness of 
his judgment, sufficient proof is his vast literary output, his many original discoveries, his 
deep understanding of the Scriptures. His memory was extremely rich and retentive: 
whatever he had once read and grasped he never forgot; it was as if knowledge were ever 
increasing in his soul as page is added to page in the writing of a book. Consider, for 
example, that admirable compilation of Patristic texts that he had read and committed to 
memory from time to time while staying in various religious houses. Still stronger is the 
testimony of Reginald his socius and of his pupils and of those who wrote to his dictation, 
who all declare that he used to dictate in his cell to three secretaries, and even occasionally 
to four, on different subjects at the same time … No one could dictate simultaneously for 
things as yet unknown to him; he seemed simply to let his memory pout out its treasures 
[…],” in Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory, Cambridge University Press, 2008 (1990), 
p. 3. 
61 As Mary Carruthers often underlines, implicitly criticising Frances A. Yates who 
did not believe that the obscurity of the mnemonic arts is to be attributed to abandoned 
practices and therefore, to the faculty of the memory and the mind that changed as the 
result of a different use being made of them, but to the hermetical aspect of the ars 
memoriae. For more about this type of meditative experience associated with the ars 
memoriae, see also “A Little Book About Constructing Noah’s Arch”, in Mary Carruthers, 
Jon Ziolkowski (ed.), The Medieval Craft of Memory. An Anthology of Texts and Pictures, 
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002, pp. 41 – 70. 
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moment we are remembering it. When, however, we mention beauty, health 
or even memory, in what form are these realities present in our memory? 
Certainly not like the images that come from the senses, and we have to 
conclude that in our mind there are images we can refer to with words for 
the sensible objects, but there are no images for general concepts, which are 
the result of an elaboration of images for the sensible objects. By continuing 
the elaboration of memory in this fashion, Augustine finds God, who is 
neither an image and nor is he is a specific place in the memory 
Sed ubi manes in memoria mea, domine, ubi illic manes? Quale cubile fabricasti tibi? 
Quale sanctuarium aedificasti tibi?62 
Augustine finds God in the memory as a condition of the possibility of 
memory itself, and of the veracity of what is stored there. 
Ramon Llull is an important exponent of mediaeval Augustinianism who 
was to take the Augustinian conception of the memory as a place where one 
finds God to extreme consequences. Inspired by a religious-messianic 
objective of converting the unfaithful and establishing a unity of faith, Llull 
devoted himself to the study of a universal language that was able to 
synthesise all knowledge. Underlying Llull’s ars memoriae is the conviction 
of being able to draw on the same structure of reality, by virtue of the 
doctrine of the divine dignities (dignitates Dei), or rather, by virtue of the 
fundamental attributes of God. With the fundamental attributes of God as 
																																								 																				
62 Augustine, Confessions, X. 25, op. cit., pp. 130 – 131: “Where do you abide in my 
memory, Lord, where in that place do you abide? What kind of resting place have you 
fashioned for yourself? What kind of sanctuary have you built for yourself?” 
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the starting point, which are as such true, one arrives at the logical-
ontological definition of the simple and first elements of reality, which are 
also the principles of the art. Llull exploits the Augustinian-symbolic 
conception of the sensible world and transforms it into a symbolism that can 
be expressed with a finite number of letters, numbers and symbols, derived 
from the divine dignities. 
 
 
3. Definition of field of research (3): the mnemonic arts in the sixteenth 
century 
In the fifteenth century interest slackened in the speculative 
Dominican theme that had spread in the fourteenth century with the 
divulgation of the mnemonic doctrine as an instrument of the ars predicandi 
and the distinction established itself between what we could call the Cicero-
rhetoric and the Dominican-Aristotelian traditions. In this century the 
authors who dealt with the ars memoriae all presented themselves as the 
clarifiers of the ars. That is, they limited themselves to explaining the 
already codified rules in a more simple fashion that helped both learning 
and its use. 
This trend continued in the sixteenth century as well, when Llull’s ars 
combinatoria was combined with mnemonics, now understood as clavis 
universalis, that is, as a discipline that allows one to gather all knowledge in 
a single doctrine. Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic studies fall into this 
category. 
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To summarise what has been said so far, to define the field of research 
in which the study on the role of Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works in 
Bruno’s corpus can be inserted, one must understand what kind of 
relationship exists between the mnemonic arts and philosophical treatises on 
memory. The elements that must be borne in mind are: 
1. The definitions of mnemotechnics and memory theories, which 
allow one to understand the role carried out by the mnemonic precepts and 
their principles in mnemonic manuals; 
2. The distinction between the two fields is clear and reasserted 
continuously until the Middle Ages when, owing to the erroneous 
attribution of Rhetorica ad Herennium, the mnemonic arts are transferred to 
the rhetoric field, which had, however, already lost its pre-eminence in the 
system of mediaeval knowledge in favour of the ethical-philosophical one. 
3. This transition is absorbed in the ars predicandi and it will be the 
Dominican and Franciscan orders in particular that will cultivate the 
mnemonic arts until they reach the Renaissance; 
4. The mnemonic arts in the sixteenth century aim at synthesising the 
diverse souls in its tradition in the attempt to provide an universal form of 





Chapter two  






“Rational arguments” […] are of the greatest importance, I have 
always regarded them as a very important and relevant part of 
history, but certainly not the only one that deserves to be studied 
or in function of which everything else should be used. I have 
always been particularly partial towards the world that is often 
ambiguous and evasive with its ideas, metaphors, ways of 
perceiving and interpreting the world, choices and “preference” (or 
to use the expressions that went on to become more fashionable), 
the paradigms, theme, images of science, research traditions, tacit 
or unexpressed knowledge, and styles of thought. All things that 
act with strength even if very often how they act is not 
immediately clear, even on the most respectable “theories” and on 
the choice amongst the countless possible argumentations 
philosophers and scientists resort to, to support them, to 
propagandise them. 




ABSTRACT The research object, Giordano Bruno’s Ars Memoriae, raises research 
problems at a methodological level owing to the history of the reception of the mnemonic 
works by Nolanus. The history of this reception is interwoven with the interpretations of 
the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age and with the same understanding of 
modern rationality. The analysis of the only systematic attempts at interpreting Giordano 
Bruno’s Ars Memoriae in sixteenth century culture (Frances A. Yates and Paolo Rossi) and 
the analysis of the conception of the memory as a productive faculty of thought in 
mediaeval mnemotechnics (Mary Carruthers) lead one to recognise the need to define 
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another hermeneutical paradigm for Bruno’s mnemonic works. The new paradigm must 
make it possible to interpret together Bruno’s mnemonic and philosophical works to 
interpret both Bruno’s mnemonic and philosophical works, that is, it has to make a 
centripetal move that goes from the cultural context, which has already been outlined in the 
interpretations by Yates and Rossi, to the existing relation between the different works of 
Bruno’s corpus. I therefore define the research methodology in the Blumenberg-matrix 
metaphorology and redefine the research object as the use of the metaphor of inner writing 
in the mnemonic works by Giordano Bruno. 
 
 
1. Definition of the research objective (1): Giordano Bruno’s ars 
memoriae  
If we look at the trajectory Frances A. Yates chose to depict the 
history of mnemonic tradition, Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae works are 
to be found in the last stage, taking up a role in the foreground as they 
represent the most thorough synthesis and reworking of the diverse 
theoretical proposals of that period, in particular regarding the development 
of the memoria verborum. 
The first work by Bruno that we have is one on mnemonics63 and 
Bruno’s publishing commitment in the field of the mnemonic arts continues 
over the years, until his return to Italy and the commencement of the trial.64  
																																								 																				
63 Il De Umbris Idearum was printed in Paris in 1582. Prior to this Bruno had 
already written several works. One, L’arca di Noè (1574), was probably presented before 
Pope Pius V, and the other, De’ segni dei tempi, was published a year later in Venice. 
Bruno himself alludes to these works in the dedicatory epistle of Cabala, DFI, p. 679, and 
Cena, DFI, p. 153. In De Umbris Bruno frequently refers to another text of his on the 
mnemonic arts, the Clavis magna. For a reconstruction of the relationship between De 
umbris and Clavis see: Nicoletta Tirinnanzi, “Introduzione”, OMN I, p. XIV – XXI. 
64 The mnemonic works include: De umbris idearum (Paris, 1582), Cantus Circaeus 
(Paris, 1582), Ars reminiscendi (London, 1583), Explicatio triginta sigillorum (London, 
1583), Sigillus sigillorum (London, 1583), De imaginum compositione (Frankfurt, 1591). 
However, references to the mnemonic arts and, more generally to the theme of memory are 
also to be found in the philosophical dialogues. In La Cena de le Ceneri, “Proemiale 
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Giordano Bruno not only dedicates a considerable amount of his production 
to mnemonic works, but he also repeatedly demonstrates his interest in and 
commitment to the development of this discipline. Considering the 
importance of the mnemonic arts for the development of predication in the 
Dominican and Franciscan orders, I believe that one could actually trace the 
fascination that the preachers of Saint Dominic in Naples exerted on young 
Bruno back to the ars memoriae, leading him to the decision to enter their 
monastery. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
epistola”, DFI, p. 10 we can read: “Che vuol dire cena de le ceneri? fu vi posto forse questo 
pasto innante? potrassi forse dir qua cinerem tamquam panem manducabam? Non; ma è un 
convito, fatto dopo il tramontar del sole, nel primo giorno de la quarantana, detto da nostri 
preti dies cinerum, e talvolta “giorno del memento.”; “What does it say, this supper of shes? 
Was perphaps utter here [the words] CINEREM TAMQUAM PANEM MANDUCABAM? [I ate 
ashes like bread]? No. But it is a repast, taken after sunset, on the first day of Lent, called 
by our priests Ash Wednesday, and sometimes the day of MEMENTO” in 
The Ash Wednesday Supper, Prefatory Epistle, transl. with and introduction and notes by 
Stanley L. Jaki, The Hague - Paris, Mouton & Co, 1975, p. 44. Again in Cena, “Dialogo 
primo”, DFI, p. 23: “[…] a voi Muse d’Inghilterra dico, inspiratemi, suffiatemi, scaldatemi, 
accendetemi, lambiccatemi, e risolvetemi in liquore, datemi un succhio, e fatemi comparir 
non con un picciolo, delicato, stretto, corto e succinto epigramma: ma con una copiosa e 
larga vena di prosa lunga, corrente, grande e soda; onde non come da un arto calamo, ma 
come da un largo canale mande i rivi miei. E tu, Mnemosine mia, ascosa sotto trenta sigilli, 
e rinchiusa nel tetro carcere dell’ombre de le idee, intonami un poco ne l’orecchio.”; “[…] 
to you Muses of England I address myself, inspire me, help me, scold me, enkindle me, 
prompt me, make me flow, and turn me into sweet juices, and make me an ample and 
copious vein of long prose, flowing grand and bubbling; and let my currents go forth not as 
from a narrow pen, but as from a wide canal. And you, my Mnemosine [goddess of 
memory], hidden unter thirty seals, and closeted inside the gloomy prisons of the shadows 
of ideas, sing a little in my ears” in The Ash Wednesday Supper, Prefatory Epistle, transl. 
with and introduction and notes by Stanley L. Jaki, The Hague - Paris, Mouton & Co, 1975, 
p. 55. In the second quotation the reference to De umbris idearum and Cantus Circaeus is 
clear, his two Parisian mnemonic works; but of even greater interest is the fact that Bruno 
places the dialogue on “suo Copernico et altri paradossi di sua nova filosofia”, DFI, p. 23, 
(“his Copernicus and other paradoxes of the new philosophy”, The Ash Wednesday Supper, 
Prefatory Epistle, op. cit., p. 55) under the auspice of Mnemosyne. In the following 
paragraph to the one quoted above, in fact Bruno clarifies immediately that he does not see 
with Copernicus’ or Ptolemy eyes, but with his own and that, even if the observations of 
the two illustrious astronomers are out of discussion and constitute material for reflection 
for his own philosophy as well, the results achieved by the Nolanus philosophy are the fruit 
of diverse reasoning. 
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“[…] si fece frate con occasione che sentì disputare a San Domenico in Napoli, e così disse 
che quelli erano dii della terra […]”65 
On the other hand, the mnemonic arts are also closely related to many 
other events in Giordano Bruno’s life. His first stay in Paris was made 
possible thanks to the fame he had acquired as an ars memoriae teacher, as 
he himself declared in the Secondo Costituto of his trial, 66  and without 
taking into account his return to Venice before being investigated by the 
																																								 																				
65 Deposition by Francesco Graziano, in Luigi Firpo, Il processo di Giordano Bruno, 
Roma, Salerno Editrice, 1993, p. 251: “[…] he took his vows as priest when he heard being 
questioned in Saint Dominic in Naples, and thus said that they were the gods of the land 
[…]” (translation mine). 
66 “(…) acquistai nome tale che il re Henrico terzo mi fece chiamare un giorno, 
ricercandomi se la memoria che havevo et che professava era naturale o pur per arte 
magica; al quale diedi sodisfattione; et con quello che li dissi et feci provare a lui medesmo, 
conobbe che non era per arte magica ma per scientia. Et doppo questo feci stampar un libro 
de memoria sotto il titolo De umbris idearum, il qual dedicai a Sua Maestà; et con questa 
occasione mi fece lettor straordinario et provisionato; et seguitai in quella città a legger, 
come ho detto, forsi cinqu’anni (…)” in Luigi Firpo, Il processo di Giordano Bruno, op. 
cit., pp. 161 – 162; “[…] Such renown did I acquire that King Henry III summoned me one 
day, wanting to know whether the memory I had and what I professed was natural or 
magical art; my reply gave him satisfaction; and with what I told him and made him also 
experience, he admitted it was not magical arts, but science. And after this I had a book on 
memory published with the title De Umbris Idearum, which I dedicated to His Majesty; and 
on this occasion I was made extraordinary, waged lecturer; and I went on to read in that 
city, as I have already said, perhaps five years […]” (translation mine). See also the 
testimony of Johan von Nostiz, a pupil of Bruno’s: “Annus nunc agitur tertius et trigesimus 
cum Lutetiae Parisiorum primum Iordanum Brunum, Nolanum, arte Lulliana et 
Mnemologica sive memorativa magnifice sese ostentantem, multos ad se discipulos atque 
auditores privatim allicere, memini. Quo factum, ut quia eo ispo tempore, peregrinationis et 
studiorum aliorumque exercitiorum causa illic agebam, ego quoque quid illud esset 
mirificae artis cogniturus, non semel auditorio eius interfuerim. Ac ipsius quidem Iordani 
peritiam et promtitudinem, quam postulato quovis disputandi et ex tempore copiose de eo 
perorandi argumento nonnunquam ostentabat, vehementer admirabar. Caeterum, cum 
paucos admodum ab hoc artifice artifices prodire animadverterem, sive quidem id docentis 
invidia, sive artis obscuritate, aut tarditate discentium accidebat, risi, et contemsi aliorum in 
arte difficilori quam utiliori inanes operas et sumtus; magis interea brevitati et perspicuitati 
Rameae favens” Johan von Nostiz, Artificium Aristotelico-Lullio-Rameum, in Giovanni 
Aquilecchia, Schede bruniane (1950-1991), Roma, Vecchiarelli, 1993, pp. 283 – 285. For 
an analysis of Bruno’s experience in Paris see: Saverio Ricci, Giordano Bruno nell’Europa 
del Cinquecento, Roma, Salerno Editrice, 2000, pp. 142 – 177.  
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Holy Inquisition, his lengthy trial and his death at the stake, all of which are 
interwoven with Bruno’s passion for the mnemonic arts.67 
So what is Giordano Bruno’s relationship with the tradition of the ars 
memoriae? What was Bruno’s position towards this tradition? As was the 
case in theology and philosophy, Bruno had no intention of doing away with 
the traditions that had accompanied his studies. He is, however, aware of the 
fact that his ars memoriae – but also his philosophy and theological 
convictions – is in excess compared to this very tradition. What I mean by 
this is that, whilst not renouncing the classical and Renaissance mnemonic 
precepts, in his attempt to give them a more complete form, Bruno reforms 
their philosophical premises and meaning compared to tradition. To clarify 
the mnemonic precepts and make their use more effective, which was 
perfectly coherent with mnemonic literature in the sixteenth century, Bruno 
																																								 																				
67 “Questo Iordani è venuto in questa città, per quello che so io, perché un giorno il 
signor Zuane Mocenigo, gentilhomo venetiano, comprando un libro dato fuori dal detto 
Iordano, intitolato De minimo, magno et mensura, me domandò se io conoscevo costui et se 
sapevo dove egli era all’hora. Io gli dissi che sì, et che io l’havevo visto in Francforte, et 
che credevo che fosse tuttavia lì. Et il detto signor Mocenigo soggionse: «Io vorrei ch’egli 
venisse a Venetia per insegnarmi li secreti della memoria et li altri che egli professa, come 
si vede in questo suo libro»; et io a questo risposi: «Crederò che, se sarà ricercato, venirà». 
Et così doppo alcuni giorni esso signor Mocenigo mi portò una littera direttiva al detto 
Iordano, con farmi istantia che io gli la mandasse, come feci, dicendomi che gli scriveva 
per veder se voleva ven[ì]r a Venetia. Et doppo comparve egli qui, saranno circa sette mesi 
o otto, e stette qui non so quanti giorni a camera locanda, come io credo (…)”, Deposition 
of the bookseller Giovan Battista Ciotti (Venezia, 26 maggio 1592) in Luigi Firpo, Il 
processo di Giordano Bruno, op. cit., 1993, pp. 149 – 150.; “This Iordani came to this city 
as far as I know, because one day Signor Zuane Mocenigo, a Venetian nobleman, 
purchasing a book published by the aforesaid Iordano, called De Minimo, Magno et 
Mensura, asked me if I knew him and if I knew where he was now. I said yes, and that I 
had seen him in Frankfurt, and that I believed he was still there. And the aforesaid Signor 
Mocenigo said: “I would like him to come to Venice to teach me the secrets of memory and 
the other ones he professes, such as the ones in this book;” and I replied: “I believe that if 
he is asked after, he will come.” Thus, a few days later Signor Mocenigo bought me a letter 
for the aforesaid Iordan, asking me to send it to him immediately, which I did, telling me 
that he had written to ask if he wanted to come to Venice. And afterwards he showed up 
here, seven or eight months later and I don’t know how many days he spent at the inn […]” 
(translation mine).  
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re-establishes the same gnosiology that underlies the ars memoriae, making 
significant changes to the memoria verborum that, having been revived in 
Germany in particular, was to result in the development of combinatorial 
analysis. In Bruno’s comprehension, the mnemonic arts therefore exceed the 
classical definition of the technique to reinforce the natural memory and 
reaches out to the gnosiological field, merging with what had, until then 
been a subject of the memory theory, that is, on how the world and man 
relate with one another.  
This thus brings me to the formulation of the research subject I intend 
to develop: if the ars memoriae is, almost programmatically, understood as 
the place of the formulation of existing relationships between man and the 
world, then one must ask oneself both what the relationship is between the 
ars memoriae and the “Nolanus muse” and if one can identify the 
philosophical place in which Bruno laid the gnosiological conditions of his 
philosophy in the ars memoriae, as it is here that the redefinition of the 
concept of order starts, which he will try to change in regard to the tradition 
in three fundamental fields: theology (Nature), gnosiology (language), and 
ethics (prassi, or to use a term that is not Bruno’s, creativity). 
 
 
2. Definition of the research object (2): status quaestionis. Analysis of 
three methodological approaches 
The studies on Renaissance mnemonics and the ars memoriae are a 
relatively new field of study, which developed in the second half of the 
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twentieth century, coinciding with the new lines of study on the Renaissance 
and, in particular, with the questioning of the historical-interpretative model 
of an enlightened mold, which had made the rationality of the age of 
Enlightenment the arrival point for the previous centuries, and which had 
founded the philosophies of history based on the idea of modern rationality 
which disappeared in the last century.68 
The history of the interpretations of Renaissance mnemonics depends 
to a great extent on the interpretation of the rationality of the Modern Age. 
We have already underlined that the history of the mnemonic arts is linked 
to the understanding of the system of knowledge, and this is not only true at 
the moment in which the mnemonic arts are developed, but also at the 
moment in which they are the object of reflection and understood 
historically. 
Since the history of the interpretation of Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic 
works is an exemplary occurrence of the aforementioned, I shall use it as an 
example. Between the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 
twentieth century, although underlining diverse elements in their reasoning, 
critics were still unanimous in their negative opinion of Bruno’s mnemonic 
works compared to his philosophical ones, as they were an expression of an 
aspect of the Renaissance culture that questioned the role of this period as 
the cradle of the origin of the enlightened rationality that was regarded as 
the mature, complete result of Renaissance criticism of the centuries of the 
																																								 																				
68  Michele Ciliberto, “Fortune (and misfortune) of an “omniscient” and “almost 
divine” teacher”, in Giordano Bruno, Opere Lulliane, Milano, Adelphi 2012, pp. XI – XLI. 
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darkness of reason. Starting in the beginning of the nineteen forties, Bruno’s 
interpreters began to absorb the change in direction of studies on the 
Renaissance in the early decades of the twentieth century, which had 
decreed the end of the conception of Renaissance that was hinged in primis 
on the relationship with Enlightenment (Konrad Burdach), and which had 
begun to place at the centre of their research Hermeticism and magic, thus 
revealing the subject of the practical, reformative dimension of Renaissance 
culture (Paul Oskar, Kristeller, Eugenio Garin). Ten years after this change 
in direction, Garin’s pupils worked on the final rehabilitation of magic, 
Hermeticism, and Llullism in the Renaissance field, bringing forth new 
essential themes such as: the relationship between logic and rhetoric, the 
incidence of magical and astrological questions, the meaning and function 
of the art of memory and Llull’s themes in the construction of the most 
important Renaissance philosophies, such as Giordano Bruno’s. 
It was in this fertile field that the works by Paolo Rossi and Frances A. 
Yates matured, and today they are still the referential outlines for anyone 
venturing into studies on the ars memoriae in the Renaissance and on 
Bruno’s mnemonics. However, owing to the importance of the tie of the ars 
memoriae with the ars predicandi in the mediaeval monastic orders, and 
owing to the fact that it was in this area that Bruno studied and encountered 
the mnemonic tradition, I believe that the works by Mary Carruthers on 
mnemonics and mediaeval rhetoric are also an inevitable reference in the 
study on Bruno’s mnemonics. 
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2.1 Paolo Rossi: “Landing on the continent of memory” 
What kind of cultural atmosphere surrounded the studies on the ars 
memoriae in the twentieth century is described succinctly, but very 
effectively, by Paolo Rossi in the introduction to Il passato, la memoria e 
l’oblio, which has the significant title of ‘memorandum’.69 At the end of the 
nineteen fifties there were very few scholars who were working on these 
themes. Historical-philosophical research was concentrating on two main 
currents: on the one hand, the perspective of idealistic philosophy, which 
regarded objects such as mnemonics not truly philosophical and, on the 
other, the perspectives of neo-Enlightenment directed towards a scientific 
philosophy that regarded research objects such as mnemonics as an 
expression of vague, imprecise ideas that were of little interest and difficult 
to juxtapose with the extremely pure scientific nature of philosophy, which 
was believed to be above historical events. 
It was through his teacher Eugenio Garin that Paolo Rossi ventured 
into two unexplored territories: Lullian tradition and mnemotechnics, and 
the magical-hermetic tradition. “Landing on the continent of memory”70 
took place in 1957, on the occasion of the publication of the important work 
on Francis Bacon.71  Rossi included a paragraph in this book explaining 
where the minstratio ad memoriam was born, and what role it played in 
																																								 																				
69 Paolo Rossi, “Promemoria”, in Paolo Rossi, Il passato, la memoria, l’oblio, op. 
cit., pp. 7 – 11. 
70 Paolo Rossi, Il passato, la memoria, l’oblio, op. cit., p. 2. 
71 Paolo Rossi, Francesco Bacone. Dalla magia alla scienza, Torino, Einaudi, 1974 
(Laterza, 1957); Francis Bacon: from Magic to Science, trans. by Sacha Rabinovitch, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968. 
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Francis Bacon’s philosophy. 72  With the intention of clarifying Bacon’s 
position compared to the vast literary current of the Renaissance ars 
memoriae treatises, Rossi tries to put order into the vast production of 
mnemonic works going back to the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 
Paolo Rossi arranges this infinite production of mnemonic manuals 
from just before the decline of the ancient discipline into three themes. The 
first is that of an encyclopaedia of knowledge; the second is that of an 
artificial memory that allows the creation of a perfect science; the third is 
that of the art of memory as an instrument to introduce order in discourse 
arguments. Represented by Lodovico Dolce, the first theme goes back to 
Llull; the second, represented by Jean Bellot, Giordano Bruno and Heinrich 
Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim, is closely related to the first theme but 
differs in as much as Lullism is not the authors’ only reference; the third 
theme goes entirely back to Petrus Ramus and to his idea of using the art of 
memory to introduce order into knowledge and discourse.73 
The attempt to order the production of treatises on the ars memoriae, 
identifying the themes that define the history of mnemonics from Antiquity 
to Renaissance is also the structure of the book with which Paolo Rossi 
opens the season of new studies on mnemonics: Clavis Universalis.74 
																																								 																				
72 Paolo Rossi, “La mnemotecnica e la “ministratio ad memoriam”: luoghi retorici e 
luoghi naturali”, in Paolo Rossi, Francesco Bacone. Dalla magia alla scienza, op. cit., pp. 
329 – 337. 
73 Ramus identifies the ars memoriae with the doctrine of discourse. For more about 
the influence of Llull and Ramus in the Renaissance, see: Cesare Vasoli, La dialettica e la 
retorica dell’Umanesimo. «Invenzione» e «metodo» nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo, 
Napoli, La Città del Sole, 2007. 
74 Paolo Rossi, Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Llull 
a Leibniz, op. cit. This is a new course of studies because it is true that both monographs on 
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The title of this overview from 1960 defines Paolo Rossi’s perspective 
on Renaissance mnemotechnics: 
The expression clavis universalis was used, between the sixteenth and seventeenth century, 
to indicate the method or general science that sees man as able to perceive, the phenomenal 
appearances or the “shadows of ideas” aside, the structure or ideal tissue that constitutes the 
essence of reality. Deciphering the alphabet of the world; being able to read the signs 
impressed by the divine mind in the great book of nature; discovering the total 
correspondence between the original forms and the chain of human reasoning; constructing 
a perfect language that is able to eliminate misunderstandings and disclose the essence, 
placing man in contact with objects, and not with signs; creating total encyclopaedias, 
ordered classifications that are a faithful reflection of the harmony present in the cosmos: 
from the middle of the thirteenth century to the end of the sixteenth century, they were 
intent on the attempt to achieve results of this kind, to analyse, defend and propagandise 
these positions and the vision of the world they are linked to, when they wanted to discuss 
the themes of Llullism, dictating the rules of artificial memory, compiling grandiose 
encylopaedias and complicated world theatres, searching for the alphabet of thoughts, 
making themselves supporters of pansophical aspirations and of the hopes in a total 
redemption and pacification of the human genre.75 
The clavis universalis is the key to the universal knowledge that was 
at the speculative centre of Ramon Llull’s undertaking to find the matrix of 
all languages and thoughts. Paolo Rossi therefore came ashore on the 
continent of memory and what he is trying to do is outline a map, following 
the developments of classical rhetoric sources and their medieval 
interweavings with aprioristic historical perspectives, which tend to exclude 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
the history of mnemonics and on the history of mnemonics in certain periods, such as 
encyclopaedia entries, for example: F. Aretin, Theorie und Praxis der Mnemonik, Sulzbach, 
1810; E. Pick, Memory and its Doctors, London 1888; L. Volkmann, Ars memorativa, in 
«Jahrbuch des Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien», n. s., III, 1929, pp. 111 – 200; H. 
Hajdu, Das Mnemotechnische Schriftum des Mittelalters, Wien, 1936. 
75 Paolo Rossi, Clavis universalis. Arti della memoria e logica combinatoria da Llull 
a Leibniz, op. cit., p. 17. 
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all those phenomena that would “stain” the descent of classical Greek 
rationality from the history of logic; Paolo Rossi’s mapping is aimed at 
sixteenth discourses on method and also wants to show how historical 
phenomena such as the mnemonic arts become part of the history modern 
rationality. 76  This is therefore the perspective with which Paolo Rossi 
surveys this territory, which he believes is still to be explored. 
Paolo Rossi’s exploration is such that it outlines the multiform nature 
of the history of Renaissance mnemonics, defining countless themes that are 
related to it. Of particular importance amongst these is that of images and 
metaphorical languages. During his interpretation the Italian scholar often 
draws attention to the fact that Renaissance culture was the fruit of an 
authentic age of images, and if one isolates the texts from the images it is 
hard to understand anything about mnemonics in the Renaissance. 
 
 
2.2 Frances A. Yates: contextualising Bruno’s memory systems within the 
Hermetic tradition 
Frances A. Yates meets Bruno while she is writing the biography of 
another Italian in Elizabethan London, John Florio, and the historian 
																																								 																				
76 Paolo Rossi, Il passato, la memoria e l’oblio, op. cit., pp. 59 – 62: as long as the 
understanding of modern rationality was based on an enlightened historical model, 




devotes an entire chapter of her first book to the relationship between the 
two and their reciprocal influence.77  
At the beginning of her research on Bruno, Yates follows Genitle’s 
and Spampanato’s interpretations and explains the philosophy of Nolanus as 
the attempt to include the discoveries of modern science, in particular 
Copernicus’ astronomical ones, in a broader theoretical discourse that 
makes him clash with theological and educational authorities in Elizabethan 
England. 78   From this perspective, the text that best describes the tie 
between Bruno and Copernicanism is La Cena delle Ceneri, to which Yates 
devotes pages of comments. 
In the years after the biography on Florio, Yates starts a project to 
translate the Cena, for which she also intended to write an introduction 
emphasising the manner in which Bruno had accepted and explained 
philosophically the novelties in Copernicus’s astronomical theory. 79 
Working on this project, the hypothesis began to take root that the Cena 
could be interpreted from a different perspective than Copernicanism. The 
more the scholar studied the text of the Cena, and the more she tried to 
analyse Bruno’s thought, the more plausible the hypothesis appeared 
																																								 																				
77 Frances A. Yates, “Florio and Bruno”, in John Florio. The Life of an Italian in 
Shakespeare’s England, New York, Octagon Books Inc., 1968 (1934 by Cambridge 
University Press), pp. 87 – 123. 
78 “It has been said that Bruno’s work forms “the greatest philosophical thought-
structure executed by the Renaissance”. His was an early attempt to build a philosophy tp 
include the discoveries of modern science, represented in his day by the work of 
Copernicus. […] By a leap of imagination he extended the Copernican theory far beyond 
the limit laid down by its author […],” in Frances A. Yates, “Florio and Bruno, in John 
Florio. The Life of an Italian in Shakespeare’s England, op. cit., p. 91. 
79 Frances A. Yates, “Preface”, in Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 
Chicago and London, The University of Chicago Press, 1964, pp. ix – xii. 
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although she was unable to define the terms. What was the interpretation for 
this different perspective? 
She was assisted in the definition of a new perspective by a series of 
studies that were published between the nineteen forties and the mid 
nineteen sixties. During that twenty-year period a significant number of 
Renaissance scholars had begun a new line of research concerning the 
importance of Hermeticism in the understanding of characters in the period 
between the end of the Middle Ages and the Modern Age. These included 
studies such as the one by P. O. Kristeller, and those started by Eugenio 
Garin on Hermeticism in Renaissance thought.80 This was how the project to 
translate the Cena was transformed into a research project tracing 
Hermeticism in Bruno’s philosophy and works. 
The works in which Yates believed that Hermeticism was more 
evident were those on magic, which she understood immediately had to be 
read together with those on mnemonics. In this fashion, a broader research 
project on the history of mnemonics took shape,81 which became famous 
both for having defined a new field of research and for having given a 
hermetic interpretation to Renaissance mnemonics. 
																																								 																				
80 Eugenio Garin, Medioevo e Rinascimento, Bari, Laterza, 1954 Id., La cultura 
filosofica del Rinascimento, Bari, Laterza, 1967, but also the works by many of Garin’s 
pupils who studied different aspects of research field identified by the philosophy historian, 
also including the aforementioned Paolo Rossi, Clavis universalis, op. cit. 
81 Frances A. Yates, The Art of Memory, op. cit. 
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This approach was subjected to fierce criticism and today it is no 
longer considered valid in its entirety.82 The main criticism concerns the fact 
that Yates tends to use Hermeticism to resolve the understanding of 
historical phenomena that are complex and obscure, also owing to their 
historical distance from us, but for which there are explanations that lie 
outside Hermeticism. 
As it addresses the problem of the interpretation of mnemonic 
tradition as a cultural one that intersects with the history of different 
disciplines and also has consequences on contemporary cultural history, I 
believe that Yates’ research approach is still valid. I also believe that the 
periodisation that Yates proposes is an interpretative grid that can be used to 
structure one’s own research. There is no doubt that the interpretation of 
Bruno and the other Renaissance authors is marked considerably by 
Hermeticism; however, once again, I see the possibility to revive and use 
Yates’ results. In fact, the historian put forward a research hypothesis that 
had not yet been applied to Bruno at that time, and only with the intention of 
seeing what results it might produce, without the pretence that it was the 




82  See, for example: Francesca Dell’Omodarme, Frances A. Yates interprete di 
Giordano Bruno: appunti per una ricerca, in “Rinascimento,” 41, 2001, pp. 353- 74. 
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2.3 Mary Carruthers: creative thinking in mediaeval memory systems 
The last attempt at systematic research on mnemonics that is of 
importance in my research was by Mary Carruthers. Although the American 
scholar did not deal with the Renaissance but mediaeval ars memoriae, and 
this is why it is not necessary to give a detailed account of her research 
results, I consider the methodological approach of her studies and two of the 
results she achieved as fundamental for my research. 
The first result is for having explained that the interpretation of 
memory in the Middle Ages was attributed with the creative function of the 
soul and thought, and not imagination, as was to be the case in the Modern 
Age. From the Middle Ages on, memory therefore expressed a productive 
nature of thought and the American scholar reached this result through the 
analysis of the metaphor of the world as a book that, as we shall see, has 
close ties with the metaphor of inner writing. 
The second result that is of importance in my research is for having 
shown that the mnemonic arts was a practice that could achieve results that 
are difficult to imagine nowadays, precisely because it was a practice, that 
is, an exercise, training of the faculty of thought that, with the advent of a 
technical instrument that made the storage of data and knowledge easier, 





3. Method and (re)definition of the research objective (3): The 
metaphor of inner writing in Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae  
From a methodological perspective, during the elaboration of the 
research subject I found it necessary to devise a new interpretative 
theoretical model of the mnemonic arts, which could be used as an 
interpretative model of the mnemonic arts in general and of the relationships 
between the mnemonic arts and memory theories. Looking at this necessity 
more closely, I was forced to consider the relationship between the 
concepts, their formation and their history. 
This was necessary both at a historical level (as can be seen in the way 
that Bruno takes his distance from mnemonic tradition, whilst using the 
same concepts and precepts) and at a meta-historical level as it were (how to 
tackle the problem of rationality and history after the decline of the 
philosophies of history). In Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology projects 
(Metaphorologie) I found a research methodology that could help me focus 
on the problems I came across. In fact, according to Blumenberg 
metaphorology is an auxiliary discipline of the history of philosophy that is 
able to bring to the surface the moments at which the conceptual systems 
enter in conflict, the order of knowledge is reconstructed and the functions 
of the concepts themselves are redefined. In other words, it seemed to me 
that Blumenberg’s functionalistic vision was able to underline both the 
historical study and the meta-historical reflect. 
I therefore began to read Giordano Bruno, both his mnemonic and 
philosophical works, from a metaphorological perspective and I began to 
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reformulate the questions I had started with from this angle. I began with the 
conviction that the ars memoriae is where Bruno questions and rethinks the 
concept of order, which is the central idea of his philosophical reflections. 
In fact, even if Bruno can be criticised for not having reached univocal 
formulations of the subjects he is dealing with, one must still acknowledge 
that Bruno is always striving to force a previous order: the cosmological 
order, the metaphysical order, the ethical order, the theological order. His 
intention is not to overturn or destroy, but the need to remove the ties of a 
conceptuality and problems is clear, since Bruno now believes they are 
unsuited to explaining reality. From a metaphorological perspective, my 
problem was thus reformulated as follows: if Bruno’s philosophy works on 
the reworking of the philosophical concept of order, starting with different 
points of view, such as the gnosiological, the physical and the ethical, and if 
the ars memoriae is where Bruno begins his redefinition of the concept of 
order, which absolute metaphor guided this conceptual reformulation? I thus 
reached the following hypotheses, which I shall present in the following 
chapters: 1. The most productive interpretative model to study the 
relationship between ars memoriae and Bruno’s philosophy can be 
formulated, starting with Hans Blumenberg’s interpretation of Giordano 
Bruno in The Legitimacy of the Modern Age83 and in Die Lesbarkeit der 
Welt84; the conclusions do, however, need to be corrected as they were spoilt 
by the model of modern rationality based on the Enlightenment, which not 
																																								 																				
83 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit. 
84 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit. 
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only Blumenberg wants to criticise but that, as we have seen, has so far 
conditioned and restricted the understanding of the mnemonic arts; if one 
adopts the analysis of the metaphors that guided the formation of the 
theories as research methodology, in the field of the mnemonic arts and 
memory theories one comes across several analogies, the development of 
which has a long history, for example, the metaphor of the seal and inner 
writing, the ark and the stomach. However, by analysing their use, it 
emerges that the most performative is the metaphor of inner writing, which 
belongs semantically to that of the seal; furthermore, there is a part of the 
semantic field of writing that is tangent with that of the ark and the stomach, 
considered as containers, as places for filing; 3. From a gnosiological point 
of view, Bruno’s ars memoriae is in an unavoidable relationship with 
Nolanus’ philosophy and is interwoven with another absolute metaphor that 
is fundamental in the understanding of Giordano Bruno’s thought: the 
metaphor of shadow. 
What I therefore intend to do is, through a new understanding of the 
metaphor of inner writing, show how Bruno develops a philosophy that has 
the new principle of order in the memory, regulating knowledge and man-
world relationships. I would like to demonstrate how the central conception 
of Bruno’s philosophy, which is articulated in the themes of nature, 
language and practice, has its origins in the ars memoriae. It must be clear, 
that by doing so I have no intention of reducing Bruno’s philosophy to the 
ars memoriae. I would simply like to draw the interpreter’s attention to an 
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important relationship and see if this enriches our understanding of 




Hans Blumenberg as an Interpreter of the Modern Age. 








ABSTRACT The justification of the methodology chosen in the previous chapter was in 
three stages with a comparison of Blumenberg’s interpretation of the transition from the 
Middle Ages to the Modern Age. In this chapter I shall present an analytical interpretation 
of Hans Blumenberg’s Die Legitimität der Neuzeit. The book, in which the paradigm of 
																																								 																				
85 For the themes dealt with in this chapter I not only took into consideration The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age, but also: Hans Blumenberg, “Kosmos und System. Aus der 
Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt,” Studium Generale, Berlin, 10 (1957), pp. 61 – 80; Id., 
“Kritik und Rezeption antiker Philosophie in der Patristik. Strukturanalysen zu einer 
Morphologie der Tradition,” Studium Generale, Berlin, 12 (1959), pp. 485 – 497; Id., 
“Augustinus Anteil an der Geschichte des Begriffs der theoretischen Neugierde,” Revue des 
Ètudes Augustiniennes, Paris, 7 (1961), pp. 35 – 70; Id., “Weltbilder und Weltmodelle,” 
Nachrichten der Gießener Hochschulgesellschaft, Gießen, 30 (1961), pp. 67 – 75; Id., 
Ordnungsschwund und Selbstbehauptung. Über Weltverstehen und Weltverhalten im 
Werden der technischen Epoche, in Helmuth Kuhn, Franz Wiedmann (ed.), Das Problem 
der Ordnung, Meisenheim am Glan, A. Hain 1962, pp. 37 – 57; Id., Curiositas und Veritas. 
Zur Ideengeschichte von Augustin, Confessiones X, 35, in F.L. Cross (ed.), Studia 
Patristica VI. Texte und Untersuchungen zur altern christlichen Literatur, Berlin 1962, pp. 
294 – 302; Id., “Säkularisation.” Kritik einer Kategorie historischer Illegitimität, in 
Helmut Kuhn e Franz Wiedmann (ed.), Die Philosophie und die Frage nach dem 
Fortschritt, München, Verlag Anton Pustet 1964; Id., “Neugierde und Wissenstrieb. 
Supplemente zu Curiositas,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Bonn, 14 (1970), pp. 7 – 40; 
Id., “Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung. Zur Konstitution der neuzeitlichen Rationalität,” 
Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Mainz 1970, n. 11, pp. 333 – 
383; Id., Neoplatonismen und Pseudoplatonismen in der kosmologie und Mechanik der 
frühen Neuzeit, in M. P. M. Schuhl, M. P. Hadot (ed.), Le Néoplatonisme, Paris, Èditions 
du Cnrs 1971, pp. 447 – 471.  
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secularisation (Säkularisierung) is criticised as the only paradigm that is able to explain the 
transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age, puts forward a functionalistic thesis of 
the concepts, in which the transition from one period to the other is understood as a 
reconfiguration of the established order by the theories. To sustain this theory, Blumenberg 
interprets Bruno as the one who made the epochal transition manifest with his 
reformulation of the same concept of order. 
 
 
1. The twofold centrality of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age 
Blumenberg worked on The Legitimacy of the Modern Age for almost 
twenty years,86 making it both the achievement of his early works, which 
stand out with their direct comparison with Martin Heidegger87 and Edmund 
Husserl88, and the starting point for his successive research. The thematic 
ties interwoven with the other works and the fact that it took Blumenberg 
from 1966 to 1988 to write the work as we know it today, explain the 
centrality of this work in his philosophical production. In fact, if one 
excludes Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie89 (1960), Matthäuspassion90 
(1988) and Höhlenausgänge,91 (1989) all of Blumenberg’s great works were 
written in this twenty-year period and if they are read bearing Legitimacy in 
mind, it can be seen that the origins of their themes and problems lie in that 
work.  
																																								 																				
86 Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, op. cit. 
87  Hans Blumenberg, Beiträge zum Problem der Ursprünglichkeit der 
mittelalterlich- scholastischen Ontologie, Kiel, 1947. Doctorate thesis, unpublished. 
88 Hans Blumenberg, Die ontologische Distanz. Eine Untersuchung über die Krisis 
der Phänomenologie Husserls, Kiel, 1950. Habilitation thesis, unpublished. 
89 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, op. cit. 
90 Hans Blumenberg, Matthäuspassion, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1988. 
91 Hans Blumenberg, Höhlenausgänge, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1989. 
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As far as his production before 1966 is concerned, The Legitimacy of 
the Modern Age is a continuation of both his doctoral dissertation and the 
one written for the achievement of the venia legendi; the former was 
dedicated to a reconstruction of Scholasticism whilst the latter was a 
reinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology; the starting point for both was 
a harsh criticism of Heidegger, of his conception of historicity and the 
direction he gave to phenomenology. In the 1970s Blumenberg went back to 
the concept of theoretical curiosity (theoretische Neugierde), which had 
been a key theme in Legitimacy since it could immediately be related to the 
historical category of self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung) with which 
Blumenberg had laid claim to the rational authenticity of Modernity.92 In the 
same period he continued his reflections on the narrative nature of history 
and signification through the study of the relationship between myth and 
conceptuality; 93  finally, finally with the analysis of the metaphor of 
shipwreck as the metaphor of existence,94 he also brought to the fore the 
anthropological theme that had been the background in Legitimacy. In the 
1980s Blumenberg also studied the theme of history, which he now 
understands as the theme of the narrative relationship between man and the 
world, and related to the theory, interpreted as a form of sclerosis of the 
narrations with which man, the animal who is the least suited to living 
																																								 																				
92 Hans Blumenberg, Der Sturz des Protophilosophen. Zur Komik der reinen Teorie, 
in Wolfgang Preisendanz and Rainer Warning (ed.), Das Komische (“Poetik und 
Hermeneutik,” 7), München, Fink, 1976, pp.11 – 64. 
93 Hans Blumenberg, Arbeit am Mythos, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1979; trans. 
by Robert M. Wallace, Work on Myth, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1985. 
94  Hans Blumenberg, Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer. Paradigma einer 
Daseinsmetaphor, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1979. 
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because nature did not assign him with a habitat (Umwelt), gives himself a 
world (Welt).95 This theme then leads to both the analysis of the metaphor of 
the world as a book96 and his research on the problem of historical time,97 
enriched and made more complex by a profound comparison with Husserl’s 
phenomenology. Finally, almost as if wanting to close the circle of the line 
of thought that had been started with a comparison with Heidegger and 
Husserl, Blumenberg went back to a comparison regarding the meaning of 
theory98 and the relationship between theory and lifeworld (Lebenswelt). 
If one broadens the perspective and looks more closely at the context 
in which Legitimacy was born, developed and discussed, one can see that it 
plays a key role in contemporary philosophy; this is because by openly 
contrasting an interpretative tradition that adopts secularisation as a 
privileged, exclusive historic category for the understanding of the Modern 
Age, it marked the start of the so-called debate on secularisation.99  The 
centrality of this debate in the German philosophical context after the war 
can also be seen in the fact that The Legitimacy of the Modern Age is a 
stratified work. The edition that is usually referred to, the second, is the fruit 
of numerous, continuous revisions of the first, all of which were aimed at 
																																								 																				
95 Hans Blumenberg, Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben, Stuttgart, Reclam, 1981. 
96 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit. 
97 Hans Blumenberg, Lebenszeit und Weltzeit, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1986. 
98 Hans Blumenberg, Das Lachen der Thrakerin. Eine Urgeschichte der Theorie, 
Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1987; trans. by. Spencer Hawkins, The Laughter of the 
Thracian Woman: A Protohistory of Theory, New York, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015. 
Hans Blumenberg, Die Sorge geht über den Fluß, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1987; 
transl. by Paul Fleming, Care crosses the River, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010. 
99 The bibliography on secularisation as a historiographic subject is vast. Here I shall 
mention only one work, because it offers a reconstruction of the debate between Hegel and 
Blumenberg and is thus more relevant here: Jean-Claude Monod, La querelle de la 
sécularisation de Hegel à Blumenberg, Paris, Vrin, 2002.  
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clarifying the text and explaining its argumentative structure, rather than 
modifying or going into it in more detail. 100  As far as the themes and 
subjects are concerned, the work was therefore already complete in 1966, 
the year in which the first edition was published, and the need to revise it 
																																								 																				
100 Blumenberg was aware of the fact that his philosophical writing hindered the 
comprehension and diffusion of his works. Testimony to this awareness is the extensive 
documentation Nachlaß, in particular in his personal correspondence with some translators; 
see, for example: Briefwechsel Rigotti-Blumenberg (1983) in Nachlaß Blumenberg, 
Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar. This awareness aside, the subject of 
Blumenberg’s philosophical style is not irrelevant when interpreting his works; on the 
contrary, many other important matters are affected. Scholars agree in their description of 
Blumenberg’s philosophical style as one in which it is difficult to trace fundamental themes 
and theses. This is why it is difficult to allocate Blumenberg to a specific philosophical 
school. Furthermore, although his skilful ability to control language has been recognised, 
for which he was awarded two prizes for the literary value of his scientific prose, the main 
characteristic of his philosophical writings is the attempt to hide his philosophical 
reasonings. It was Jürgen Habermas who, when discussing Blumenberg’s philosophical 
style and, more generally, the question of the relationship between philosophical writing 
and literature, showed that, Blumenberg’s attempts aside, his works are based on a critical 
approach that is characteristic of philosophy; this is also the case when it is not explicitly 
dealing with matters of truth and it is the approach, the perspective of the viewpoint rather 
than the manner in which he describes it that one sees that is dictating the difference 
between philosophy and literature: Jürgen Habermas, “Philosophy and Science as 
Literature?” in Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, transl. 
by William Mark Hohengarten, Cambridge-London, The MIT Press, 1992, pp. 205 – 228. 
Furthermore, the subject of disguised philosophical reasoning which is difficult to 
understand fascinates the interpreter because it is associated with a characteristic of 
Blumenberg’s personality, that is, his reserve mixed with shyness that is so extreme that we 
know very little about his private life – with the exception of his academic career; and it is 
so extreme that there is even discussion regarding the authenticity of some photos of him in 
his old age and he has been even made into the subject of a novel: Sibylle Lewitscharoff, 
Blumenberg, Frankfurt am Main,	 Suhrkamp, 2011. For more about these problems see, for 
example: Robert Buch, Daniel Weidner (ed.), Blumenberg lesen. Ein Glossar, Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 2014, pp. 11-25; Franz J. Wetz, Hans Blumenberg zur Einführung, 
Hamburg, Junius, 1993, pp. 7-11; Franz J. Wetz, Hermann Timm (ed.), Die Kunst des 
Überlebens. Nachdenken über Hans Blumenberg, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1999, 
p.8. As regards the interpreters’ difficulties, I believe that certain facts have either been 
repeatedly ignored, or not taken with sufficient honesty. As far as the matter of allocating 
Blumenberg to a philosophical current is concerned – the questionableness of such a 
question aside (as if merely belonging to a philosophical school could make it easier to 
understand a philosophy), one must bear in mind that Blumenberg studied with 
phenomenologists such as Ludwig Landgrebe and more than once he stated that his 
research was based on the field of phenomenology. It was no coincidence, as I shall show 
later on in this chapter, that the philosophical terminology he works with most frequently 
and repeatedly is all phenomenological in nature: world, lifeworld, horizon, to name but a 
few. If one is to study this link with phenomenological themes and problems, one must start 
with the Blumenberg-Landgrebe correspondence that is preserved in Nachlaß, Deutsches 
Literaturarchiv, Marbach am Neckar. It should also be borne in mind that hiding was a 
subject that was very close to Blumenberg’s heart, and he devoted extensive research to the 
metaphor of the naked truth (die nackte Wahrheit) as an absolute metaphor of truth. 
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came from the countless objections and stimuli it had aroused in German 
philosophical circles,101 following the first presentation102 of its thesis at the 
Seventh German Philosophy Congress.  
 
 
2. Critique of the historical-interpretative category of secularisation 
At the Seventh German Philosophy Congress, which was held in 1962 
in Münster, many of the most important German philosophers – including 
Karl Löwith, Hans Georg Gadamer and Theodor W. Adorno - were asked to 
reflect upon how historical progress should be understood. The 
unprecedented and systematic violence of the Second World War had cast 
doubt on and led to accusations against the manner in which the 
philosophies of history of an enlightened mould had developed the concept 
of historical progress. This is why the questions that sparked the debate 
dealt with the meaning of the Modern Age, its ties with the theological-
Christian tradition in the Middle Ages and the degree of originality with 
which the Modern Age had presented itself on the scene of history; and this 
is why the key words in the ensuing debate were: civilisation, secularisation, 
revolution and dialectics. 
 
																																								 																				
101 For example contributions by Karl Löwith and Hans Georg Gadamer, because I 
will refer to them throughout this chapter: Karl Löwith and Hans Georg Gadamer, reviews 
by Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitmität der Neuzeit, in Philosophische Rundschau, 15, 1968, 
pp. 196 – 209. 
102  Hans Blumenberg, “Säkularisation.” Kritik einer Kategorie historischer 
Illegitimität, in Helmut Kuhn and Franz Wiedmann (ed.), Die Philosophie und die Frage 
nach dem Fortschritt, München, Verlag Anton Pustet, 1964. 
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2.1 The legitimisation of a historical period 
In his contribution Blumenberg dealt with the subject of progress and 
the Modern Age, in the sense of the problem of the legitimacy of the 
Modern Age: whilst on the one hand, the issue of legitimacy is one that is 
common to all the problems of historical legitimacy, on the other, it is the 
characteristic trait of the Modern Age because for the very first time the 
subjects of a historical period are openly disputing and breaking with 
tradition, questioning the historical continuum. According to Blumenberg, 
the problem of the legitimacy of the Modern Age can be interpreted from 
two different perspectives: the Modern Age is either the result of a historical 
period, the Middle Ages, which was theologically conditioned and in the 
face of which the new period is asserting itself authoritatively, by turning 
against it with disputes; or, it is the metamorphosis of the theological 
substance of the Middle Ages, in other words, a simple derivative of the 
latter, which can only be understood through the category of secularisation. 
The first thesis is able to legitimise human self-assertion (humane 
Selbstbehaupting), that is, to explain the emblematic trait of the Modern 
Age in its full legitimacy; the second categorises it as Christian heresy. 
Nevertheless, the first thesis, which Blumenberg intends to support and 
which asserts the right to autonomy of the Modern Age, has to deal with the 
becoming of historical reality and cannot position the Modern Age in an 
absolutely new beginning, disregarding the rectilinear theological cause-
effect pattern – because it would lose all its meaning. For Blumenberg, the 
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problem of the legitimacy of the Modern Age is therefore extended to the 
problem of how one can keep together the justification of the autonomy of 
historical periods and the idea of the becoming of historical reality, that is, it 
questions directly the actual problem of a philosophy of history that is no 
longer based on the enlightened concept of progress. 
Blumenberg expands this criticism to the category of secularisation on 
two levels: on the one hand, he develops a metalinguistic reflection on the 
terminological transfer of becoming worldly to secularisation, where the 
former is the technical philosophical term derived from Hegel’s 
philosophy103 and the second, is the technical legal term used to name the 
expropriation of assets of the Church, as sanctioned by the Peace of 
																																								 																				
103 The term becoming worldly (Verweltlichung) was not coined by Hegel, but the 
origins of the concept it refers to go back to Hegel’s philosophy of history and, in 
particular, to the reflection on the role of Christianity in the formation of the modern world. 
In G.W.F. Hegel, “Glauben und Wissen oder die Reflexionsphilosophie der Subjectivität, 
in der Vollständigkeit ihrer Formen, als Kantische, Jakobische und Fichtesche Philosophie” 
in Id., Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 4, 1968, pp. 315 – 324, anticipating Weber’s concept of 
disenchantment (Entzauberung), Hegel makes a connection between the Protestantism and 
desacration (Entheiligung) of nature (Natur) in the world (Welt). According to Hegel, this 
desacration is not the emblematic trait of the Modern Age but rather it merely describes the 
relationship between Protestantism and the new conception of the salvation of the world. In 
the later form of his philosophical system, Hegel was to return to this theme, transferring it 
from the religious to the context of philosophy and the history science: the characteristic of 
the Modern Age thus lies in the co-existence of Protestantism of the religious moment, and 
of the worldly moment, which is created through the twofold movement of becoming 
worldly of the principles of free subjectivity and in the subjectivisation of worldliness. This 
twofold movement is to be revived and made famous by Hegel’s epigones. In particular, 
Richard Rothe is the first to identify the becoming worldly process with that of 
secularisation: Richard Rothe, Die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung. 
Ein geshcichtlicher Versuch, Band 1, 1837, 85. For the history of the concepts of becoming 
worldly (Verweltlichung) and secularisation (Säkularisierung), see: Anders H. Lübbe, 
Säkularisierung. Geschichte eines ideenpolitischen Begriffs, Freiburg/München, Verlag 
Karl Alber, 1965; Walter Jaeschke, Hegel Handbuch. Leben, Werk, Wirkung, Stuttgart, J.B. 
Metzler, 2003, pp. 416 sgg.; Id., “Säkularisierung” in Hubert Cancik, Burkhard Gladigow, 
Karl-Heinz Kohl (ed.), Handbuch religionswissenschaftlicher Grundbegriffe, Band V, pp. 9 
– 20, Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlkammer; Hermann Zabel, Verweltlichung/Säkularisierung. 
Zur Geschichte einer Interpretationskategorie, Diss. Phil. Münster 1968. 
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Westphalia;104 on the other hand, he identifies the emblematic moments in 
the history of thought in which the object of philosophical reflection, that is, 
the relationship between man and the world, changes radically, thus 
highlighting the “metakinetics of historical horizons,”105 in other words, the 
actual movement of history. Blumenberg’s critical strategy concentrates on 
understanding how concepts are formed, that is, how meanings are chosen 
and how linguistic usage is determined. 
 
 
2.2 Against the underlying theologism of the secularisation category (1): on 
the use of the secularisation concept 
Blumenberg shows that in historic interpretations the use of the 
expressions becoming worldly and secularisation wavers between two 
meanings: one is descriptive while the other is explicative. The first, 
descriptive meaning is a quantitative observation that presupposes one 
already knows what preceded the becoming worldly, and establishes a 
correlative relationship between not becoming worldly and becoming 
worldly. We all understand and use the expression ‘becoming worldly’ to 
indicate a lengthy process that is characterised by a progressive fading of 
religious ties, of approaches aimed at the transcendent and cult behaviour. 
Furthermore, we are all able to understand what the expression ‘becoming 
worldly’ means because we feel we are still on the horizon of the final stage 
																																								 																				
104 J.G. von Meiern, Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica oder Westphälische Friedens-
Handlungen und Geschichte, 1734, II.15 §14. 
105 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 5.  
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of this process; in other words, we are still all able to understand what 
waiting for salvation means, hope in the after life, transcendence, divine 
judgement, abstinence from the world or abandoning oneself to it. If one 
therefore asks oneself what the expression ‘becoming worldly’ means, the 
answer should be a descriptive meaning of the expression, in which 
‘becoming worldly’ is a process that leads to more profane assets than 
religious ones. 
On the other hand, when ‘becoming worldly’ and ‘secularisation’ are 
used as historic interpretative categories, their use is explanatory – or at 
least is meant to be. To understand the transition from the descriptive to the 
explicative use of the two terms, Blumenberg analyses what happens at a 
semantic level in the transition from the proper use of ‘secularisation’ to the 
analogical one, and in the transfer of this analogical meaning to the 
expression ‘becoming worldly’. 
In fact, by analogy the descriptive use of ‘becoming worldly’ is 
derived from the technical legal use of the word secularisation, and this has 
two consequences. First and foremost, the analogy creates the idea of 
expropriation as a fundamental concept of historical comprehension. 106 
Secondly, a substantialist meaning is introduced in the word world, which 
can only be explained by resorting to the theological premises that are 
extraneous to the historical discourse. In fact, if the enunciations produced 
																																								 																				
106  The analogical transfer preserves the characteristics of the expropriation 
experience, that is, the identificability of the expropriated asset, the legitimacy of the 
primitive property, the unilaterality and partiality of the expropriation (because the original 
property remains the legitimate one).  
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from the application of the secularisation theorem are analysed, it can be 
observed that when speaking of ‘becoming worldly’, phrases such as ‘B is 
secularized A’ are used, determining univocal relationships between the 
points of departure and arrival, so that they are understood as a change of 
substance. 107  In this way ‘becoming worldly’ is no longer a process of 
quantitative loss (such as, for example, when one says that the Peace of 
Westphalia went from more sacred to less sacred assets), but the sum of the 
qualitative, specifiable and transitive transformations of a given substance – 
the world – that must be postulated in the definition of what it now is. One 
therefore no longer dwells on the descriptive process, but on the sum of the 
specific changes, the summation of which results in the product of 
secularisation. 
However, Blumenberg then asks himself that if the historical 
interpretative category of secularisation has a descriptive and not explicative 
use, what interest is it to the historian when speaking of secularisation and 
																																								 																				
107 For example: modern work ethics would be the secularisation of sacredness and 
forms of ascesis; the postulate of the political equality of all citizens would be the 
secularisation of the equality of all men before God; the expectations of political salvation 
as in The Communist Manifestos would be the secularisation of the biblical paradise and 
Messianism. However, Blumenberg regarded Carl Schmidt’s Political Theology as the 
work in which the theorem of secularisation affirmed itself for the first time and with 
vigour; this is why his observations about it are of a more general nature and are, as a rule, 
applicable to all the declinations of the secularisation theorem. According to Blumberg, 
Carl Schmitt opens his Political Theology I with the strongest secularisation theorem: «All 
significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts», 
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignity, transl. by 
George Schwab, Chicago, Univeristy of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 36. The exception state, 
for example, would have its theological correlation in the miracle and the figure of the 
omnipotent legislator would be derived from divine omnipotence. According to 
Blumenberg, Schmitt interpreted political and theological phenomena in a directly 
symmetrical manner, albeit only analogically. The cited examples link historically different 
phenomena in such a way as to present the affirmation of what is subsequent as a result of 
the secularisation of what is previous, one rises from the other. 
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he attributes an explanation to it? According to Blumenberg, secularisation 
is not to be understood as a historical category that is able to explain the 
transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age, but should be 
interpreted as a moment of theological self-comprehension. In other words, 
the secularisation category is an expression of the theological attempt at 
self-preservation: faced with the phenomenon described by the ‘becoming 
worldly’ concept, or rather the withdrawal of religious forms from the 
historical scene, and faced with the consequent doctrinal risk of losing the 
availability of the world as the eminent place of God’s work, theology 
reduced the world to an essential body, but one of such generality that it 
could predicate everything. In fact, theological interest never regarded the 
world, but its position in total dependence to its own categories and in 
function of its own justification and self-preservation. 
However, the theological premises of the use of secularisation are not 
theoretically available, that is, they are not at the historian’s disposal and the 
historian must therefore reject not so much secularisation in the sense of the 
description of a phenomenon, but the service it should provide as an 
argument that justifies the importance and cultural value of Christianity in 
the world. When the historian adopts the secularisation category as a 
historical-interpretative one, the difficulty that emerges is that everybody 
believes they still understand what is meant by the expression ‘becoming 
worldly’ to a certain extent, attributing it to the common use, whilst the use 
made of it is exquisitely theological, entailing the adhesion to premises that 
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are not available theoretically. From a historical point of view, Blumenberg 
concludes that the Modern Age cannot be included with the recourse to the 
secularisation theorem as it introduces conditions into the historical 




2.3 Against the underlying theologism of the secularisation category (2): a 
functionalistic vision of the concepts or of the good use of analogies 
Once the double use (descriptive and explicative) of the secularisation 
category has been explained, and the explicative pretention of the historical 
category has been clarified, one can then ask oneself whether “the 
possibility of a scientific use of the term ‘secularisation’ is possible”. 108 In 
other words, the problem remains whether analogies can be put to good use. 
According to Blumenberg, what made the secularisation category appear as 
an explanatory form of historical processes was because the secularised 
premise conceptions had been traced back to an identity in the historical 
process, and this identity would correspond to a presumed “firm canon of 
the ‘great questions’ that have occupied human curiosity and motivated the 
pretension to world and self-interpretation”109 throughout history and with 
an unchanging urgency. Exploiting the difference that Ernst Cassirer 
introduced between the concept-substance (Substanzbegriff) and concept-
																																								 																				
108 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., p. 11. 
109 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., p. 65. 
 
 115 
function (Funktionsbegriff),110 Blumenberg thus explains what happens in 
the transition from one historical period to another: at a certain moment in 
historical becoming, the answers to the questions about the sense and truth 
of the world appear to be obsolete or, simply and unexpectedly new answers 
appear; as a consequence, these questions require new answers, and the 
relationship between man and the world develops around this. Therefore, in 
the transition from one period to another a transfer of substances 
(Substanzen) that the concepts refer to does not take place, as those who 
support the interpretative secularisation pattern claim, but a change of 
functions (Funktionen) of the actual concepts that make up man’s 
experience in the world. 
Of course this identity, according to the thesis advocated here, is not one of contents but 
one of functions. It is in fact possible for totally heterogeneous contents to take on identical 
functions in specific positions in the system of man’s interpretation of the world and of 
himself. What mainly occurred in the process that is interpreted as secularisation, at least 
(so far) in all but a few recognizable and specific instances, should be described not as the 
transposition of authentically theological contents into secularized alienation from their 
origin but rather as the reoccupation of answer positions that had become vacant and whose 
corresponding questions could not be eliminated.111 
By analysing the formation of concepts, Blumenberg therefore comes 
to an important consequence for the philosophy of history: one has to 
liberate oneself from the conception that there is a fixed canon of great 
questions that throughout history have urgently occupied the desire of man’s 
																																								 																				
110  Ernst Cassirer, Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff, Berlin, Bruno Cassirer 
Verlag 1910; trans. by William Curtis Swabey, Mary Collins Swabey, Substance and 
Function and Einstein’s Theory of Relativity, New York, Dover Publications, 1923. 
111 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., pp. 64 – 65. 
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knowledge and that would motivate the aspiration of the interpretation of 
self and the world.112  
To summarise, it is possible to say that criticism of the secularisation 
category is a criticism of the use of the secularisation concept. Blumenberg 
has no intention of proposing any kind of “linguistic prohibition:”113 those 
who want to speak of ‘becoming worldly’ or ‘secularisation’ to describe a 
historical process are certainly free to do so; what he is disputing is “the 
claim to render intelligible by this terminology something that would 
otherwise not be intelligible, or would be less so.”114 Blumenberg explains 
that he does not wish to either be polemic or negate the demonstrations for 
each individual use but rather that he would like to draw the reader’s 
attention to a quantity of affirmations, the established correlations of which 
are not in question, and verify the soundness of the secularisation category 
as a historical-interpretative one. According to Blumenberg, the 
																																								 																				
112 For example, historians should liberate themselves from the idea of progress, 
which counterbalances the idea of the fixed canon of questions that develop throughout 
history and that would be the secularisation of eschatology. Blumenberg’s controversial 
target here is Karl Löwith, Meaning in History, The University of Chicago Press, 1949. 
Blumenberg believes, however, that there is no mainstay for a transposition (Umsetzung) of 
the idea of eschatology in that of progress, and offers three explanations: a formal one, a 
genetic one and one that concerns the use of analogy. The formal difference lies in the fact 
that eschatology deals with an event that bursts into history and is transcendent and 
heterogeneous to it, while the idea of progress is extrapolated from a structure that is 
immanent to history and compresent in every present towards the future. The genetic 
difference is even more important than the formal one: eschatology is a reply to the 
question about the meaning and progress of history in its totality while the idea of progress 
was originally a structural formula for the theoretical process and as such comes from the 
aesthetic field as a protest against the constant dependency on ancient models. See: Hans 
Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., pp. 43 – 44.  
113 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., p. 5. 
114 Ibid. Here one can discern a reference to Gadamer who had laid claim to a 
legitimate hermeneutic function for the secularisation category that is derived from the fact 
that there is always a dimension of hidden meaning in concepts, Hans Georg Gadamer, 
review of Hans Blumenberg, Die Legitimität der Neuzeit, in Philosophische Rundschau, 15, 
1968, pp. 201 – 209. 
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secularisation category does not play an effective role in the comprehension 
of the Modern Age as regards its legitimacy, or rather, as regards its 
originality and rational authenticity compared to other periods; this is 
because it is a category that is tied to theological premises that cannot be 
shared by either the historian or philosopher and which condition negatively 
the understanding of historical phenomena. In this sense the heaviest 
condition that the secularisation theorem imposes on those who use it, 
affects the conception of the world as an indeterminate substance that, 
throughout the period of historical development has been the object of 
diverse attributes, while the reference itself remained unchanged.  
Blumenberg opposes this conceptual substantialism with an 
anthropological-functionalist vision of the concepts (with clear reference to 
Cassirer’s reference of Substanzbegriff and Funktionsbegriff), according to 
which the concepts are to be understood as orientation strategies in the 
reality imprinted by man, which is the most unsuitable for living because it 
is devoid of a habitat (Umwelt) as a reference point and thus forced to give 
the self a world (Welt) through infinite narrations. 
This biological deficiency, that is, the lack of biological characteristics 
that would tie it to a specific environment, is remedied by man with the 
creation of conceptual systems that allow him to take his distance and orient 
himself inside the chaos and the immediacy of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). 
However, this strategy that man uses to cope with the absolutism of reality 
does not occur just once. Man is forced to the endless rethinking and 
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redefinition of his conceptuality because the lifeworld changes 
continuously, and he has to be able to respond as effectively and rapidly as 
possible to the new arrangement of reality, which always stimulates him in a 
different manner. In this anthropological-phenomenological reference 
framework, the theories, that is, the most abstract conceptualisations, are not 
descriptions of reality but are narrations with which man faces absolutism, 
and the effort to preserve the effectiveness of their function makes it 
necessary to develop the theories. However, this development is not without 
interruptions and, on the contrary, the historical process becomes clear at 
the moments in which a theory is replaced by another. When this happens it 
means that voids have been created within the conceptual system that the 
previous theory is no longer able to fill, and they have to be reoccupied by 
new responses that are able to guarantee the minimum of stability necessary 
to live. 
In conclusion, even if one questions the use of the expression 
secularisation by comparing it with the theological one, it can be seen that, 
while the theological use foresees the legitimacy of original properties, the 
property of an idea or of a concept does not fall under the category of 
legitimacy because, when the comparison is continued to the historical use, 
it entails no positivity for historical understanding. From a methodical 
perspective, it is therefore better to leave the secularisation concept in the 




3. The formation of the Modern Age 
Let us now look at how the second stage of the criticism of the 
secularisation category is structured, in other words, which categories 




3.1 The thesis: the Modern Age as a second overcoming of Gnosis 
The second part of The Legitimacy of the Modern Age begins with two 
untitled pages – almost like a prologue with a syncopated rhythm – that, 
introducing the thesis Blumenberg wants to support, succinctly goes over 
the ways in which he disputes the legitimacy of the Modern Age, that is, its 
rational authenticity compared to other periods. According to Blumenberg, 
there are basically three ways: recourse to the secularisation category, the 
accusation of pagan recidivist aimed at the Renaissance and the accusation 
of gnostic recidivist. Of these, recourse to the secularisation category is 
certainly the most effective because without questioning the originality of 
the Modern Age, it defines it as a period that is clearly derived from the 
Middle Ages. In this manner conditioning exists between the Modern Age 
and the Middle Ages that, apart from the novelty the former represents, is to 
the detriment of its authenticity. The secularisation theorem thus presents 
itself as a gentle refutation of the legitimacy of the Modern Age, because it 
does not expect a past time to be restored, as in the case of the accusation of 
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pagan recidivist and, on the contrary, admits the originality of the Modern 
Age. The refutation does, however, concern the fact that the Modern Age 
has its own rational authenticity and that it might rightly lay claim to it. In 
actual fact, it is this gentle refutation, which seems to do justice to historical 
individuation, that Blumenberg believes is concealing the strong condition 
that the secularisation theorem is imposing on the Modern Age, in other 
words, the request for recognition of conditioning, and thus a 
delegitimisation. 
This is the reason that, according to Blumenberg, despite the elements 
of interest in the secularisation theorem, it is the gnostic recidivist 
accusation that is the most effective in understanding the Modern Age 
because it forces one to question the event that marked the beginning of the 
Middle Ages and the unhealed trauma that then led to the Modern Age, in 
other words, the confrontation between Gnosticism and Christianity. 
Following in the footsteps of the Catholic theologian Adolf von Harnack,115 
who believed that Gnosticism was the stimulus for the start of the Middle 
Ages, understood as the Christian attempt to oppose it by resorting to its 
own dogmatisation, Blumenberg interprets the Middle Ages as something 
that arose from the conflict with the late-antique and early Christian 
Gnosticism. However, the medieval attempt to overcome Gnosticism failed, 
																																								 																				
115 Von Harnack claimed that the Hellenization of the Gospel had been a historic 
decision, thanks to which the ancient Church was able to preserve its identity in the 
difficult confrontation with the Hellenistic civilisation and Roman Empire; see: Adolf von 
Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (1886-1889), Das Wesen des Christentums 
(1900), Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten 
(1902), Marcion (1921). 
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and it was not until the Modern Age that it was reattempted with totally 
different premises. 
The thesis that I intend to argue here begins by agreeing that there is a connection between 
the Modern Age and Gnosticism, but interprets it in the reverse sense: The Modern Age is 
the second overcoming of Gnosticism. A presupposition of this thesis is that the first 
overcoming of Gnosticism, at the beginning of the Middle Ages, was unsuccessful. A 
further implication is that the medieval period, as a meaningful structure spanning 
centuries, had its beginning in the conflict with late-antique and early-Christian Gnosticism 
and that the unity of its systematic intention can be understood as deriving from the task of 
subduing its Gnostic opponent.116 
The reasoning to support his thesis is based on the three main themes 
of Legitimacy, which are, in the order in which they are discussed: the 
fundamental role of the problem of the origin of evil in the development of 
the history of philosophy; the self-assertion category as a privileged 
historical category in the understanding of the Modern Age; reflection on 
what is meant by historical epoch and how the transition from one period to 
another can be determined. 
In the work most of the treatise is devoted to the discussion of the 
concept of epoch and the explanation of what determines the transition from 
one period to another, while less space is devoted to the role of the problem 
of the origin of evil in the history of thought, although it does preserve its 
genealogical priority in the definition of the thesis. The subject of self-
assertion, on the other hand, is enunciated and introduced with an explicit 
																																								 																				
116 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., p. 126; here 
Blumenberg borrows an expression that Eric Voegelin used in Philosophische Rundschau, 




reference to the underlying anthropological question, and it is exemplified 
immediately afterwards in various forms, such as cosmogony and method; 
they are however, all grouped together in a single figure, that of theoretical 
curiosity, which makes explicit the meaning of self-assertion as an 
emblematic characteristic of the Modern Age. 
Both the structure and the economy of the text thus show that 
Blumenberg’s main interest lies in the definition of a hermeneutic rather 
than detailed, in-depth analysis of the Modern Age; indeed, if one looks 
closely, it is almost as if the Modern Age is absent in Legitimacy and that 
the real protagonist is the history movement, analysed at the precise moment 
of the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age. For this reason, 
in the presentation of Blumenberg’s interpretation of the Modern Age, I 
shall first define the hermeneutic strategy he developed, starting with the 
answer to the question of what a historical epoch is and what determines the 
transition from one epoch to another; I shall then clarify the role that the 
problem of evil plays in this hermeneutic strategy, before going on to 
introduce the category of self-assertion as a privileged historical category 
for the interpretation of the Modern Age, including one of the two examples 
of the comparative analysis method put forward by Blumenberg. That 
almost brings us to Giordano Bruno ’s interpretation, but before doing so, I 
shall make a deviation in the next chapter to look more closely at the subject 
of concept formation, followed by the question of metaphorology as an 
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3.2 The epochal threshold (Epochenschwelle) 
According to Blumenberg, through the concept of epochal threshold 
(Epochenschwelle) one is able to comprehend fully the transition from one 
period to another, albeit differentially and thus not directly. This new 
conception of epoch comes from an analysis of the linguistic meaning of the 
word epoch. Going back over the history of the concept, from Antiquity to 
Historicism, Enlightenment and the foundation of the philosophy of history, 
Blumenberg identifies two senses for the meaning of the word. In an initial 
stage, which went from the origins of thought to Enlightenment, epoch was 
an extraordinary event (from the Latin extraordinarium, made up of extra, 
“outside”, and ordinem, “order”, that is “outside the order of things”), which 
was taken as the reference point to measure the temporal duration of the 
state of things. In this sense, the concept of epoch is still very closely linked 
to its astronomical meaning, according to which epoch (from the Greek 
epochè) means the stopping of a movement, or more precisely, the point at 
which a movement inverts direction. In fact, in the technical language of 
ancient astronomy, epochè was the observation point of a star, in other 
words, its passing through the zenith, and in astrology, epochè was a 
position or constellation, the importance of which had been recognised in 
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tradition. Univocally definable, the distances with reference to these points 
were used in chronological assessment. In this first sense, epochs are thus 
those points in the course of time that have been characterised by an out-of-
the ordinary event, and which, as such, is taken as an absolute temporal 
reference (in the Latin sense of ab-solutum, “free”, “independent of the 
rest”). Enlightenment introduces a variation in the meaning of the concept, 
which goes from the evenemential to the situational; this means that 
importance is no longer given to the actions but to the situations, or rather, 
according to what Historicism is going to radicalise, it is no longer the 
events but the characteristics of a period that make the epoch. Blumenberg 
contrasts these two meanings with a third: the epochal threshold. By this he 
means an imperceptible limit that is not clearly tied to any fact or any 
meaningful event. 
In this manner, Blumenberg aims to overcome the gnosiological 
impasse that he claims is afflicting the previous two notions of epoch, which 
are totally dependent on substantialist premises. In other words, both 
meanings betray that expectation of meaning as regards reality and its 
historical progress that, as we have already seen, is unacceptable once the 
functional nature of the concepts and theories has been clarified. The only 
thing that the historical can therefore do, is a differential study that is able to 
understand the epochal threshold, or rather, the traces that reveal that the 
previous conceptual configuration is in difficulty and that a new conceptual 
configuration is healing the rift.  The conceptual function of the threshold 
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image is to explain the situation in which one is no longer outside a place, 
but one has not yet entered either; it is the point at which one can see the 
space one is coming from, and perceive the space one is entering, but in 
perspective, whilst embracing them fully and thoroughly. Differential 
analysis involves interrogating two testimonies that make it possible to 
perceive the epochal threshold. The presupposed condition for differential 
analysis to be historically valid is that the two testimonies can be compared 
as they ask similar questions (we have already seen that Blumenberg does 
not believe there is a canon of fixed question, and that the questions and 
answers can appear on the horizon totally unexpectedly). It is only under 
this condition that differential analysis can make the epochal threshold 
clear, making what must have happened to result in the incompatibility of 
their answers accessible. 
 
 
3.3 The origin of evil in the world 
According to Blumenberg, of all the questions that have been debated 
throughout the centuries, there is one that helps one understand the dynamic 
of the history of ideas better and identify the epochal thresholds: the 
question regarding the origin of evil in the world. The strength of this 
question lies in the fact that it draws the historian’s attention to the 
definition of the world, which is a fundamental philosophical term, and 
shows how, within the diverse conceptions of the world, relationships are 
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defined between world, God and man, which Blumenberg regards as the 
terms underlying the construction of the meaning of history. 
Blumenberg identifies six response models. The first, Plato’s 
Timaeus,117 is the paradigm of the idea of the world as an order (from the 
Greek, kòsmos); thanks to Aristotle, this idea was to dominate classical 
Greek thought. In Plato’s tale of the formation of the cosmos the problem of 
evil is of little importance in the philosophical system. In fact, ancient 
metaphysics has no need to be a cosmogony because the world neither 
needs it nor is it able to justify it: it has no need for it because according to 
the demiurgic myth cosmos is everything that can be in accordance with the 
world of ideas, and it does not have the ability because correspondence with 
the world of ideas is guaranteed by the persuasion with which reason 
subjects necessity. The demiurge is not omnipotent: the material he needs 
exists already, an unordered substrate of unknown cause, and it is by relying 
on the power of reason and its ability to convince that the world originates; 
that is he orders the unordered substrate according to the model of the world 
of ideas. Blumenberg rightly draws the reader’s attention to the fact that 
here we see in action, “the Greeks’ belief in the power of speech and 
persuasion”118 and how this is projected on a cosmic plane. It is the Greek’s 
faith in the power of discourse and persuasion that protects the guarantee of 
goodness of the work done by the Demiurge, and there is not the slightest 
doubt that the material might already have been corrupted by evil or that 
																																								 																				
117 Plato, Timaeus, 47 E – 48 A, transl. by R. G. Bury, Cambridge (MA) – London, 
The Loeb Classical Library, 1966 (1929), pp. 108 – 111. 
118 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., p. 127. 
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this might ruin the Demiurge’s persuasion. Plato’s demiurgic myth thus 
bequeathed tradition with an underlying ambiguity: the phenomenal world 
is a reproduction of ideas, but it is unable to reach its archetype. It is on this 
ambiguity that Neoplatonism (second model) focuses and, in the attempt to 
resolve it, translates the negative element of the demiurgic myth into 
concepts, making it an object of reflection, claiming that the phenomenal 
world is the mistake compared to the ideal model: hyle, the substrate the 
Demiurge needs to create the world, is of unknown origins and contains the 
seed of evil, in other words, the burden of the fact that there is also evil in 
the world is on the inhomogeneity between archetype and material. Plotinus, 
who describes the origin of the world as the fall of the soul of the world in 
material, introduces the idea that the world originates from an act of 
disorder, starting with an ordered situation – the cosmos - , which can be 
restored if the soul of the world inverts the process it is trapped in. Now, it 
is precisely this contemplation of the possibility of inverting this process 
that shows we have not yet reached gnostic dualism. In fact, in Gnosticism 
(third model), the Demiurge is the source of evil, the antagonist of the god 
of transcendent salvation, who has nothing to do with the creation of the 
world and this is why Gnosis does not need theodicy, because the good god 
is not compromised in the world, which is the labyrinth of the lost pneuma. 
The end of the world is the process that leads to definite salvation through 
the suppression of the illegitimate creation of the Demiurge. This is where 
the asymmetry lies compared to Neoplatonism: Neoplatonism foresees a 
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symmetrical path to the prehistory of perdition for the redemption process, 
while Gnosticism does not foresee the restoration of the original state.119 To 
stem this dangerous gnostic dualism, the Church had to dogmatize itself. 
The Middle Ages (from the origins to scholasticism: the fourth model) 
should therefore be seen as an attempt to protect itself from the gnostic 
syndrome, reviving the world as a creation from the negativisation of its 
demiurgic origins and saving its ancient dignity as a cosmos, by transferring 
it to the Christian system, a task that was made even more urgent as the 
much-awaited Parousia had not occurred. The world, which was proving to 
last much longer than expected, once again attracted questions regarding its 
origin and reliability. Since it appeared that redemption would be less 
spectacular than had been believed, metaphysical interest in the creation 
was reawakened and Christianity had to adapt to the rules of the game of the 
pre-existing world, which continued to exist; it had to prove its own ability 
in the discussion with the surrounding Hellenistic environment and its 
pressing questions about its position of the new doctrine regarding the old 
cosmos. The first and most complete attempt at trying to keep God the 
creator and God the Saviour together in a single system was thanks to 
Augustine. Although it had been expected that the salvation of man would 
have been a result of the destruction of the cosmos, Christianity’s 
compromise with ancient metaphysics led to a new conservatorism of the 
																																								 																				
119 Blumenberg is not interested in embracing the totality of the speculative variants 
of Gnosticism but rather in underlining that it was a challenge for both ancient tradition and 
Christianity, disputed with the former the perfection of the cosmos and with the second the 
correlation between creation and salvation thanks to the only God. 
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world, thanks to the introduction of the theological patrimony of the stoic 
formula of providence, according to which the world had been created for 
man. However, whilst explaining the duration of the world beyond the 
expectations of the Parousian, and its possible use as an anti-gnostic 
argument, the concept of providence still revived the discussion about the 
origins of evil in the world and removed any possibility of explanation with 
the resort to the material’s pre-existing dualism. Evil thus became an 
element that was included in the creation from nothing (creatio ex nihilo). 
Once the gnostic response had been neutralised, man was then encumbered 
with the problem of the justification of God. It was for this reason that 
Augustine defined a new concept of freedom, with the aim of laying on man 
all the blame and responsibility of evil. For Blumenberg, the thematic 
question of De libero arbitrio is “the condition under which it was possible 
for the just God to punish man, on account of his failings, with the bad 
things in the world.” 120  This theory allowed Augustine to interpret the 
defects of the world not as the original failure of its destination in favour of 
man, but as modifying interventions by God in his work, with which he 
places nature at the service of justice towards man. In many ways 
Mediaeval Scholasticism goes back over Augustine’s itinerary in an attempt 
to exonerate God. At the end of the Middle Ages there was also a shift in 
the emphasis of the interpretation of man in the world and a different vision 
of the divine principle. According to Blumenberg, this was due to the 
																																								 																				
120 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., p. 133. 
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nominalist current (fifth model). According to William of Ockham, an 
exponent of this current that appeared on the philosophical scene in the 
fourteenth century, reason is unable to offer justifications of truth that 
surpass sensible experience as its cognitive power is limited and conditioned 
by the latter. This differentiation by Occam is of great importance and 
marks a turning point in the relationship between reason and faith, which 
had been maintained in harmony until Anselm and Thomas. Nominalists 
believed that the cognitive power of reason cannot address the explanation 
of the supernatural. God becomes a hidden god who works above any 
ability of human knowledge, and what the human subject can know about 
the divine nature is only possible through the act of faith of Christian 
revelation. According to Blumenberg, the god of Nominalism has no ratio 
creandi whatsoever, in other words, no plausible explanation for the 
creation of the world. From such a vision of God to total and absolute 
liberty – the traces of which can be found in Descartes – it is just a small 
step. By contrasting faith and reason, one could say that this Occamist 
fideism encouraged the development of scientific thought, distinguishing it 
from that of metaphysics and theology. The rift that was created between 
theology and philosophy revealed the irrationality of the theological-
metaphysical dogmas and their incompatibility with science. It might be 
more accurate to say that it was not so much Nominalism that encouraged 
the development of modern thought but rather the urgency, driven by the 
disappearance of the image of a god who intervened in the things of the 
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world, to find new horizons of thought. The Middle Ages ended, when in 
the interior of its spiritual system it was no longer able to preserve for man 
the credibility of Creation as providence, and he was thus burdened with its 
affirmation.  Human self-assertion (the sixth model) revealed man’s eminent 
need for a new model of reality, having lost any cosmic advantage. This 
resulted in the particular importance that was given in this context to the 
concept of loss of order (Ordnungsschwund). The crisis of the late-
mediaeval order, described as the autonomation of the sphere of human 
performance, resulted in man’s construction of a counter-world that, 
detached from the model of the Greek cosmos and the Christian theological 
one, enabled him to stop the fall into nothingness. The need of the human 
subject to create a new order, or rather, a self-order was directly linked to a 
new vision of freedom, which had lost the characteristics Augustine had 
given it, and had become responsible for the condition of the world as it was 
a need directed towards the future, not a past original sin. The human 
subject founds anthropodicy in antithesis to theodicy and the evil of the 
world thus become simple aspects of the effective reality. The metaphysical 
insecurity the human being finds himself thrown into, and the fear of 
nothingness force him to take care of his existence (Dasein). The ensuing 
transformation of man’s role from created creature to artifice of his own 
destiny also leads to changes in the concept of self-preservation 
(Selbsterhaltung): the latter essentially presents itself as transformation of 
the theology concept. With Newton’s first law, the perseverare in statu suo 
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is transformed into statum suum mutare, in other words, the physical laws of 
movement are embellished with the ability of transformation, which is 
fundamental for the development of the sciences and the entire philosophy 
of the Modern Age as a whole. 121  What the moderns claim, including 
Descartes, is that not only was the world created from nothing, starting from 
a temporal point zero, but it also has to defend itself from the effects of 
nothingness (it is no coincidence that Descartes talks of création continuée).  
Conservatio and creatio thus become two complementary aspects. 
 
 
3.4 Self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung) and the first of the two emblematic 
comparative analyses 
In his comparative analysis of Epicureanism and Nominalism, 
Blumenberg asks why the ancient epochal crisis did not find its 
correspondence in self-assertion. In other words, he discusses the theory in 
which Hellenism can be seen as a sort of impeded Modern Age, on the one 
hand by the irruption of Christianity, and on the other, by what is still a 
primitive and insufficient technical availability. Blumenberg wants to prove 
that this hermeneutic hypothesis is not valid, in as much as it is unable to 
perceive the different conception of the cosmos that dominates at the two 
historical moments; it is therefore not able to highlight the reoccupation of 
																																								 																				
121  Blumenberg explains elsewhere that this is not one of the many rational 
principles but it is the actual beginning of the new rationality: Hans Blumenberg, 
Selbsterhaltung und Beharrung. Zur Konstitution der neuzeitlichen Rationalität, Verlag der 
Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes- und 
Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, n. 11, 1969, p. 4. 
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the theoretical places at the two historical moments. What Blumenberg 
wants to do, however, is to explain the process in which the metamorphosis 
of meaning does not simply represent a linear descent and a parental tie with 
the previous meanings, but above all expresses the need to adapt to the new 
constellations of reality.  
The detailed comparative analysis of ancient atomism and nominalist 
volontarism, which from Nicola d’Autrecourt on at least, revealed its 
affinity with atomistic physics, highlights the fact that in late Antiquity and 
the late Middle Ages, heterogeneous attitudes towards the world were 
induced. It is true that there were different forms of man’s turning away 
from the cosmos and the ideal of theory in Hellenistic philosophy but the 
severity of the problem had remained hidden in the uninterrupted validity of 
the cosmic quality of reality. In fact, gnostic speculation is not an expression 
of a loss of order, but rather an expression of the overturning of the value of 
an order, that is, the ancient conception of the cosmos, which is becoming 
petrified. In other words, the world was in any case order, and that sufficed 
so that man would not need to perceive himself as self-asserted towards it. 
In fact, a characteristic of Epicurism is the neutralisation of the human 
reference to the cosmos, while atomistic physics had to establish the 
indifference of physical replies for the configuration of life in the world, 
that is, objectivisation. The immanent aim of objectivisation is to verify a 
hypothesis, while neutralisation wants to eliminate uncertainties without, 
however, creating certainties. Basically, the epochal difference lies in the 
 
 134 
fact that Epicurus ignores the postulate of the dominion over nature as a 
consequence of its consideration of man’s situation in the world; for both 
Bacon and Descartes, on the other hand, this postulate became the 
quintessence of the existential necessities foreseen for man. Epicurus did 
not regard making man maitres et possesseurs de la nature as a condition 
for the possibility of human existence in the world. What his desire for 
knowledge lacked, one could say, was technical implication – he wanted to 
be able to distance the phenomenon, and not produce it. The late-mediaeval 
man has no way out: neither towards the exterior, nor towards the interior: 
the world is devoid of order and God could be a malignant genius. 
Towards the end of his study on the Modern Age, Blumenberg 
highlights the difficulties the nominalists had encountered. Their realistic 
theory of concepts, which tried to eliminate the substantialistic and eidetic 
nuclei of reality, had only managed to remove through logic the difference 
between divine and human grandeur. In this manner, man had to continue to 
be forced to isolate himself from the world, and self-assert himself against 
it. The need for credibility and rational acceptability of the world leads the 
human subject to use the human instrument par excellence, reason, and to 
reawaken the theoretical curiosity that had been put to sleep by the 
Christian-mediaeval culture. The greatest difference between this moment 
and the earlier one is that the world has lost the order that characterised it, 
and now it is without a structure that can be referable to man; as a result 
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human freedom thus becomes responsibility towards a world that is 
available. 
Since Creation loses credibility as providence, man is burdened with 
self-assertion (Selbstbehauptung). With self-assertion Blumenberg does not 
mean the pure biological preservation of the living being man with the 
means available to his nature; instead, he means a life programme that man 
subjects his own existence to in a historical situation and in which he traces 
the way in which he intends to face the reality around him, seizing his own 
possibilities. 
The places left free by providence and theology are reoccupied by 
self-assertion in the form of its most effective instrument: modern science. 
In this process the quantitative analysis of the performances and technical 
resources must also be interpreted. The destruction of faith in the structure 
of the world order had to mean an outstandingly pragmatic change in the 
conception of the world and man’s relationship with the world. 
Furthermore, the growth of the technical potential is not only the 
continuation, but neither is it just the acceleration of a process that embraces 
the entire history of humanity. The quantitative multiplication of the 
performances and technical resources can only be derived from a new 
quality of the consciousness. In the growth of the technical sphere there is a 
will that consciously tackles the estranged reality, a will to conquer a new 
humanity of this reality. Man is now more interested in the lack of nature as 
it is comprises the impulse for all his behaviour. 
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The other side of self-affirmation that is shown historically is that of 
curiosity. Whilst Aristotle believes there is identity between the possession 
of knowledge and happiness (eudaimonìa), in Confessions 122  Augustine 
believes that curiosity is a dangerous. In fact, according to Augustine, 
knowledge of the world and looking after salvation are anti-ethical 
concepts. In the Modern Age, there is a growing interest for human 
curiosity, mainly owing to the greater value attributed to human reason in 
the development of the natural sciences in the search of new foundations of 
the real. The research objective the new science of nature sets itself is not 
the metaphysical explanation of the enigma of the universe and the 
preservation of the truth of theological contents; instead, it is particularly 
interested in reoccupying this theological void at a purely anthropological 
level. Self-assertion has to be based on autonomous rationality or, to use 
Descartes’ words, it represents self-justification (Selbstbegründung). 
Blumenberg offers us to two complementary aspects of science: on 
the one hand, it helps us exorcise the enigmatic character of nature, on the 
other, it reveals and confirms the mysterious nature of natural phenomena. 
With the Copernican revolution, which Blumenberg regards as the absolute 
metaphor of the Modern Age, the disenchantment of the world is clear. 
After Copernicus, man has become aware of his precarious and relative 
position in the universe and, if he wants to avoid being plunged into a void, 
he has to take reason as the only strong point, the only tool that allows 
																																								 																				
122 Augustine, Confessions, X. 25, op. cit. 
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human infiniteness to compensate the indifference and infinitude of the 
universe. Giordano Bruno marks this change in direction. Man must not 
abandon himself to otium and Lucretian-like to nature, but has to be active 
in the world through work, the only instrument that can make him similar to 






From metaphorology as an auxiliary discipline to the 






We have said that smart sayings are derived from proportional 
metaphor and expressions which set things before the eyes. We 
must now explain the meaning of “before the eyes”, and what must 
be done to produce this. I mean that things are set before the eyes 
by words that signify actuality. (…) As we have said before, 
metaphors should be drawn from objects which are proper to the 
object, but not too obvious; just as, for instance, in philosophy it 
needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in things that are apart. 




ABSTRACT The chapter analyses Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, Hans 
Blumenberg’s first work on metaphorology as an accessory discipline to the history of 
concepts (Begriffsgeschichte). In this book Blumenberg convincingly shows how the 
rearrangement of the order (therefore of the historical periods) occurs through the 
replacement or metamorphosis of the metaphor-guide of conceptual formation. 
Blumenberg’s understanding of “absolute metaphor” and the relationship between 
																																								 																				
123 For the subjects dealt with in this chapter, I not only took into consideration Hans 
Blumenberg’s, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, op. cit., but also: Hans Blumenberg, 
“Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit. Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung”, 
Studium Generale, Berlin, 10 (1957), n. 7, pp. 432 – 447; Id., “Beobachtungen an 
Metapher,” Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, Bonn, 15 (1971), n. 2, pp. 161 – 214; Id., 
“Nachdenklichkeit,” Neue Züricher Zeitung, Zürich, 21 November 1980. 
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philosophy and the use of metaphors is made clear with a selection of few moments in the 
history of the debate on metaphors, beginning with Aristotle. At the end of the chapter, 
explaining the phenomenological characteristics of Blumenberg’s discussion, I shall put 
forward the interpretation of metaphorology as a “discipline of attention.” 
 
 
In the previous chapter we saw that according to Hans Blumenberg, 
the transition from one historical period to another can be understood as the 
redefinition of the concept of order, which is the concept through which the 
relationship between man and the world is defined. Let us now look at how 
the historian of concepts can study the conceptual rearrangement of the 
concept of order. 
 
 
1. Metaphorology as an auxiliary discipline of the history of philosophy 
Hans Blumenberg’s first work, Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie, 
focuses on the use of metaphors in philosophy. As regards content, a large 
part of the book is devoted to the presentation of a review of the reception 
of some of the metaphors throughout the history of thought, for example: 
the metaphor of light for the concept of truth, the metaphor of the naked 
truth, the organicistic metaphor and the mechanicistic metaphor for the 
comprehension of the world, etc. This historical interpretation is 
accompanied by an introductory chapter on the underlying motives of this 
study; how the study, which Blumenberg calls metaphorology, was carried 
out, is indicated only with sparse comments in the following chapters. 
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1.1 Metaphor, concept and history 
In the introduction Blumenberg asks us to imagine what would have 
happened if the Cartesian methodology programme had been implemented: 
what would the scenario have been if the four Cartesian method rules had 
always been respected?124 If the clarity and accuracy of all the facts of the 
experience expressed in judgement had been fully implemented, we would 
find ourselves in a situation of perfect objectivity, which would correspond 
to “the perfection of a terminology designed to capture the presence and 
precision of the matter at hand in well-defined concepts.”125 There would no 
longer be anything undetermined and “logically ‘provisional’ (logisch 
überholbar)”126 and the translated forms of the language would only be 
provisional forms, sooner or later to be replaced with logical forms. 
This situation of perfect objectivity and logical-terminological 
perfection would not only result in the elimination of the historical studies 
of concepts, but of history itself. In fact, from a perspective of perfect 
logical-conceptual definition, the history of concepts is only of any “critical 
																																								 																				
124 “The first was never to accept anything as true that I did not incontrovertibly 
know to be so; that is to say, carefully to avoid both prejudice and premature conclusions; 
and to include nothing in my judgements other than that which presented itself to my mind 
so clearly and distinctly, that I would have no occasion to doubt it. The second was to 
divide all the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible, and as many as 
were required to solve them in the best way. The third was to conduct my thoughts in a 
given order, beginning with the simplest and most easily understood objects, and gradually 
ascending, as it were step by step, to the knowledge of the most complex; and positing an 
order even on those which do not have a natural order of precedence. The last was to 
undertake such complete enumerations and such general surveys that I would be sure to 
have left nothing out”, René Descartes, A Discourse on the Method of Correctly 
Conducting One’s Reason and Seeking Truth in the Sciences, transl. by Ian Maclean, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 17 
125 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 1. 
126 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 2. 
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and destructive (einen kritisch-destruktiven Wert)”127 value of the failure of 
the “actual presence (Verfehlung der genauen Präsenz)” 128  of reality. 
Therefore, from the perspective of the Cartesian methodology programme, 
the history of concepts is destined to disappear when the exact presence is 
achieved, which, according to Descartes, is bound to be reached.129 
Nevertheless, although the Cartesian method programme was 
achievable and although the sciences and philosophy reached a level of 
perfection with their highly accurate terminology, what is presented to us is 
the persistence of the historicity and the persistence of the use of figurative 
expressions even in highly abstract theoretical contexts. This persistence 
leads Blumenberg to ask himself “the fundamental question of the 
conditions under which metaphors can claim legitimacy in philosophical 
language.”130 Blumenberg sees two possibilities: either metaphors are the 
vestibule of conceptuality and, as such, reveal the incorrectness of the 
concept that has not yet been logically defined, or one could hypothesise 
that there are metaphors “that resist being concerted back into authenticity 
																																								 																				
127 Ibid., p. 2. 
128 Ibid., p. 2. 
129 It was Giambattista Vico who realised that the implementation of the Cartesian 
method meant the elimination of the meaning of history, and he opposed Cartesian logic 
with a logic of fantasy. Cartesian logic is founded on clarity and distinction, but according 
to Vico these characteristics are only reserved to the relationship that God has with his 
work, with what is the given for us; man, on the other hand, only has the clarity of what he 
has produced: “the world of our images and artefacts, our conjectures and projections – in 
short, the universe of our ‘imagination’, in the new, productive sense of the term unknown 
to antiquity,” Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 2. Vico, 
according to Blumenberg, thus revived in philosophy the interpretation of the translated 
discourse of the metaphor, which was traditionally part of the chapter of rhetorical figures. 
130 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 3. 
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and logicality,”131 that is, absolute in the sense of independent of the concept 
and that, as such, are the first elements of the philosophical language. The 
function of absolute metaphors is the “hiding (Verborgenheit)” of a 
concept’s logical deficiency and, being absolute, their analysis would be 
determinant in the understanding of the history of thought; this is because 
we would thus find ourselves having to redefine the relationship between 
fantasy (Phantasie) and logos in the direction of a reassessment of fantasy. 
It would no longer be a container of images that can be drawn on while 
working on the definition of the concept, until its availability is used up; 
rather, it would be a “catalytic sphere from which the universe of concepts 




1.2 The Kantian origins of the problem of the absolute metaphor 
To allow a better understanding of what the word ‘metaphor’ means, 
Blumenberg explains that he is reformulating the problem of symbols as 
Kant had formulated it in paragraph 59 of Critique of Judgement.  
Kant calls the procedure of the translation of reflection of an object of 
intuition to a totally different concept ‘symbol’, in other words, the 
procedure that explains how the ideas (the concepts of reason) exhibit 
reality. Kant writes: 
																																								 																				
131 Ibid. 
132 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 4.  
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The use of the word symbolic in contrast to the intuitive kind of representation has, of 
course, been accepted by recent logicians, but this is a distorted and incorrect use of the 
word: for the symbolic is merely a species of the intuitive. The latter, namely (the 
intuitive), can be divided into the schematic and the symbolic kinds of representation. Both 
are hypotyposes, i.e., presentations (exhibitions): and not mere characterizations, i.e., 
designations of the concepts by means of accompanying sensible signs, which contain 
nothing at all belonging to the intuition of the object, but only serve them, in accordance 
with the laws of association of the imagination, and hence in a subjective regard, All 
intuitions that are ascribed to concepts a priori are thus either schemata  or symbols , the 
first of which contain direct, the second indirect presentations of the concept. The first do 
this demonstratively, the second by means of an analogy (for which empirical intuitions are 
also employed), in which the power of judgment performs a double task, first applying the 
concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then, second, applying the mere rule of 
reflection on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the first is only the 
symbol. Thus a monarchical state is represented by a body with a soul if it is ruled in 
accordance with laws to the people, but by a mere machine (like a handmill) if it is ruled by 
a single absolute will, but in both cases it is represented only symbolically.  For between a 
despotic state and a handmill there is, of course, no similarity, but there is one between the 
rule for reflecting on both and their causality. This business has as yet been little discussed, 
much as it deserves a deeper investigation; but this is not the place to dwell on it. Our 
language is full of such indirect presentations, in accordance with an analogy, where the 
expression does not contain the actual schema for the concept but only a symbol for 
reflection. Examples are the words ground (support, basis), depend  (be held from above), 
from which flow  (instead of follow), substance  (as Locke expresses it: the bearer of 
accidents), and innumerable other nonschematic but symbolic hypotyposes and expressions 
for concepts not by means of a direct intuition, but only in accordance with an analogy with 
it, i.e., the transportation of the reflection on one object of intuition to another, quite 
different concept, to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond. If one may 
already call a mere kind of representation cognition (which is certainly permissible if it is a 
principle not of the theoretical determination of what an object is in itself, but of the 
practical determination of what the idea of it ought to be for us and for the purposive use of 
it), then all of our cognition of God is merely symbolic, and anyone who takes it, along 
with the properties of understanding, will, etc., which prove their objective reality only in 
beings within the world, a  as schematic, lapses into anthropomorphism, just as, if he leaves 
out everything intuitive, he lapses into deism, by which nothing at all, not even from a 
practical point of view, is cognized.133 
																																								 																				
133 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, Cambridge, Cambridge 
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Blumenberg also prefers to use the word ‘metaphor’ instead of 
‘symbol’ to avoid creating any confusion with the logical meaning of the 
term and to make sure it is not burdened with other meanings. The 
overlapping of the problem of the symbol and that of the absolute metaphor 
can be recognised in the fact that Blumenberg, when speaking of absolute 
metaphors, does not speak of the translation of meaning of a word to 
another, but of the procedure of the translation of the reflection. In other 
words, here metaphor means the mechanism of the metaphoricity and not 
the translated expression of the literal one. Blumenberg is therefore 
interested in analysing the semantic problem of the metaphor, that is, the 
problem of the “mechanism bearing the transfer of meaning.”134 
 
 
1.3 Absolute metaphors have history (beyond the Kantian historical 
apriorism) 
In short, we have seen that the absolute metaphor is the procedure of 
reflection translation, of which Blumenberg highlights the linguistic origin 
and irreducibility to the concept, that is, its absolute being, as it resists 
logical-conceptual reduction; in other words, when a metaphor is described 
as an absolute metaphor, one implies that it cannot be substituted by a 
concept. This does not mean, however, that an absolute metaphor cannot be 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
University Press, 2000, pp. 226 – 227. 
134 Enzo Melandri, “Per una filosofia della metafora”, introduction of the Italian 
edition by Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1969, 
p. IX (translation mine). 
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substituted or corrected by another. In this sense, one can say that absolute 
metaphors have history and their history “brings to light the metakinetics of 
the historical horizons of meaning and ways of seeing within which 
concepts undergo their modifications,”135 that is, absolute metaphors show 
how the different conceptual systems man uses to order reality are arranged. 
In fact, the questions that absolute metaphors answer are not: What world 
can we have? What are we waiting for? But rather: What was it we wanted 
to know? What was the world one believed they had? In other words, they 
are questions that Blumenberg calls the “man’s clandestine expectations in 
the face of reality”136 and it is because of this unique function of retrieving 
the “substructure of thought” that metaphorology is closely linked to the 
history of concepts. 
Metaphorology seeks to burrow down to the substructure of thought, the underground, the 
nutrient solution of systematic crystallizations; but it also aims to show with what ‘courage’ 
the mind preempts itself in its images, and how its history is projected in the courage of its 
conjectures.137 
Blumenberg is not getting ready, however, to found a metaphorology 
as a classificatory science of absolute metaphors. He wants to lay the 
foundations for a metaphorological paradigmatics, a discipline with the 
preparatory task of demarcating the fields in which one is more likely to 
find absolute metaphors, or rather, procedures of the reflection translation 
																																								 																				
135 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 5. 
136 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 10: “den clandestinen 
Erwartungen des menschen gegenüber der Wirklichkeit” (translation mine). 
137 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 5. 
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that are not constantly definable with resorting to concepts. In this sense the 
work of a paradigmatic is more radical than a history of metaphors because 
it focuses the attention on the distortions of meaning of the history of 
concepts, and of history in general, making it possible to recognise epochal 
thresholds. More specifically, once an absolute metaphor has been 
identified, a metaphorological paradigmatic traces the historical lines of its 
development and, at the most important moments of this course, it studies in 
depth the more particular uses, the ones that reveal the most radical 
distortions. 138 
																																								 																				
138 Of help in clarifying this point is Enzo Melandri’s reflection on the meaning of 
the book’s title: Enzo Melandri, “Per una filosofia della metafora”, introduction to the 
Italian edition of Hans Blumenberg, Paradigmi per una petaforologia, op. cit., p. VII. 
Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie evokes the Kantian Prolegomena zu einer jeden 
künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können. The analogy between the 
titles is justified because, as seen earlier, Blumenberg makes a direct reference to Kant as a 
source of metaphorological research. However, to what extent is it possible to insist on this 
analogy and how far can one go? Should this implicit reference be interpreted as the 
adhesion to a research programme that would make the fundamental exposition of the 
fundamental principles and propositions of a doctrine precede the systematic exposition of 
the latter? But then, since in the corpus of Blumenberg’s works there is no systematic 
exposition of metaphorology, can the Paradigmen be regarded as the beginning of an 
ambitious project that was never completed? If one looks carefully, the analogy only 
concerns the form of the titles and not the content; on the contrary, the titles are the 
opposite of one another and in this sense a critical stance against critical philosophy is to be 
perceived. The inceptive meaning of that ‘for’ certainly makes one think one is going to 
read a programmatic work that will be followed by the science of the metaphor, which is “a 
classification system of metaphors, that is both coherent and complete.” But being 
discussed are paradigms, i.e. models, and not prolegomena, i.e. the fundamental exposition 
of fundamental principles and propositions. This is a fundamental difference: the 
Paradigms, as such, can potentially be replaced by others – in fact, the paradigm does not 
lead to the original, to the terminus a quo -; instead, prolegomena establish the terminus a 
quo of the doctrine that is to systematically take place at a later moment. This is why the 
Paradigms are for a possible, unspecified metaphorology – but, others would be potentially 
possible starting with other paradigms; while prolegomena are for any metaphysical future 
that wants to present itself as a science. And this is precisely what Blumenberg is trying to 
oppose. I would like to add another observations to Melandri’s on the importance of the 
title that comes from an essay Blumenberg wrote in 1971: Hans Blumenberg, „Paradigma, 
grammatisch”, in Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte, 15, 1971, p. 196, then in Hans 
Blumenberg, Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben, Reclam, Stuttgart 1981, pp. 157 – 162. In 
it Blumenberg reflects on the paradigm concept that Thomas Kuhn introduced in the theory 
and history of science, observing that, “One reads this text without, however, understanding 
anything other in the expression ‘paradigm’ than the meaning of ‘example.’” (translation 
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First and foremost, metaphorology has to make the metaphorical 
implications of the theories clear. For example, if one wanted to study the 
concept of truth from a strictly logical point of view, if one wanted to study 
that concept by making explicit the meaning of the given definitions, one 
would achieve little. In fact, Blumenberg says, the most common definition 
is the one that Scholasticism erroneously attributed to Isaac ben Salomon 
Israeli:139 “veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus.” Although this formula 
allows very few modifications (basically two: either the adaequatio of the 
intellect to the object or of the object to the intellect), this limited latitude 
between the two positions (Spielraum) sufficed for all the philosophical 
systems working on the definition of the concept of truth. However, this 
definition – in either of the two meanings – never satisfies the question: 
what is the truth? So, anyone who wants to study the concept of truth should 
not limit themselves to a strictly logical point of view; they would be better 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
mine). Hans Blumenberg, Die wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben, op. cit., p. 158: “Man liest 
diesen Text, ohne in dem Ausdruck <Paradigma> etwas anderes als die Bedeutung 
<Beispiel> wahrzunehmen”. However, the expression ‘paradigm’ can also be used in the 
sense of ‘grammatical example.’ And it is precisely with this meaning that Blumenberg is 
using it in the Paradigms. The absolute metaphors in question function, for example, for 
the discovery of similar structures. But metaphors are linguistic examples and refer to 
similar linguistic structures. In fact, as seen earlier, Blumenberg’s conception of the 
metaphor is directly derived from the conception of the symbol as Kant described it in § 59 
of the third Critique. By renaming the translation procedure of reflection with the word 
‘metaphor’ Blumenberg, however, obtains a twofold result: he relieves the procedure Kant 
called the symbol of logical tradition and places the matter in what he has recognised as its 
original philosophical field: reflection on the use of language. Indeed, by putting forward a 
metaphorical philosophy, Blumenberg concludes the first stage of his research on the study 
of the relationship philosophy-science; however, he also begins to retrieve what he believes 
to be the original meaning of philosophy and its truth, returning to the reflection on the use 
of language in philosophy. In this initial stage, however, the critical aspect of philosophical 
expectations dominates over the constructive sense and the role of philosophy, which 
Blumenberg was to arrive at more explicitly in the eighties, as we shall see at the end of 
this chapter. 
139 See Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 6, n. 1 for the 
historical reconstruction of this false attribution. 
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off following the history of the metaphor associated with the problem of 
truth, that of light, because “the question explicates itself in a concealed 
plenitude never yet hazarded by any system.”140 The expression “concealed 
plenitude” refers to the fact that metaphors voice the attempt to reply to 
fundamental questions, which appear to be naïve, pre-systematic and often 
ignored questions. 
They are questions such as: 
To what extent does mankind partake of the whole of the truth? What situation do those 
who seek the truth find themselves in? Can they feel confident that what exists will freely 
reveals itself to them, or is knowledge to be acquired only through an act of violence, by 
outwitting the object, extorting information from it under duress, interrogating it on the 
rack? Is our share in truth meaningfully regulated by the economy of our needs, for 
example, or by our aptitude for superabundant happiness in accordance with the idea of a 
visio beatificata.141 
In the philosopher’s language are hints of how philosophy replied to 
these questions prior to judgement (that is, before formulating judgment), 
how philosophy regarded the relationship of man with the world and man 
with himself. Through metaphors, the philosophical language expresses 
portrayal-models that guide the most refined and abstract philosophical 
conceptions. In fact, the metaphor is not only to be found along the path 
from the metaphor to the concept, but also, - and this is the result that is 
																																								 																				
140  Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 7. Hans 
Blumenberg had already tackled this subject in an essay several years earlier: “Licht als 
Metapher der Wahrheit. Im Vorfeld der philosophischen Begriffsbildung”, op. cit. 
141 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 7. 
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most affected by metaphorology – in the opposite direction, from the 
concept to the metaphor.142 
Absolute metaphors are said to be answers to fundamental questions  
Absolute metaphors ‘answer’ the supposedly naïve, in principle unanswerable questions 
whose relevance lies quite simply in the fact that they cannot be brushed aside, since we do 
not pose them ourselves but find them already posed in the ground of our experience.143 
Regarding the original collocation of fundamental questions a 
metaphorology can offer neither a method for the use of metaphors nor a 
method that allows us to dominate the questions the metaphors are speaking 
about. The metaphor, according to metaphorology, is an essentially 
historical object, the truth of which is a pragmatic one.  This means that the 
metaphor expresses truth to the extent in which, speaking about the 
questions that cannot be answered but nor can they be left undecided, it 
decides, in other words, producing a model that allows man to exist. 
A closer look at this aspect of the matter is not included in the 
Paradigms and the 1960 work, once and for all, gives the reader: the 
definition of an auxiliary discipline of the history of philosophy, 
metaphorology; a problem that regards the meaning of philosophy, the 
resolution of which the newly-created discipline should also help solve, and 
																																								 																				
142 Here Blumenberg takes a greater distance from Ernst Cassirer, who, together 
with Edmund Husserl, should be considered one of Blumenberg’s authors of reference, as 
he himself stated when he was awarded the Kuno Fischer Preis: Hans Blumenberg, “Ernst 
Cassirers Gedenkend. Rede bei Entgegennahme des Kuno-Fischer Preises der Universität 
Heidelberg im Juli 1974,” in Revue Internationale de Philosophies, Bruxelles, 28 (1974), 
pp. 456 – 463. For more about the subject of the myth and science in Cassirer, see: Ernst 
Cassirer, An Essay on Man – An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1944. 
143 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 14. 
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which is linked to the problem of the origin of absolute metaphors; finally, a 
task that was legacy of Kant’s third Critique, in other words, finding the 
justification of the similarities between the rules that make the similarity 
between different things possible. 
Before continuing with the presentation of Blumenberg’s thought on 
the presence of metaphors in philosophical discourse, and before looking at 
how he deals with the questions left unanswered in the Paradigms, I would 
like to outline the fundamental lines of this horizon of philosophical 
questions concerning the debate on metaphors to allow a better 
understanding of Blumenberg’s stance. 
 
 
2. Historical reconstruction of the philosophical theories of the 
metaphor, with reference to Hans Blumenberg’s metaphor theory 
Although it has always been left in the background of the big 
problems, that of the metaphor has always been a constant in the history of 
philosophy and Western culture. In fact, the metaphor has not been the 
object of just one discipline: philosophy, rhetoric, aesthetics, have all had 
their share as have linguistics and psychology and, recently, following 
renewed interest, even disciplines such as epistemology and pedagogy have 
had shown interest. Moreover, from the very moment that, as Umberto Eco 
pointed out, studying metaphors also means looking at “(and the list is 
incomplete) of: symbol, ideogram, model, archetype, dream, desire, 
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delirium, rite, myth, magic, creativity, paradigm, icon, portrayal,”144 even 
people who were not directly involved made their contribution to research. 
 
 
2.1 Aristotle: definition of the research space 
It is owing to the multifold points of view that studied metaphors and 
the heterogeneity of the instruments used to do so that it is difficult to define 
it univocally and offer a summary of the different solutions that have been 
put forward. If one is to define the general characteristics of the problem, I 
believe it is indispensable to look at the first extant treatise, that is 
Aristotle’s, as it is impossible to discuss metaphors in Western tradition 
without making either an implicit or explicit reference to Poetics145  and 
Rhetoric146, to their contents and the history of their reception. For sure, 
Aristotle’s treatise on the problem is not exhaustive, but it does define the 
discussion area in which centuries of reflection on metaphors took place. 
In Poetics and Rhetoric Aristotle discusses two different kinds of 
discourse (lògos): rhetoric (téchne retoriké) is the art of everyday 
communication, the art of speaking in public; poetry (téchne poetiké) is the 
art of imitative communication, the art of poetry in the broader sense of 
																																								 																				
144 Eco, Umberto, “Metafora e semiosi” in Id., Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio, 
Torino, Einaudi 1997 (1984), p. 142: “(e la lista è incompleta) di: simbolo, ideogramma, 
modello, archetipo, sogno, desiderio, delirio, rito, mito, magia, creatività, paradigma, icona, 
rappresentazione” (translation in English mine). 
145  Aristotle, Poetics, ed. and trans. by Stephen Halliwell, Cambridge (MA) – 
London, The Loeb Classical Library, 2005 (1995). 
146 Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, trans. by John Henry Freese, Cambridge (MA) 
– London, The Loeb Classical Library, 1967 (1926). 
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creating a language that imitates reality. The contents of Poetics can be 
summarised in brief as follows: definition of poetry; classification of its 
forms; discussion of the best form of poetry, the tragedy, according to its 
history and the elements it is made up of; indications on how the best 
tragedy can be composed; discourse and its elements (the discussion of the 
metaphor belongs to this section); comparison of the epic genre with the 
tragic. The content of this work does obviously not differ very much from 
what one would expect: a treatise of poetry, its history, characteristics and 
the element comprising it, first and foremost language. 
The same cannot be said of Rhetoric. Although the content of the 
work is what one would expect – an explanation of the phenomenon of 
everyday communication with its three fundamental aspects: the sources for 
means of persuasion in public discourse, style (this is where metaphors are 
discussed) and the arrangement of the different parts of discourse -, 
Aristotle’s opinion on rhetoric clashes with our common understanding of 
the same. In fact, according to Aristotle, rhetoric is not the art of decorating 
discourse, an unnecessary set of devices finalised at making discourse more 
pleasant. Aristotle says, rhetoric “is a counterpart of Rhetoric,” because147 
neither of them is a science that deals with the nature of any definite subject, but they are 
merely faculties of furnishing arguments 148 
																																								 																				
147Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, Α, 1354a, op. cit., pp. 2 – 3: “Rhetoric is a 
counterpart of Dialectic.” 
148 Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, Α, 1356a, op. cit., pp. 18 – 19. 
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What distinguishes rhetoric and dialectics are the faculties (dynàmeis) 
of each: in dialectics, induction and syllogism, in rhetoric the example and 
the enthymeme or dialectic syllogism. Therefore, in short, although ideally 
part of a broader discussion on discourse, rhetoric and poetics are 
considered distinct, while rhetoric and dialectics are similar. One could say 
that this is thanks to the alethic statute of the discourses that were studied: 
the discourses developed in poetics are ones that imitate reality; while those 
of rhetoric and dialectics concern reality – everyday life in the former, and 
epistemic in the latter. 
Summarising Aristotle’s discussion of metaphors in the way it is 
presented in Poetics and Rhetoric, one can perceive these three themes, 
which have defined the discussion range of metaphors up to today: 
definition of the metaphor and elucidatory examples149 from the poetic and 
																																								 																				
149 Aristotle, Poetics, 1457b, 7 – 10, op. cit., pp. 104 – 107, Aristotle says: “A 
metaphor is the application of a word that belongs to another thing: either from genus to 
species, species to genus, species to species, or by analogy. By “from genus to species” I 
mean, e.g., “my ship stands here”: mooring is a kind of standing. Species to genus: “ten 
thousand noble deeds has Odysseus accomplished”; ten thousand is many, and the poet has 
used it here instead of “many”. Species to species: e.g. “drawing off the life with bronze”, 
and “cutting with slender-edged bronze”; here he has used “drawing off” for “cutting” and 
vice versa, as both are kinds of removing. I call “by analogy” cases were b is to a and d is 
to c: one will then speak of d instead of b, or b instead of d. Sometimes people add that to 
which the replaced term is related. I mean, e.g., the wine bowl is to Dionysus as the shield 
to Ares: so one will call the wine bowl “Dionysus’ shield”, and the shield “Ares’ wine 
bowl”. Or old age is to life as evening to day: so one will call evening “the day’s old age”, 
or, like Empedocles, call old age “the evening of life” or “life’s sunset”. In some cases of 
analogy no current term exists, but the same form of expression will still be used. For 
instance, to release seed is to “sow”, while the sun’s release of fire lacks a name; but the 
latter stands to the sun as odes sowing to the seed, hence the phrase “sowing his divine 
fire”. This type of metaphor can further be used predicating the borrowed term while 
denying one of its attributes: suppose one were to call the shield not “ares’ wine bowl” but 
“a wineless wine bowl””.  
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everyday language; study and evaluation of the euristic value of the 
metaphor;150 finally, judgement on the use of metaphors in philosophy.151  
 
 
2.2 A history of the reception of Poetics and Rhetoric  
If we now look at the history of how Aristotle’s two works were 
received, we can understand how interest towards the problem of the 
metaphor changed over the centuries. In fact, whilst Aristotle’s treatment of 
the metaphor remained canonical in rhetorical tradition, through Cicero and 
Quintilianus, - with just few changes - , what did change significantly is the 
relationship between rhetoric, logic (or philosophy) and poetics. An outline 
of the history of this relationship equals an outline of the history of 
reflection on the metaphor. 
After Aristotle the tie between rhetoric and dialectics already became 
looser, taking the path that led to a “poetical totalisation of rhetoric”152, in 
other words, towards the affirmation of the indivisibility of poetics and 
rhetoric and therefore the annihilation of the latter in the former. Several 
																																								 																				
150 In Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, Γ, 1410b, 14 – 17, op. cit., pp. 396 – 397, 
Aristotle praises the euristic value of the metaphor, that makes it possible to learn quickly 
and with ease; and in Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, Γ, 1411b, 20 and following, op. cit., 
pp. 402 – 403, he explains that his characteristic should mainly be attributed to the fourth 
kind of metaphor, analogy, because these metaphors “set things before the eyes” the object, 
or rather, it represents an object in action. 
151 Cf. Aristotle, The “Art” of Rhetoric, Γ, 1412a, 10-12, op. cit., pp. 406 – 407 and 
Aristotle, Poetics, 1459 a, 4 – 8, op. cit., pp. 114- 115 where it is underlined that the use of 
the metaphor is a sign of good cognitive activity; for example, Aristotle, Poetics, 1459 a, 4 
– 8, op. cit., pp. 114- 115: “It is important to use aptly each of the features mentioned, 
including double nouns and loan words; but much the greatest asset is a capacity for 
metaphor. This alone cannot be acquired from another, and is a sign of natural gifts: 
because to use metaphor well is to discern similarities”. 
152 Roland Barthes, L’ancienne rhétorique, in Communications, 16, 1970. 
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fundamental vicissitudes in the history of Western culture provide trail 
marks along this course. For example, the Middle Ages was to cite Ovid as 
the one who was first to postulate a relationship between poetry and the art 
of oratory. However, another two testimonies that go back to the Greek-
Latin world are much more important and explicit. One is the change that 
Dionysius of Halicarnassus made to the constitution of rhetoric in De 
compositione verborum, in which the enthymematic is abandoned so that 
only the rhythm of the phrases is considered. The second comes from 
Tacitus in Dialogus de oratoribus: the historian traces the causes of the 
decadence of eloquence back to the Domitian’s imposition of silence in the 
forum. By doing so, Tacitus declares, eloquence is deviated towards an 
independent art, poetry. Things do not change in the Middle Ages: even 
though rhetoric is included in the disciplines of the Trivium, which, together 
with the Quadrivium define the ideal of mediaeval culture, its function is 
supplementary. Rhetoric is the inessential art of decorating the essential, and 
is recognised in its essentiality through dialectics and expressed suitably 
with a correct use of grammar. As the Middle Ages came to an end, so did 
its cultural idea of rhetoric. By now, freed from dialectics once and for all, 
rhetoric was to follow the development of literature, which was also no 
longer dependent on philosophy. From this moment on, philosophy was to 
continue with dialectics alone, guided by a new value that was to perfect its 
definition throughout the entire Modern Age: evidence. Language was also 
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to follow this value and this was the same as recommending that 
philosophers abstained from using metaphors. 
Restricting interest to the studies of metaphors carried out in the 
twentieth century, with the aid of the interpretative grid based on Aristotle, I 
shall now try to highlight how consideration of the problem changed, and 
which aspects research focussed on. I do not intend to look at the various 
solutions that were put forward in detail, but will only look at those works 
or authors who determined the general course in these years and who 
created the paradigms that research on metaphors was to be based on. 
 
 
2.3 The twentieth century: “the age of metaphoromania” 
In the twentieth century interest in the metaphor went from being 
secondary, kept in the background of big problems, and became the main 
interest in most philosophical research.153 This change was directly due to 
																																								 																				
153 This is also testified by the fact that those who study metaphors today have at 
their disposal several tools that comprise a reference base shared by all metaphorologists. 
In particular, an English journal that deals with metaphors, their theory and history: 
Metaphor and Symbolic Activity. A Quarterly Journal, ed. Howard R. Pollio, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates Inc. Publish.; another journal, in French, devoted to the problems and 
history of imagination, frequently devoted several numbers to the metaphor, regarding it as 
a subfield, at times a replacement for imagination: Cahiers de l’imaginaire, published 
under the guidance of Gilbert Durand and Michel Maffesoli by the publisher Privat in 
Toulouse. Other equally indispensable instruments available include the following 
bibliographies: compiled by a group of Belgian scholars, directed by Jean-Pierre van 
Noppen, Metaphor. A Bibliography of Post-1970 Publications, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1985; Jean-Pierre van Noppen and Edith Hols (ed.), Metaphor II. 
A Classified Bibliography of Publications 1985 to 1990, John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 1990. Even if these two bibliographies are now outdated, of valid 
assistance is still the work by Warren A. Shibles, Metaphor: An Annotated Bibliography 
and History, The Language Press, Whitewater/Wisconsin, 1971; its value lies in the fact 
that it provides bibliographical references that cover several centuries, without claiming to 
be exhaustive, and a brief summary of the contents of many texts. 
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the re-evaluation of rhetoric, of which the metaphor was considered a figure 
par excellence, and the so-called linguistic shift that placed language as the 
main object of philosophy. The first, extremely important contribution to 
research on metaphors came from Max Black who, with his works 154 , 
introduced in analytical philosophy the conception that rejects the position 
of a metaphor as a decoration or as a comparison and promoted the idea that 
the metaphor has an irreducible meaning and a particular cognitive content. 
According to M.L. Johnson, the sixties and eighties of the last century 
will go down in history as “the age of metaphoromania”.155 In fact, it was 
precisely in this period that studies were published that are now considered 
classics, for example: Paul Ricœur, La Métaphore Vive156  and the book 
edited by Andrew Ortony, Metaphor and Thought.157  
1980 saw the publication of another important volume that marked a 
further change in perspective. Written by a linguist and a philosopher, 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By158 arose from the 
authors’ interest in “how people understand their language and their 
experience.” 159  Based on linguistic evidence, Lakoff and Johnson 
formulated the following thesis: contrary to what many people think about 
metaphors, that is, that it is merely an instrument to embellish language, a 
																																								 																				
154  See above all Max Black, Models and Metaphor, Ithaca – London, Cornell 
University Press, 1962. 
155  M.L. Johnson (ed.), Philosophical perspective on Metaphor, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota University Press, 1981, IX. 
156 Paul Ricœur, La métaphore vive, Paris, Seuil, 1975. 
157  Andrew Ortony, Metaphor and Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1979. 
158 George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, Chicago and London, The 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980. 
159 George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, op. cit., p. ix. 
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rhetorical device, in short, an expedient of the extraordinary language and 
not the common language  
(…) metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. 
Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature 160 
The entire book is a lengthy analysis of metaphorical expressions that 
are used in every day language and in specialised fields, – mainly in the 
scientific and philosophical fields - , with the aim of demonstrating the 
pervasiveness of their thesis. 
If one takes M. Black and Lakoff-Johnson’s works as paradigmatic, it 
is possible to say161 that in America it is difficult to trace all essays prior to 
the year 1980 back to a global perspective and, on the contrary, research is 
still extremely inhomogenous. The questions raised by Black in 1962 can, 
however, be summarised, that is: 
“How do we recognize a case of metaphor?” “Are they any criteria for the detection of 
metaphors?” “Can metaphors be translated into literal expressions?” “Is metaphor properly 
regarded as a decoration upon ‘plain sense’?” “What are the relations between metaphor 
and smile?” “In what sense, if any, is a metaphor ‘creative’?” “What is the point of using a 
metaphor?” (…) The list is not a tidy one, and several of the questions overlap in fairly 
obvious ways. But I hope they will sufficiently illustrate the type of inquiry that is 
intended.162 
																																								 																				
160 George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, op. cit., p. 3. 
161  I am following the chronological division adopted by van Noppen in the 
aforementioned article, but am specifying it more clearly. 
162 Max Black, Models and Metaphor, op. cit., pp. 41 – 42. 
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The publication of Lakoff and Johnson’s book (1980) marked a 
change in the research and became a paradigm for the research to follow. 
Testimony to this is, for example, a miscellaneous volume published in 
1985, edited by Paprotté and Dirven, The Ubiquity of Metaphor.163 It is 
these two editors who underline the change in paradigm: not only the 
metaphor, which has been wrenched away from the domain of rhetoric, has 
become the object of diverse disciplines, but the questions surrounding it 
have also changed. The questions now are: if one can recognise a 
metaphorical expression, it requires a recognition strategy that is 
fundamentally different to the clarification of a literal affirmation; 
metaphorical skill is developed in the same way as a linguistic skill in 
general; there is a correlation between a subject’s mnemonic faculty and 
their metaphorical skill; can metaphorical meaning or the degree of 
metaphorical understanding be measured? It is this ubiquity of metaphorical 
processes that the book tries to illustrate: in the language system, in the use 
of language, and in psycholinguistic processes. The essays in the first part 
adhere closely to Lakoff and Johnson’s thesis: the metaphor is a mental 
construction that is based on experience and determined culturally: 
conventional metaphors and dead metaphors are very important for the 
intuitions that they give us in conceptual processes and that allow the 
development of mental portrayals in a large number of semantic fields; the 
metaphor is not a marginal linguistic phenomenon, on the contrary, it 
																																								 																				
163 W. Paprotté, R. Dirven (ed.), The Ubiquity of Metaphor. Metaphor in Language 
and Thought, Philadelphia/Amsterdam, John Benjamins (C.I.L.T. n. 29) 1985. 
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constitutes the basic use of language while the literal use is derived from it. 
The second part explores how the metaphor can function as a mechanism 
that systematically explains a large amount of lexical-syntactical or 
morphological processes. The third, lengthiest part and the most susceptible 
to developments deals with the role metaphors play in comprehension. It is 
the greater number of contributions on this aspect of research that indicates 
the change in perspective that has occurred. 
After 1985 the main question becomes: what can humanity do with 
the results of the research on metaphors that has been carried out in recent 
decades? Now that the metaphor has been promoted from its status as a 
decoration to that of a fundamental category that allows man to structure 
and understand the reality he is living and moving in, now that many of its 
mechanisms have been identified and described, the problem presents itself 
in the comparisons of the practical use that can be made of these 
intuitions.164 Such a question has resulted in, for example, countless studies 
on the use of metaphors in politics, theology and religion. But conferences 
have also been organised on the subject: “what can one do with metaphors?” 
However, in America, in addition to the enthusiasm shown towards 
metaphors, there are also people who, using the most refined analytical 
contemporary theories, appear to have also questioned the actual possibility 
of the metaphor, as it was described and studied in that period. It suffices to 
																																								 																				
164 Jean Pierre van Noppen, “More Books on Metaphor”, op. cit., p. 632. 
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mention Donald Davidson’s essay “What metaphors mean.”165 According to 
Davidson, “metaphors mean whaat the words, in their most literal 
interpretation, mean.” 166  This hypothesis is justified in the course of a 
concise criticism of the most widespread conceptions of the metaphor – 
Richards’, Black’s, Freud’s,167 Lakoff’s, to name but a few of the most 
representative. The essay therefore also offers a critical introduction to the 
contemporary debate, particularly in the English language. 
In Europe the debate on metaphors was not as lively as in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. Philosophers who took part included Ricœur and Derrida, 
who were the ones who enjoyed the greatest international renown. These 
studies on metaphors represent a chapter of their philosophical activity and 
it was a chapter they could write together. In fact, they produced a 
philosophical comparison that was developed in the following texts: in 1971 
Derrida published La mythologie blanche. La métaphore dans le texte 
philosophique, Ricœur commented it in the eighth study of La mètaphore 
vive (1975); Derrida’s reply then arrived in 1978, at a conference held in 
																																								 																				
165 In Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Thruth and Interpretation, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1985. 
166 Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, op. cit., p. 245. 
167 Sigmund Freud discussed the phenomenon of the metaphor in a work dated 1905, 
devoted to the existing relationship between the jokes and the unconscious: Sigmund Freud, 
Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten. This work is to be regarded as a 
provisional arrival point in the studies on unconscious dynamism. The study, started in 
1895 with Entwurf einer Psychologie and continued in the seventh chapter of Die 
Traumdeutung (1899), was to be revived in 1915 with metapsychological contributions, in 
1920 with Jenseits des Lustprinzips and in 1922 with Das Ich und das Es. According to the 
hypothesis underlying the thesis on dreams and jokes – but also on metaphors and on all the 
figurative uses of language – they are of the greatest significance in men’s lives when 
considered within a quantitative and dynamic conception of the psychic apparatus. It was 
after Freud’s research that the problem of the metaphor also became a problem.  
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Geneva.168 What were the two philosophers discussing? The role of the 




2.4 Hans Blumenberg and the revival of the Aristotelian discussion 
framework  
This was therefore how the main paradigms and main lines that 
characterised the research of the metaphor in the past century and probably 
also developed today.  If one only looks at the problems that were dealt 
with, one can see that the questions were still those raised by Aristotle: what 
is a metaphor? What role does it have in knowledge? What weight does it 
have in philosophical discourse? This revival of all the Aristotelian themes 
was certainly encouraged by the reassessment of everyday language and the 
studies carried out in analytical and epistemological fields.  
Hans Blumenberg tackles the problem of the metaphor by starting 
with the question of the use of metaphors in philosophical discourse. The 
questions he begins with are: are metaphors used in philosophical 
discourse? What role do they play? Or rather, are they accessories – and 
therefore replaceable or even eliminable – or do they lay the foundations – 
and are therefore indispensable and inevitable? In short, do metaphors in 
																																								 																				
168  Jacques Derrida, “La mythologie blanche. La métaphore dans le texte 
philosophique”, in Id., Marges de la philosophie, Paris, Les Editions de Minuit, 1972. Paul 
Ricœur, La mètaphore vive, Paris, Éditions de Seuil, 1975. Jacques Derrida, “Le retrait de 
la métaphore”, in Psyché. Inventions de l’autre, Paris, Galilée 1987 – 1988. 
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philosophical discourse make it or betray it? Can one do without using 
metaphors in philosophical discourse? Can one decide not to use 
metaphors? Tackled from this perspective, the problem is particularly 
interesting because it allows one to reflect, yet again, on the sense and 
meaning of philosophy, but from a specific position. In fact, we have 
already seen how opposition to the use of the metaphor in philosophy is part 
of a philosophical tradition that goes back to the Greek-Roman period, and 
has its most complete form in the Modern Age. Nevertheless, what this 
tradition opposes is basically of a nature that belongs to the philosophy of 
origins. How can this renewed interest in metaphors in philosophy therefore 
be interpreted? As an attempt to return to the origins? An attempt to recover 
a sense of philosophy that has been lost? But, then, which sense? These are 
the questions Hans Blumenberg seems to be answering in his formulation of 
the historical-philosophical programme of a metaphorology, the origins of 
which, not by chance, lie in Kant’s third Critique.169 
 
 
3. Metaphorology as a discipline of attention  
In 1981 Blumenberg wrote an article entitled Nachdenklichkeit170 for 
the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, in which he reflected on what philosophy is, and 
																																								 																				
169  This could also be the starting point to deal with Blumenberg’s question of 
philosophical reference points, and it could be done by analysing the use Blumenberg, 
Heidegger e Cassirer make of this text, in which Kant finally discusses the problem of 
philosophy as a discipline of thought. 
170  Hans Blumenberg, Nachdenklichkeit, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, nr. 273, 
22.11.1980, p. 65. 
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how it originated. In this article Blumenberg returned once again to the 
Kantian question that the Königsberg philosopher himself had left 
unanswered, that is, the question of what makes reasoning in analogies on 
heterogeneous experiences possible.171 
 
 
3.1 Stimulus-reaction or stimulus-dilation 
This article dated 1981 starts with a comparison with the 
functionalistic and organicistic explanation of life, according to which, 
every living being reacts according to a stimulus-reaction scheme to the 
reality surrounding it. According to Blumenberg, man does not respond to 
the stimuli of the world of life in the same way as other living beings, in 
other words, following the stimulus-reaction scheme, because man is the 
being that hesitates. As seen earlier, Blumenberg perceives man as the 
biologically most unsuitable living being, because he lacks the ability to 
respond to the stimuli of reality, which is, on the other hand, an element in 
animal’s response to its habitat (Umwelt). This is also why Blumenberg 
believes that the world concept (Welt) is one of the philosophically most 
relevant concepts, because it tells us what man expects from his relationship 
with reality. In fact, man is able to counter-balance the possible 
disadvantage compared to other living beings, and compared to life itself, 
because a great number of possible actions (of responses and not reactions) 
																																								 																				
171 In the quotation here on page 143 Kant says: “This business has as yet been little 




to a stimulus, to a prompt, results in what we call experience, which is the 
human response why not only signals are perceived, but things, and one 
learns to wait for what is still to become manifest. 
 
 
3.2 The rise of philosophy from pensiveness (Nachdenklichkeit) 
Blumenberg hypothesises that hesitation was the first step towards 
civilisation, that is, towards that system of questions and answers that have 
the function of filling the human biological inadequacy.172 Blumenberg says 
that we have an idea of thinking about what creates the shortest link 
“between two points, between a problem and its solution, between a need 
and its being satisfied, between interests and their consent to them.” 173 
Those who are pensive, on the other hand, are not expected to produce 
results: “Pensiveness includes an experience of freedom, and even more 
freedom of rambling.” 174  However, no form of sociality can allow its 
members to ignore the functionalism and actual dialogical strategies, 
including philosophy, that do not allow one to remain pensive, and it is from 
this perspective that they need to be understood. 
If, on the one hand, philosophy is to be understood as the discipline 
that tackled these problems methodically, at the extreme it is also the 
demonstration of the impossibility of having final answers. If regulated 
																																								 																				
172 Although life requires utility, it has granted “to its favourites the experience of 
freedom from the objective. And this brings into being every civilisation,” Hans 
Blumenberg, Nachdenklichkeit, op. cit. 
173 Hans Blumenberg, Nachdenklichkeit, op. cit. 
174 Hans Blumenberg, Nachdenklichkeit, op. cit. (translation mine). 
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thought appears to be the furthest thing possible from pensiveness, many 
philosophical exponents are against this separation, such as, for example, 
Socrates and Kant. Therefore, although philosophy is not reducible to 
pensiveness, “one cannot deny its origins from this and above all its wish to 
be at its service.”175 
Blumenberg offers one of Aesop’s fables as an example of 
pensiveness, one of the things Socrates devoted himself to whilst in prison: 
A poor man was carrying a load of wood on his shoulders. After a while he was feeling 
faint, so he sat down by the side of the road. Putting aside his burden, he bitterly called out 
to Death, summoning Death with the words ‘O him!’ Death immediately showed up and 
said to the man, ‘Why have you summoned me?’ The man said, ‘Oh, just to have you help 
me pick this burden up off the ground!’ (The fable shows that everyone clings to life, even 
if they suffer from affliction and oppression)176  
All of Aesop’s fables end with a sentence that explains what the fable 
is teaching (the epimythion or ‘moral of the story’). Humanists and 
philologists had noticed the disproportion between these sentences and the 
stories they belong to, and there has always been an excess of meaning on 
either one side or the other. According to Blumenberg, the pensiveness 
provoked by the fable depends on the pensiveness that is displayed in the 
actual fable 
The old man in the tale is not a ‘thinker’ who has changed his mind about the scarce value 
of life between throwing away his load, and the arrival of death; he is someone who learns 
																																								 																				
175 Ibid. (translation mine). 
176 “The Poor Man and Death”, in, Aesop’s Fables, transl. by Laura Gibbs, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 223. 
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that it is only in hesitation that one benefits from the profit that this brings. The old man 
threw away his unbearable burden because in the end he decided he wanted to await death, 
and having thrown away his burden grants him deferral, he draws a deep breath and looks 
at the world once again, understanding what the price would be if he were to free himself of 
his burden once and for all. Whilst he is lost in reflection, the death he called approaches; 
and it seems that the old man is granted that deferral that he had acquired with his fatigue 
of life. The tale does not say anything about what was going through the old man’s head to 
move death to help him carry on walking with his burden, almost as if that had been the 
reason he had been summoned. However, it is precisely what the tale does not tell us that 
the tale grants us a space to be pensive.177 
As this fable so clearly shows, pensiveness is a pause in the 
functionalistic scheme and the philosopher has to  
preserve if not to renew some of that pensiveness, of its origin from the lifeworld. This is 
why it must not be bound to any particular aspects regarding its kind of utility. Its tie with 
the lifeworld would be destroyed if the right to question a philosopher were restricted by 
the normativity of the replies or also just the constriction of asking questions according to 
the possible answers and their disciplines.178 
 
3.3 A phenomenological-anthropological reply to Kant 
When Blumenberg wrote the article on Nachdenklichkeit a 
considerable amount of time had elapsed since the metaphorology project as 
it had been formulated in Paradigms; furthermore, from a 
phenomenological perspective the anthropological question, which had been 
																																								 																				
177 Hans Blumenberg, Nachdenklichkeit, op. cit. (translation mine). 
178 Hans Blumenberg, Nachdenklichkeit op. cit. Blumenberg continues as follows: 
“Philosophy merely represents a more general result in each culture: that of the 
unsuppressible nature of its elementary needs and problems through its hypothetical 
overcoming. Culture is also respecting problems we cannot find a solution to and that make 
us reflect and leave us pensive.” (translation mine). 
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the background of Legitimacy and had found its correct philosophical 
formulation in the Kantian problem of the symbol, now occupied an 
important place in his reflections.179  
I think that a comparison between Paradigms and Nachdenklichkeit 
might facilitate understanding since the idea of the absolute metaphor also 
leads us to reflect on pensiveness, because the pensiveness of man also 
emerges in absolute metaphors and their history. 180  We have seen this 
extensively when we discussed the loss of order (Ordnungsschwund), epoch 
in its diverse meanings, and the logical inadequacy of the concept: every 
time the historical movement becomes clear at a conceptual level, there is a 
redefinition of the order in the countless fields it is to be found in. 
This is why, in my analysis of Blumenberg I feel it is necessary to 
underline this phenomenological characteristic of metaphorology as a 
discipline of attention, in the other words, in the sense of a discipline that 
once again draws attention to the pensiveness that precedes and 
accompanies every conceptual formation, thus allowing one to understand 
something more about the history of concepts. When absolute metaphors are 
being sought and questioned, one is not searching for an original meaning; 
attention is drawn phenomenologically to an aspect of the history and 
																																								 																				
179 It was no coincidence that amongst the unpublished works that were published 
after Blumenberg’s death was the essay on man, in its most complete from for printing, 
entitled Beschreibung des Menschen: Hans Blumenberg, Beschreibung des Menschen. Aus 
dem Nachlaß herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort von Manfred Sommer, Frankfurt am 
Main, Suhrkamp, 2006. 
180 We could perhaps even go so far as to define Nachdenklichkeit as the form that 




conceptual formation that is, for historical-cultural reasons, considered 
marginal but can, in actual fact plumb very deep meanings.181  
There is a great affinity between this conception of the history of 
concepts and Paolo Rossi’s explanation about the history of ideas through 
the concept of “intellectual fossils.”182 In particular, the idea that the history 
of ideas also has to confront experiences that detract linearity from the 
historical process, and are certainly less coherent with the genealogical 
expectations of the historian of ideas; while unable to offer total 
enlightenment, they are, however, able to delve deeper and deeper into the 
historical understanding, establishing connections and implications that 
show us the historical complexity, and the complexity and wealth of reality. 
This lengthy excursus on Hans Blumenberg and metaphorology brings 
to an end the methodological part of the thesis, the objective of which was 
to introduce and justify the proposal to study the metaphor of inner writing 
as an absolute metaphor for the memory. In other words, in conceptual 
																																								 																				
181, “Dienst an der Schärfung der Wahrnehmungsfähigkeit im weitesten Sinn ist das, 
was die Philosophie gemein hat und was sie gemein macht mit allen ‘positive’ Disziplinen. 
Nur daß allein sie kein anderes Verfahren hat, ihre ‘Phänomene’ zu konservieren, als sie zu 
beschreiben. (...) Deshalb wird es eine Phänomenologie der Geschichte geben, zu der einige 
Anläufe in den wenigen Arbeitsproben dieses Bändchen bemerkbar sein sollten” Hans 
Blumenberg, Die wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben, op. cit., p. 6; “What philosophy has in 
common and makes it similar to other ‘positive’ branches of knowledge is the contribution 
it gives to the improvement of the perception - ‘perception’ here has a broad meaning. The 
only difference to the other positive disciplines is that philosophy keeps its ‘phenomena’ by 
describing them. (…) Therefore there can be a phenomenology of history and I aim to 
explain some aspects of it in the following essays” (translation mine). 
182 See: Introduction. 
 
 170 
formation the leading paradigm of both the mnemonics and theories of 
memory is the metaphor of inner writing.183 
I would like to maintain the historical-phenomenological approach in 
Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorological proposal, which consists in drawing 
the attention to several links between themes and phenomena that reoccur 
throughout the history of philosophy.184 In particular, in my research these 
reoccurrences regard how reflection on natural memory and artificial 
memory was formulated throughout the history of philosophy. 
Starting in the following chapter I would like to attempt a limited 
interpretation and analysis with the aim of testing a hermeneutic hypothesis: 
the metaphor of inner writing is the absolute metaphor for mnemonics and 
																																								 																				
183  This is the hypothesis I put forward here in the Introduction. Should this 
hermeneutical hypothesis be founded, it would mean a second hypothesis that I shall 
formulate here, but not deal with in this thesis: the development of the technique of writing 
has influenced the history of mnemonics and the history of the theories of memory; 
analysing these three questions at the same time could be highly instructive for a better 
understanding of how, over the centuries, the problem of memory developed. In other 
words: as the technique is part of how we experience reality, and as our experience of 
memory is understood through the paradigm of writing, it is possible that the history of the 
technique of writing, having modified our experience of writing, also results in cognitive 
changes in the understanding of memory. 
184 Other approaches to the study of metaphors in historical research are presented in 
this book: Benjamin Specht (ed.), Epoche und Metapher. Systematik und Geschichte 
Kultureller Bildlichkeit, Berlin-Boston, Walter De Gruyter, 2014. There are several reasons 
why I have decided to follow Hans Blumenberg’s approach. Above all, Blumenberg’s 
study deals with many of the historiographical problems that one also comes up against in 
the interpretation of Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works, first and foremost, that of the 
possibility of a philosophy of history (criticism of the epoch concept is a criticism of the 
philosophy of history, as can be seen by the accusation of historical substantialism directed 
at the supporters of the historical-interpretative category of secularisation). Furthermore, 
from a theoretical point of view, I am also interested in this reflection on attention, which 
can be derived from both Blumenberg’s concept of Nachdenklichkeit and the analysis of the 
reception of the problem of metaphors in the field of philosophy. It is no coincidence that I 
started with Aristotle: I was interested in revealing this aspect of philosophy that is 
discussed in reflections on metaphors, its character as a “discipline of attention” that also 
cultivates the connections and similarities of things that are distant from one another. For a 
more extensive introduction, which also takes into consideration other aspects of the 
metaphor theme, see Eckard Rolf (ed.), Metapherntheorien. Typologie, Darstellung, 
Bibliographie, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2005.  
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the theories of memory. This is prompted by one of Hans Blumenberg’s 
works, this time Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, because it was whilst reflecting on 
this study by Blumenberg that I formulated the hypothesis on the metaphor 
of inner writing as an absolute metaphor of the memory. I will not apply the 
research lines that Blumenberg applies in the Paradigms; in particular, I will 
not carry out a differential analysis because the aim of my research is not to 
demonstrate an epochal transition, but how an absolute metaphor – or 
















ABSTRACT With Die Lesbarkeit der Welt as my starting point, a text in which 
Blumenberg analyses the absolute metaphor of the world as a book that can be understood 
as a metaphor of the same concept of order, I shall show how Bruno’s interpretation of 
Blumenberg is limited, but surpassable, by looking closer at the metaphor of the world as a 
																																								 																				
185 For the themes dealt with in this chapter, in addition to the three main works 
whose bibliographical references are to be found in the following notes, I also took into 
consideration: Hans Blumenberg, “Der kopernikanische Umsturz und die Weltstellung des 
Menschen. Eine Studie zum Zusammenhang von Naturwissenschaft und 
Geistesgeschichte“, Studium Generale, Berlin, 8 (1955), pp. 637 – 648; Id., Einleitung, in 
Nicolaus von Cues, Die Kunst der Vermutung, Bremen, Dieterich 1957, pp. 7 – 69; Id., 
“Kosmos und System. Aus der Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt,” Studium Generale, 
Berlin, 10 (1957), pp. 61 – 80; Id., “Die Vorbereitung der Neuzeit,” Philosophische 
Rundschau, Tübingen, 9 (1962), pp. 81 – 133; Id., “Kopernikus im Selbstverständnis der 
Neuzeit,” Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz. Abhandlungen der 
geistes- und sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse, Jahrgang 1964, Mainz, 5, pp. 339 – 368; Id., 
“Nachruf auf Erich Rothacker,” Jahrbuch der Akademie der Wissentschaften und der 
Literatur in Mainz, Mainz, 1966,  pp. 70 – 76; Id., “Nachbemerkung zum Bericht über das 
Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte,” Jahrbuch der Akademie der Wissentschaften und der 
Literatur in Mainz, Mainz, 1967,  pp. 79 – 80; Id., Das Universum eines Ketzers, 
introduzione a Giordano Bruno, Das Aschermittwochsmahl, Insel, Frankfurt am Main 1969, 
pp. 9 – 51; Id., “Kopernikus und das Pathos der Vernunft. Das Denken der Neuzeit im 
Zeichen der kopernikanischen Wende,” Evangelische Kommentare, Postverlagsort, 
Stuttgart, 8, 1973, pp. 460 – 465; Id., “Versuch zu einer immanenten Geschichte der 




book and tracing it back to the more general field of the metaphor of writing. This chapter 
is therefore a transitional chapter in the methodological discussion of the interpretation of 
the object of this study. I shall discuss two theses in this chapter: 1. The metaphor of inner 
writing can be interpreted as the paradigm of the conceptual formation of mnemonics; 2. 
Placing at the centre of the analysis of Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works the use that he 
makes of the metaphor of inner writing can not only aid understanding in reference to the 
mnemonic tradition, but also Bruno’s philosophy. 
 
 
1. Giordano Bruno philosopher of Copernicanism 
Blumenberg discusses Bruno in four different works, in which his 
interpretation of the main problem of Nolanus’ philosophy plays a central 
role in the interpretation of the Modern Age. These works are: Die 
Legitimität der Neuzeit, 186 Die kopernikanische Wende,187 Die Genesis der 
kopernikanischen Welt188 and Die Lesbarkeit der Welt.189 
Blumenberg’s interpretation of Bruno can be listed with those that see 
in the “Nolanus philosophy” a philosophical translation of Copernican 
thought, that is, an attempt to resolve philosophical problems using 
conceptual instruments that come from a different horizon of questions. 
According to this interpretation, Bruno’s is the expression of a cultural 
climate rather than the result of the development of an independent 
reflection, i.e. it belongs to the history of the effects of Copernican 
																																								 																				
186 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit. 
187 Hans Blumenberg, Die kopernikanische Wende, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 
1965. 
188 Hans Blumenberg, Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1975; trans. By Robert M. Wallace, The Genesis of the Copernican World, 
Cambridge, MIT Press, 1987.  
189 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit.  
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thought. 190  This is not why Blumenberg minimises the importance of 
Giordano Bruno’s work and, on the contrary, he acknowledges it played a 
key role in the understanding of the transition from the Middle Ages to the 
Modern Age. What Blumenberg does not do is acknowledge he had any 
autonomy in the formulation of themes and problems.191 One can criticise 
this interpretation for continuing to adhere to an enlightened vision of the 
Modern Age as a period of empirical-scientific rationality and therefore as a 
period that sees Copernicanism as the most influential, representative and 
paradigmatic event.192 
The necessary corrections aside, however, I believe that Blumenberg 
offers instruments that allow new research perspectives, which do not 
necessarily lead to the total understanding of modern thought, as 
Blumenberg himself wanted to do, but which highlight other aspects or at 
the very least develop them. Indeed, if one understands metaphorology as a 
																																								 																				
190  According to Thomas S. Kuhn’s definition, The Copernican revolution. 
Planetary astronomy in the development of Western thought, Cambridge-Massachussets, 
Harvard University Press, 1995. 
191 I use the expression “autonomy” in Blumenberg’s sense of “legitimate.” 
192 This interpretation certainly has to be seen in relation to the Kantian and Neo-
Kantian tradition that Hans Blumenberg referred to. At one of the few moments when he 
gives account of himself and his own research, Blumenberg mentions Ernst Cassirer as an 
inevitable reference point for any historian of modern thought: Hans Blumenberg, “Ernst 
Cassirers Gedenkend. Rede bei Entgegennahme des KunoFischer Preis der Universität 
Heidelberg im Juli 1974“, Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Bruxelles, 28 (1974), pp. 
456 – 463, poi in Wirklichkeiten in denen wir leben, Stuttgart, Reclam, 1981, pp. 163 – 172. 
Even if they start from different premises and with different interpretative aims, there is no 
doubt that in the interpretation of Cassirer’s modern thought Bruno acts as a cornerstone for 
the movement of thought when it tends to Kantian rationalism and his Copernican 
philosophical shift. See: Ernst Cassirer, Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und 
Wissenschaft der neuren Zeit. Erster Band, in Ernst Cassirer, Gesammelte Werke. 
Hamburger Ausgabe, Band 2, op. cit., pp. 225 – 261; Id., Individuum und Kosmos in der 
Philosophie der Renaissance, op. cit.; Id., Die Philosophie der Aufklärung, Tübingen, 
J.C.B. Mohr 1932. Another author with whom Blumenberg not only shares the same 




discipline of attention, one must also surmise that the metaphorological 
studies are not conclusive and that each researcher can perceive aspects of 
absolute metaphors and highlight them to plumb the depths of historical 
phenomena.193 And this is what I shall begin in this chapter: I shall present a 
general outline of Blumenberg’s interpretation of Bruno, drawing attention 
to an aspect of the absolute metaphor of the world as a book that 
Blumenberg did not develop, but that I believe is both fruitful and 




1.1 The second of two comparative model analyses: Nicola Cusano and 
Giordano Bruno194  
In the structure of the reasoning of Legitimacy against the theorem of 
secularisation, the interpretation of Giordano Bruno’s thought plays a very 
important role; this is because Nolanus is one of the two authors who were 
the subject of the differential analysis used to exemplify the concept of 
epochal threshold and it was with this that Blumenberg completed the 
critique of historical substantialism on which the historical-interpretative 
																																								 																				
193 This theme can also be found in Blumenberg’s thoughts and I think that his 
attempt to dissimulate a stringent philosophical reasoning should be interpreted as such; 
this would have imposed the exclusion of possible developments of discourses that, on the 
contrary, Blumenberg wishes to keep open in favour of the pensiveness of his readers.  
194 Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, op. cit., Part IV, pp. 549 – 
596. Bruno’s interpretation here is also repeated in the two books on the Copernican 
revolution and the Copernican world: Hans Blumenberg, Die kopernikanische Wende, op. 
cit.; Id., Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt, op. cit. Blumenberg refers to Legitimacy 
in both texts as the main reference of his understanding of Bruno’s philosophy and it is for 
this reason that I shall therefore limit my presentation to this part of Legitimacy. 
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use of the secularisation category was to be based. We have seen195 that the 
epochal threshold is an imperceptible limit that is not tied in any obvious 
manner to any fact or pregnant event and that a differential study makes it 
possible to track a threshold that can be ascertained as one that has not yet 
been reached or as one that has already been crossed. To identify the 
epochal threshold one must therefore question at least two testimonies: one 
that still finds itself on this side of the threshold, and the other that has 
already left it behind it. The two testimonies can be compared in as much as 
they ask homologous questions and differential analysis makes accessible 
what must have occurred to make them incompatible. 
Epicurean and nominalist comparative analysis was directed at 
exemplifying the hermeneutic principle, according to which, when the 
function of a concept changes within a philosophical system, one cannot 
speak of similarities with previous historical phenomena; on the other hand, 
the comparative analysis by Nicola Cusano and Giordano Bruno 
exemplifies the other principle, according to which anyone speaking of an 
epochal shift has to show that what was produced was irreversible. 
Blumenberg interprets Cusano as an extreme attempt to save the 
stability of the Middle Ages by arranging it systematically. The soundest 
proof of this attempt lies in the systematic endeavour of his work, which no 
longer has the serial unity of Scholasticism texts. The three exponents of 
Mediaeval reality – God, the universe and man – are not placed one above 
																																								 																				
195 See here, Chapter two. 
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the other in a multi-storey building, but are joined one to the other in such 
intimate interdependency that the mutation of any element also effects the 
others. Cusano concentrates his efforts on the definition of the objective 
interdependence of theology, anthropology and cosmology to avoid the 
critical auto-dissolution of the Middle Ages that, owing to its vacillation 
between anthropocentrism and theocentricism, is incapable of keeping the 
three elements together. 
In fact, on the one hand mediaeval anthropocentrism is to be 
understood as a consequence of the worry about saving the biblical god in 
history, and beyond its eschatological nullity, which is translated into a rule 
of the world and of the correlation between nature, history and man, which 
was fully developed in the scholastic system of pure rationality; on the other 
hand, theocentricism is the product of the dissolution of scholastic 
rationality owing to the excessive amplification of the transcendence of its 
God. The first motive maintains the unity of the metaphysical triangle, made 
up of theology, anthropology and cosmology, while the second lacerates it. 
Blumenberg believes that Cusano therefore tries to force the anthropocentric 
and theocentric element into a single structure, increasing the transcendence 
of God whilst also bringing both man and the cosmos closer to this same 
quality.  
According to Blumenberg, in certain ways Cusano actually anticipates 
Bruno’s philosophy: adhering to nominalism and recognition of the 
authentic dignity of the human system of understanding of reality; the 
 
 178 
destruction of the scholastic cosmos in overlapping levels and the negation 
of the separation between the sopralunar and sublunar world; the enrichment 
of the world object thanks to the idea of a new metaphysical dignity that 
makes it questionable, these are all themes that Bruno will go on to develop, 
but that can no longer be interpreted as themes from the last stage of the 
Middle Ages. 
According to Blumenberg, what is particular about Bruno’s position is 
his philosophical rethinking of the Copernican cosmology, in which he finds 
the justification for his anti-Trinitarianism and refusal of incarnation. It is in 
these theological problems that Blumenberg identifies the nucleus of 
reflections at the origin of Nolanus’ philosophical research. The instrument 
used to radicalise Cusano’s intuitions was none other than the Copernican 
cosmology, according to which the cosmos was no longer the static universe 
of the ancients, which could lead one to surmise something like the 
supernatural and, it was only in the Copernican universe that – being infinite 
– one could think of something like incarnation. By assuming Copernicus’ 
ideas of scientific theory in the philosophy, Bruno places himself entirely 
outside the Middle Ages, even though he had not yet arrived at the 
fundamental formula of the Modern Age, in other words, the idea of 
progress and self-assertion, owing to the adhesion to the pagan conception 




However, what I would like to do is try a different path and show that 
it is through the studies of the mnemonic arts and, more specifically, 
through the formulation and entirely new understanding of the absolute 
metaphor of the world as a book that Bruno reaches a reconfiguration of the 
concept of order, that is, the concept that dictates the relationship between 
man and the world, which is to result in his reworking of the concepts of 


















2. The metaphor of the world as a book 
Blumenberg’s interpretation of Giordano Bruno as a Copernican 
philosopher is also offered in a metaphorological perspective in Die 
Lesbarkeit der Welt. Published almost twenty years after Legitimacy, the 
work is dedicated to the absolute metaphor of the world as a book, which 
Blumenberg interprets as the metaphor for the “experimentalism of 
everything”196 or rather, for modern empiricism. 
 
 
2.1 Ernst R. Curtius, Erich Rothacker, Hans Blumenberg: three approaches 
to the study of the metaphor of the book  
Reconstructing the genesis of his research on the metaphor of the 
world as a book,197 Blumenberg shows how it is interwoven with the first 
study on the subject by Ernst R. Curtius198, through the figure of Erich 
Rothacker. Promoter of a terminological encyclopaedia of culture science, 
Rothacker was not only one of the founders of Begriffsgeschichte, but also 
founder of the Archiv für Begriffsgesschichte (1955), in which Paradigmen 
zu einer Metaphorologie was published for the first time in 1960.  
Blumenberg’s reconstruction is very useful in understanding better Die 
Lesbarkeit, and highlights clearly its derivation from the Paradigmen. 
																																								 																				
196 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 16. 
197 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., pp. 12 ff.. 
198 E. R. Curtius, «Schrift- und Buchmetaphorik in der Weltliteratur», in Deutsche 
Vierteljahresschrift, XX (1942), pp. 359 sgg.; poi in E. R. Curtius, Europäische Literatur 
und lateinisches Mittelalter, Bern, A. Francke Verlag, 19738 (1948), pp. 306 – 352; transl. 
by Willard R. Task, «The Book as Symbol», European Literature and the Latin Middle 
Ages, New York, Pantheon Books Inc., 1953, p. 302 - 347. 
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One of the editors of the Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift, in 1942 Erich 
Rothacker had published Ernst R. Curtius’ study on the metaphor of the 
world as a book and writing, which can be regarded as the originator of later 
studies. Curtius began with Goethe’s reflections on the metaphor as a sign 
of the productivity of language and the role of fantasy in thought199 and, 
sharing the poet’s hopes, he laid the basis for a historical study on the 
metaphors of world literature. Curtius’s project started with the metaphors 
of the book and writing because he believed that they were the best 
explanation for language productivity, that is, the fact that metaphors have a 
“close ‘life relationship’ (Lebensbezug) with man or that allow ‘the 
interaction of all things’ (das Wechselleben der Weltgegenstände).” 200 
Aimed at identifying the moment in which the book was attributed with a 
sacred value, this study resulted in a detailed collection of uses of the 
metaphor of the book from ancient Greece to Shakespeare. 
Maybe because stimulated by Curtius’ work and aiming at criticising 
the results of his research, in 1950201 Erich Rothacker outlined a work plan 
in which he foresaw the publication of his research results on the book of 
nature (das Buch der Natur) in 1956. 
In 1958 Blumenberg presented an outline of metaphorology before a 
commission for research on the Begriffsgeschichte of the Deutsche 
																																								 																				
199 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, “Noten und Abhandlungen,” in Goethe, West-
Östlicher Divan. 2. Noten und Abhandlungen, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1952. 
200 E. R. Curtius, “Il libro come simbolo,” op. cit., p. 336. 
201  Eric Rothacker, Mensch und Geschichte. Studien zur Anthropologie und 




Forschungsgemeinschaft, presided by Hans Georg Gadamer and also in the 
present of Rothacker. On this occasion Blumenberg used the comparison 
between the metaphors of writing, of reading and of the book with the 
“implicated” 202  metaphors of organism and mechanism 203  in order to 
explain what metaphorical research consists in. He did not, however, make 
any reference whatsoever to Rothacker’s research as, in the meantime the 
book he had pre-announced in 1950 had not been published and 
Blumenberg was convinced that the project had been abandoned. In 
addition, Blumenberg was even more convinced owing to the fact that 
Rothacker did not intervene during the commission sitting. For the same 
reason, when Blumenberg gave Rothacker’s funeral oration in 1966 he did 
not mention the meeting of their research on Curtius; the book was not even 
published in the period between the presentation of the metaphorology 
project and Rothacker’s death. In fact, the book that had been announced in 
1950 had not been published. With the intention of going back to the project 
he had outlined in the sixties, in the 1978-1979 winter semester Blumenberg 
held a series of lectures on metaphorology and once again he used the 
metaphors of writing and the book as his examples. This time, however, he 
went further; not wanting to leave the question of the relationship of his 
research and Rothacker’s open to any critical reflections regarding 
posthumous papers, he stated explicitly that Rothacker’s manuscript did not 
																																								 																				
202 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 12. 
203 The subject had already been developed in Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a 
Metaphorology, op. cit., pp. 62 – 76, in particular pp. 72 – 74 on the comparison between 
mechanistic metaphor and the metaphor of the book. 
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exist and that in all likelihood the scholar had never started the project for a 
book on the metaphor of the book of nature. It was not until 1979 that 
Blumenberg realised he had made a mistake, when Wilhelm Perpeet 
published some of Rothacker’s works for the first time, “Materialien und 
Grundsätzliches zur Metapherngeschichte” (Materials and fundamental 
considerations for a history of the metaphor), entitled Das Buch der 
Natur.204 
This reconstruction of the origins of Lesbarkeit allows us to 
understand two things: first of all, that Lesbarkeit originates in the 
Paradigms, thus revealing a continuity in Blumenberg’s philosophical 
reflections that very often his interpreters do not acknowledge; secondly, it 
also furthers our understanding of the more theoretical part of Blumenberg’s 
interpretation on the metaphor of the world as a book, which otherwise, 
once again, might seem to be a collection of philosophical anecdotes about a 
literary topos. In fact, in Lesbarkeit Blumenberg does more than simply 
reconstruct the origins of his work and acknowledge his mistake, which was 
actually justified. He adopts Rothacker’s criticism of Curtius and, using 
Rothacker’s concept of significance (Bedeutsamkeit), takes his distance 
from both the latter and Curtius by reviving one of the fundamental theses 
of the Paradigms, that is, that of the pragmatic value of the metaphors that 
we have seen also means that absolute metaphors have a history – in other 
words, they are not ‘absolute’ in the sense that they are historical apriori, 
																																								 																				
204  Eric Rothacker, Das Buch der Natur. Materialien und Grundsätzliches zur 
Metapherngeschichte, Wilhelm Perpeet (ed.), Bonn, Bouvier, 1979. 
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but in the sense that concepts cannot replace them in their paradigmatic 
function. 
Let us look at this passage in detail. Rothacker and Blumenberg’s 
criticism of Curtius205 lies in the fact that although he did select his material 
very carefully and study numerous sources with care, offering an extensive 
collection of examples, but what did not emerge from his study is that 
Rothacker had defined the significance (Bedeutsamkeit) of the experience of 
the book of nature. Rothacker used the principle of significance (Satz der 
Bedeutsamkeit)206 for the fact that the experience of the world of life is never 
the experience of a uniform, indifferent whole, but on the contrary, in it 
man’s interest towards the world emerges. In Blumenberg’s terms we could 
say that Curtius’ research did not allow the paradigmatic function of the 
metaphor of the book to emerge (so far Blumenberg’s opinion, although 
based on diverse premises, agrees with Rothacker’s). On the other hand, in 
the research project for the book of nature Rothacker said he wanted to 
demonstrate that “from the literary metaphorics of the book one can explain 
the monumental philosophical task entitled The world as a hermeneutical 
problem, and that it is possible to solve it.”207 
																																								 																				
205  Eugenio Garin criticised Curtius for the same thing, “La nuova scienza e il 
simbolo del ‘libro’”, in Id., La cultura filosofia del Rinascimento italiano, Firenze, Sansoni, 
19792 (1961), pp. 451 – 465. Whilst underlining the importance of the theme of the symbol 
of the book, which is “at the centre of a complex web of conceptions and disputes: and 
encompasses, in its various meanings, the variation of a vision of the world and 
knowledge” (translation mine), p. 452, Garin criticises Curtius for not having 
contextualised the countless examples he gathered, so that the meaning of many is not 
understood.  
206 Eric Rothacker, Zur Genealogie des menschlichen Bewusstseins, Bonn, Bouvier, 
1966, pp. 44 – 52. 
207 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 15. 
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Rothacker had therefore analysed the problem of the historical 
significance or function of the metaphor of the book but Blumenberg 
believed that not even he had managed to go beyond a mere collection of 
examples; this was because he had not reconstructed the history of 
metaphors from a functionalistic perspective and thus, had not understood 
that the paradigm of legibility is the paradigm of the Modern Age for the 
experimentability of the world, and not an apriori historical paradigm that is 
able to respond to the problem of the world, in the ahistorical sense. 
Blumenberg therefore takes his distance from both Curtius’ topic, criticising 
the total indifference that the value material he collected suffers, and 
Rothacker’s hermeneutic perspective, because he does not believe that the 
world as a hermeneutic problem can be solved once and for all; neither does 
he believe that a single problem of the world that is portrayed identically 
throughout the course of history has never existed.208 
 
 
2.2 The absolute metaphor of the world as a book: a metaphor for the 
experimentability of everything. 
The starting point for Blumenberg’s study on the metaphor of the 
world as a book is the malaise of contemporary civilisation denounced by 
the Kulturkritik. Blumenberg sees the denunciation of a loss of meaning that 
is expressed in the discomfort of contemporary civilisation as an expression 
																																								 																				
208 See Chapter three, here, as regards the functionalistic conception of concepts and 
the role of the world concept in the history of philosophy. 
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of the disappointed expectations that it is difficult to trace, because they 
correspond to the expectations with which man related to the reality that 
stimulated him. It is the historian’s task to find out where these disregarded 
expectations may be hidden and where they could still occur. In other 
words, the concept that should be questioned is, once again, the concept of 
world and to understand contemporary malaise one must ask oneself: “what 
kind of world did they believe they could have?”.209 For Blumenberg this is 
always the most useful question when studying man’s expectations towards 
reality.  
The field in which one can study the disregarded expectations of 
modern man is the metaphor of the world as a book of nature, that is, as a 
paradigm of the esperimentability of everything, or rather, of modern 
empiricism. This absolute metaphor describes man’s desire that the world 
has a meaning and 
the desire that the world reveals itself to be just as accessible as it is in the manner of mere 
perception and even the precise predictability of its phenomena; that in the state of 
aggregation of legibility it can open up with a donation of meaning as a totality of nature, 
life and history, certainly not a natural and spontaneous need like that of magic – of 
acquiring power over uncontrolled strength. From this point of view it is only comparable 
to that other unique desire of an immediate identity, in other words, that the god himself 
reveals himself to be edible, since at the same time nothing remains and that he is entirely 
incorporated: incarnation as a ritual.210 
																																								 																				
209  Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 9. In this passage 
Blumenberg reformulates Kant’s questions in his first critique about what we can know in 
terms of “what we believe we can know.” 
210 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 10. 
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In other words, the paradigm of the legibility of the world highlights 
that the idea of carrying out experiments on the world is not obvious, “it is 
not a natural need,”211 that is, it is not always available and does not even 
depend on technical availability.212 In fact, as Curtius’ extensive study also 
shows, the metaphor of the book is not the paradigm of the 
esperimentability of everything from the very beginning of its history. 
Indeed, whilst on the one hand it is true that experience of the world in the 
same way as experience of the book implies the diffusion of the book (and 
therefore an advanced degree of production and fruition) and widespread 
literacy, on the other it is necessary that “the experience of the book is made 
autonomous in its own experience of totality”213 because it makes itself the 
paradigm of the testability of everything. This is where Blumenberg corrects 
Rothacker’s concept of significance: to guarantee the historical significance 
of a metaphor, above all one must show that “it would not be plausible in 
every period.”214 
The interpretative scheme that Blumenberg applies to the absolute 
metaphor of the world as a book is the same that we have seen in 
Legitimacy. The metaphor of the world as a book becomes an absolute 
metaphor when a second attempt at overcoming the Gnosis is made, that is, 
																																								 																				
211  Blumenberg effectively insists: “Only those who believe that the theoretical 
empirics of the Modern Age is roughly the “most natural thing in the world”- an immediate 
relationship with the things that only had to be discovered and that was finally allowed – 
may take as rhetorically redundant the fact that this offer occurs in the language of rivality 
with the book, of overcoming all preceding legibilities.” Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit 
der Welt, op. cit., p. 11 (translation mine). 
212 See here, Chapter three, when talking about the late antiquity as the first modern 
age that failed owing to the lack of technical availability. 
213 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 11 (translation mine). 
214 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 22 (translation mine). 
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in the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age. According to 
Blumenberg, Curtius’ thesis, according to which the book becomes an 
(absolute) metaphor of the world with the rise of Christianity, because 
Christianity is the religion of the book, cannot be supported; this is because 
before the meeting with Gnosticism, nature does not have the same value as 
it does when Christianity has to defend itself against it: the Greek cosmos is 
not the Christian world at the beginning of the Middle Ages and this is not 
the Christian world at the end of the Middle Ages. It is true, however, that if 
Plato’s cosmogony and the Greek concept of cosmos developed here is 
compared with the biblical creatio ex nihilo and the Christian world, from 
the very start this lent itself to be understood as a book while the former did 
not. In fact the Platonic cosmos is the platonic cosmos of ideas and in the 
world of phenomena images are perceived that, through “their simplification 
in a profile, to what makes it possible to recognises them,” 215  creating 
concepts. Furthermore, one does not speak in cosmogony; while the biblical 
creation occurs through the word that commands what has to be created 
from nothing. But the historical revelation of God in the diverse sacred 
books is against the idea that God has already declared himself in nature in a 
manner that is both comprehensible and sufficient. Only when nature, the 
product of creation, is developed in its redemptive function, is the first step 
taken towards a revival of nature, which is no longer (only) deception, 
prison and labyrinth. This has not yet brought us to see nature as a book, but 
																																								 																				
215 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 22 (translation mine).. 
 
 189 
at least a positivity of nature has been retrieved, inserting it in the 
redemption process of man. It is only with Pelagianism, that is, it is only 
when nature absorbs the qualities of the divine that it can become 
antichristian; and Giordano Bruno and Spinoza represent the height of this 
path because they are the most illustrious exponents of the pantheism 
promoted by the new Copernican conception of the cosmos.216 
 
 
3. Criticism of Blumenberg’s interpretation of Bruno 
We have seen that the interpretation of Bruno plays a key role in both 
Legitimacy and Legibility – although in his interpretation here Blumenberg 
only grants the space of a single sentence, but one of greater hermeneutic 
weight than many exemplifications that illustrate the thesis of the book. It is 
worth summarising what we have seen so far. In Legitimacy Bruno is one of 
the two philosophers who exemplifies the concept of the epochal threshold 
(and thus has a central function in the criticism of the historical 
substantialism of the secularisation theorem) and, by interpreting his 
theological-philosophical thesis as part of the history of the effects of 
Copernicanism, Blumenberg demonstrates the signs of the transition from 
the Middle Ages to the Modern Age; in Legibility, on the other hand, Bruno 
is the first modern author who lays the philosophical basis of empiricism, 
because he offers a philosophical translation of Copernicus’ infinite 
																																								 																				
216 Hans Blumenberg, Die Lesbarkeit der Welt, op. cit., p. 35. 
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astronomical universe into the philosophical infinite-pantheist universe; 
doing so, he thus opens the interpretation of the medieval metaphor of the 
world as a book of God to an absolute metaphor of the esperimentability of 
everything by modern man, emphasising the aspect of the reading of the 
book.217 
The overall interpretation of Bruno that Blumenberg offers us 
certainly has the merit of underlining the impact of the effects of 
Copernicanism, understood as scientific theory, in the history of philosophy 
in the early Modern Age. It has, however, the limit of reviving Bruno’s 
interpretation as a philosophical vulgariser of Copernicus, that makes one 
lose sight of, and I believe this is the central aspect that deserves criticism, 
the autonomy of the path that Nolanus followed to reach his formulation of 
a gnosiology that in his conclusions is in agreement with Copernicanism, 
understood now as the cultural atmosphere, that is, as a horizon of meaning 
that is rearranging itself. 
Blumenberg analyses the metaphor of the world as a book from a 
Copernican perspective. Proof of this is the fact that Blumenberg interprets 
this metaphor only as a metaphor of the legibility of the world and neglects 
the moment of writing in the world. The aspect of metaphorics regarding the 
																																								 																				
217 Bruno’s philosophy thus also plays a central role in Blumenberg’s interpretation 
of the Modern Age as an independent rational period in which self-assertion is one of its 
most important characteristics. This reveals both Blumenberg’s debt towards Cassirer’s 
approach, but also what he disagrees with. At the centre of Cassirer’s interpretation of the 
Modern Age is Giordano Bruno’s philosophy since his philosophical interpretation of 
Copernicanism introduces categories into philosophy that will lead to rationalism and 
Kantism; Blumenberg, on the other hand, underlines above all the consequences that 
Bruno’s Copernicanism have on the man-world relationship and thus, on the development 
of the self-assertion category in history. 
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writing of the world had been, however, very important in mediaeval 
thinking because it had been one of the arguments against curiositas. In fact, 
in the mediaeval formulation of the metaphor of the world as a book, God is 
both the subject of writing and subject of reading of the book of nature and 
of the book of history, while man is the passive object of both books. 
Blumenberg perceives the paradigm change at the threshold of the Modern 
Age, that is, when the moment of reading the book is no longer a 
characteristic of God but is also attributed to man, and concentrates on the 
new experience of world that foresees that this is also legible by man. 
Blumenberg is certainly interested in this aspect of metaphorics 
because, the criticism of historical substantialism aside, he also interprets 
the Modern Age from the perspective of empirical rationality and the event 
that represents this aspect of the Modern Age best is the Copernicus 
question and the history of the effects of the latter. However, in the Middle 
Ages and even up to Bruno, the metaphor of the world as a book had its 
philosophical supremacy because it emphasised that it had been God who 
had written the book of the world and only he could do it, creating an image 
of the distance between God and man. This metaphor thus had its 
philosophical supremacy because, as Blumenberg has rightly shown, it 
helped portray the terms of the man-world-God relationship from a 
theological perspective. 
One example suffices to understand how the perception of the man-
world-God relationship changed through the metaphor of the world as a 
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book. Galileo Galilei’s statement is renowned, when he said that the world 
is written in mathematical characters and this means that everything that is 
written can be understood by anyone who knows this language and without 
the need for the intermediation of the Scriptures 
Philosophy is written in this grand book — I mean the universe — which stands continually 
open to our gaze, but it cannot be understood unless one first learns to comprehend the 
language and interpret the characters in which it is written. It is written in the language of 
mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other geometrical figures, without 
which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one is 
wandering around in a dark labyrinth.218  
This is truly the moment in which the metaphor of the world as a book 
reveals itself as a metaphor of modern empiricism because Galileo’s words 
presuppose the conviction of the existence of a unitary conception of the 
reading of the world and its rules, and a unitary conception that can be 
shared and reproduced with time. And it is precisely these characteristics 
that are to define modern experimentalism: with the same instruments and 
the same conditions, the experiments carried out on nature yield the same 
results, which can be interpreted in the same way, and reproducible, that is, 
if under the same conditions, valid and repeatable with time. 
By studying the history of the metaphor of the world as a book, I believe 
that it is possible to demonstrate that the idea that the writing of the world is 
done in comprehensible characters and can be reproduced by man 
permeated the mnemonic sciences and is not an effect of Copernicanism. To 
																																								 																				
218 Galileo Galilei, The Assayer, trans. by Stillman Drake, Discoveries and Opinions 
of Galilei, New York, Anchor Book, 1957, pp. 237-8. 
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do this, however, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that there are 
two sides to the metaphor of the world as a book: one is that of reading, the 
other is that of writing. It is true that throughout the history of the absolute 
metaphor the aspect of reading is prominent, because it explains the 
relationship between man and world from a Christian theological 
perspective, and it is therefore a passive relationship in as much as it is God 
who writes the book of Nature (even Galileo Galilei was convinced of this). 
There is, however, a field in which the active aspect of the metaphor of the 
book, that of writing, is favoured. The field is that of the theories of memory 
and mnemotechnics in the sixteenth century and the emblematic exponent 
and most conscious of this understanding of the metaphor of the world as a 
book and memory is Giordano Bruno. 
 
 
4. Metaphors for memory and the mnemonic arts 
I shall now go back to the texts I analysed in the introduction,219 
defining the sources of the mnemonic arts, because I would like to 
demonstrate the role that the metaphor of inner writing has in the illustration 
of rules for the creation of artificial memory. The aim of this study is 
therefore to demonstrate that the metaphor of inner writing is an absolute 
metaphor, that is, the leading paradigm in the conceptual formation of 
artificial memory and it is the element of the interpretation that guides and 
																																								 																				
219 See Chapter one, § 2. 
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furthers understanding. Furthermore, I shall demonstrate that the other 
metaphors that are usually a generic reference to memory are technically 
metaphors for the natural memory and can be traced back to the moment of 
reading the book. To conclude, combining the two theses, I believe that: the 
metaphor of the world as a book, with its two aspects of reading and 
writing, has guided the conceptual formation of the philosophical and 
scientific understanding of memory (both natural and artificial memory); in 
particular, the metaphor of writing is an operative metaphor that is 
necessary to explain artificial memory, while the other metaphors are 
metaphors for the natural memory and illustrate its retentive function. 
The starting point for this presentation is therefore the following 
observation. Metaphors for memory are oriented towards two semantic 
fields: the metaphor of the seal-writing and the metaphor of the ark-
stomach. The first group of metaphors describes artificial memory while the 
second describes natural memory. 
 
 
4.1 Metaphors for natural memory 
Metaphors for natural memory are those that highlight the retentive 
function of memory, its function as a container. They are metaphors such as 
that of the ark and the stomach.  
For Cicero memory is thesaurus  
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Nunc ad thesaurum inventorum atque ad omnium partium rhetoricae custodem, memoriam, 
transeamus.220 
and Quintilian also defines it as follows 
neque inmerito thesaurus hic eloquentiae dicitur221 
but he also sees memory as the stomach 
Quare et pueri statim, ut praecepi, quam plurima ediscant, et quaecumque aetas operam 
iuvandae studio memoriae dabit devoret initio taedium illud et scripta et lecta saepius 
revoluendi et quasi eundem cibum remandendi.222 
There is a minimal, but significant difference between the two 
metaphors. While the metaphor of memory as an ark expresses only the 
retentive function, and therefore the passive function of natural memory, the 
metaphor of memory as a stomach also expresses the possibility that natural 
memory reworks the facts of the experience it contains and transforms them 
into something else, thus also symbolising an active function of the natural 
memory. It is no coincidence that it is Quintilian who accompanies this 
reflection on the two memories with this double image. We have seen that 
unlike Cicero, Quintilian was not convinced of the use of artificial memory 
																																								 																				
220 Cicero, Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, XVI, 
28, op. cit., pp. 204 – 205: “Now let me turn to the treasure-house of the ideas supplied by 
Invention, to the guardian of all the parts of rhetoric, the Memory.” 
221 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI. II, 1-2, op. cit., pp. 212 – 213: “Indeed it is not 
without good reason that memory has been called the treasure-house of eloquence.” 
222 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI. II, 41, op. cit., pp. 234 – 235: “Therefore boys 
should, as I have already urged, learn as much as possible by heart at the earliest stage, 
while all who, whatever their age, desire to cultivate the power of memory, should 
endeavour to swallow the initial tedium of reading and re-reading what they have written or 
read, a process which we may compare to chewing the cud.” 
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and claimed that the natural memory was able to exalt those characteristics 
that were to be reproduced and perfected in the artificial memory. 
From the level of conceptual formation, the two metaphors result in 
different implications and guide the definition of the concept of memory. If I 
think of the natural memory (Aristotle’s mnéme, I mean) as an ark, I will 
have to explain the ability of the soul to retrieve what is deposited in the 
memory by introducing another element (for example anamnesi, remaining 
with the Aristotelian model for the functioning of memory). If, on the other 
hand, I think of natural memory as a stomach, whilst preserving the idea of 
memory as a container of facts of sensible experience, I am using an image 
that is also already operative, thus making the search for another element or 
function of memory to complete the concept I have been given of the 
metaphor as superfluous.223 
 
 
4.2 Metaphors for the artificial memory 
Whilst metaphors for the natural memory illustrate its retentive 
function, metaphors for the artificial memory highlight the function of 
memory, in other words, the ability to summon the images deposited in the 
natural memory. Metaphors for the artificial memory are the wax upon 
which a seal impresses a significant shape and writing, understood first and 
foremost as a system of portrayal and only then as an instrument that 
																																								 																				
223 I think that this example offers a good illustration of what has been said about the 
functionalistic conception of concepts and the leading role of absolute metaphors in 
concept formation. See Chapter four.  
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transmits linguistic meaning. Since the gesture of impressing a significant 
shape on a wax tablet is one of the first experiences of writing, we can say 
that metaphors for the artificial memory belong to the same semantic field 
as writing. 
The author of Rhetorica ad Herennium uses the metaphor of writing 
on wax tablets to explain the important moment in the construction of the 
memory system, which is the formation of the loci. We have seen that the 
selection of the loci is very important because a system of loci that is 
constructed well can be used more than once to remember different things. 
In fact, the author explains, the images in the loci can be removed when 
they are no longer needed and be replaced with other ones, just like when 
we are writing on a wax tablet and cancel what we have written so we can 
use the tablet again. 
Quemadmodum igitur qui litteras sciunt possunt id quod dictatur eis scribere, et recitare 
quod scripserunt, item qui mnemonica didicerunt possunt quod audierunt in locis conlocare 
et ex his memoriter pronuntiare. Nam loci cerae aut chartae simillimi sunt, imagines litteris, 
dispositio et conlocatio imaginum scripturae, pronuntiatio lectioni.224 
And 
																																								 																				
224 Cicero, Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, 
XVII, 30, op. cit., pp. 208 – 209: “Those who know the letters of the alphabet can thereby 
write out what is dictated to them and read aloud what they have written. Likewise, those 
who have learned mnemonics can set in backgrounds what they have heard, and from these 
backgrounds deliver it by memory. For the backgrounds are very much like wax tablets or 
papyrus, the images like the letters, the arrangement and disposition of the images like the 
script, and the delivery is like reading.” 
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Locos quos sumpserimus egregie commeditari oportebit, ut perpetuo nobis haerere possint; 
nam imagines, sicuti litterae, delentur ubi nihil utimur; loci, tamquam cera, remanere 
debent.225 
In his treatise on Ars Memoriare in De Oratore Cicero also refers 
repeatedly to the metaphor  
vidit enim hoc prudenter sive Simonides sive alius quis invenit, ea maxime animis effingi 
nostris, quae essent a sensu tradita atque impressa; acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris 
sensibus esse sensum videndi; quare facillime animo teneri posse, si ea, quae perciperentur 
auribus aut cogitatione, etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur; ut res caecas et 
ab aspectus iudicio remotas conformatio quaedam et imago et figura ita notaret, ut ea, quae 
cogitando complecti vix possemus, intuendo quasi teneremus. His autem formis atque 
corporibus, sicut omnibus, quae sub aspectum veniunt, sede opus est, etenim corpus 
intellegi sine loco non potest.226 
Cicero, however, also draws attention to the figurative aspect of the 
metaphor, creating a parallel between scriptura and pictura that, as we shall 
see, is to be very important in Giordano Bruno’s mnemotechnics 
(…) quam facultatem et exercitatio dabit, ex qua consuetudo gignitur, et similium 
verborum conversa et inmutata casibus aut traducta ex parte ad genus notatio et unius verbi 
																																								 																				
225 Cicero, Ad C. Herennium. De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium), III, 
XVII, 31, op. cit., pp. 210 – 211: “We shall need to study with special care the backgrounds 
we have adopted so that they may cling lastingly in our memory, for the images, like 
letters, are effaced when we make no use of them, but the backgrounds, like wax tablets, 
should abide.” 
226 Cicero, De oratore, II, LXXXVIII, 357 – 358, op. cit., pp. 468 – 469: “It has been 
sagaciously discerned by Simonides or else discovered by some other person, that the most 
complete pictures are formed in our minds of the things that have been conveyed to them 
and imprinted on them by the senses, but that keenest of all our senses is the sense of sight, 
and that consequently perceptions received by the ears or by reflexion can be most easily 
retained in the mind if they are also conveyed to our minds by the mediation of the eyes, 
with the result that things not seen and not lying in the field of visual discernment are 
earmarked by a sort of outline and image and shape so that we keep hold of as it were by an 
act of thought. But these forms and bodies, like all the things that come under our view 
require abode, in as much as a material object without a locality is inconceivable.” 
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imagine totius sententiae informatio, pictoris cuiusdam summi ratione et modo formarum 
varietate locos distinguentis.227 
sic fore ut ordine rerum locorum orto conservaret, res hautem ipsas rerum effigies notaret, 
atque ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris uteremur.228 
Qui sit autem oratori memoriae fructus, quanta utilitas, quanta vis, quid me attinet dicere? 
(…) ita audire vel eum unde discas vel eum, cui respondum sit ut illi non infundere in aures 
tuas orationem sed in animo videantur inscribere?229 
Neque verum est quod ab inertibus dicitur, opprimi memoriam imaginum pondere et 
obscura etiam id quod per se natura tenere potuisset; vidi enim ego summos homines et 
divina prope memoria, Athenis Charmadam, in Asia, quem vivere hodie aiunt, Scepsium 
Metrodorum, quorum uterque tanquam litteris in cera sic se aiebat imaginibus in eis locis 
quo haberet quae meminisse vellet perscribere230 
																																								 																				
227 Cicero, De oratore, II, LXXXVIII, 358, op. cit., pp. 470 – 471: “[…] the ability to 
use these will be supplied by practice, which engenders habit, and by marking off similar 
words with an inversion and alteration of their cases or a transference from species to 
genus, and by representing a whole concept by the image of a single word, on the system 
and method of a consummate painter distinguishing the positions of objects by modifying 
their shapes.” 
228 Cicero, De oratore, LXXXVI, 354, op. cit., pp. 466 – 467: “[…] with the result that 
the arrangement of the localities will preserve the order of the facts and the images of the 
facts will designate the facts themselves, and we shall employ the localities and images 
respectively as a wax writing tablet and the letters written on it.” 
229 Cicero, De oratore, LXXXVI, 355, op. cit., pp. 466 – 467: “[…] of giving such 
close attention to the instructions of your client and to the speech of the opponent you have 
to answer that they may seem not to just pour what they say into your ears but to imprint it 
on your mind?.” 
230 Cicero, De oratore, LXXXVIII, 360, op. cit., pp. 470 – 473: “Nor is it true, as 
unscientific people assert, that memory is crushed beneath a weight of images and even 
what might have been retained by nature unassisted is obscured; for I have myself met 
eminent people with almost superhuman powers of memory; Charmadas at Athens and 
Metrodorus of Scepsis in Asia, who is said to be still living, each of whom used to say that 
he wrote down things he wanted to remember in certain ‘localities’ in his possession by 
means of images, just as if he were inscribing letters on wax. It follows that this practice 
cannot be used to draw out the memory if no memory has been given to us by nature, but it 
can undoubtedly summon it come forth if it is in hiding.”. 
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Quintilian also works on the two aspects of the metaphor, underlining 
first the figurative and then the semantic 
Imagines voces sunt, quibus ea quae ediscenda sunt notamus, ut, quomodo Cicero dicit, 
locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris utamur.231 
Mitto quod quaedam nullis simulacris significari possunt, ut certe coniunctiones. Habeamus 
enim sane, ut qui notis scribunt, certas imagines omnium et loca scilicet infinita (…).232 
Illud neminem non iuvabit, isdem quibus scripserit ceris ediscere. Sequitur enim vestigiis 
quibusdam memoriam, et velut oculis intuetur non paginas modo, sed versus prope ispos, 
estque cum dicit similis legenti. Iam vero si litura aut adiectio aliqua atque mutatio 
interveniat, sigan sunt quaedam quae intuentes derrare non possumus.233 
Non arbitror autem mihi in hoc inmorandum, quid sit quod memoriam faciat, quamquam 
plerique inprimi quaedam vestigia animo, velut in ceris anulorum signa seruentur, 
existimant.234 
																																								 																				
231 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI. II, 21, op. cit., pp. 222 – 223: “By images I 
mean the words by which we distinguish the things which we have to learn by heart: in 
fact, as Cicero says, we use “places like wax tablets and symbols in lieu of letters.”” 
232 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI. II, 25, op. cit., pp. 224 – 227: “I pass by the 
fact that there are certain things which it is impossible to represent by symbols, as, for 
example, conjunctions. We may, it is true, like shorthand writers, have definite symbols for 
everything […].” 
233 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI. II, 32, op. cit., pp. 228 – 231: “There is one 
thing which will be of assistance to everyone, namely, to learn a passage by heart from the 
same tablets on which he has committed it to writing. For he will have certain tracks to 
guide him in his pursuit of memory, and the mind’s eye will be fixed not merely on the 
pages on which the words were written, but on individual lines, and at the times he will 
speak as though he were reading aloud. Further, if the writing should be interrupted by 
some erasure, addition or alteration, there are certain symbols available, the sight of which 
will prevent us from wandering from the track.” Here the metaphor of writing is not being 
used for the artificial memory, but according to Quintilian, the practice of writing and 
reading are useful in themselves to reinforce the natural memory. 
234 Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI. II, 4, op. cit., pp. 214 – 215: “I do not conceive, 
however, that I need dwell upon the question of the precise function of memory although 
many hold the view that certain impressions are made upon the mind, analogous to those 
which a signet-ring makes on wax.” 
 
 201 
Ex hoc Simonidis facto notatum videtur, iuvare memoriam signatis animo sedibus, idque 
credet suo quisque experimento.235 
Let us now go back to our medieval sources of mnemotechnics and 
see what happens to the metaphors of memory. Of particular importance is 
Albertus Magnus’s position as regards the tradition concerning the use of 
metaphors in writing because it clearly shows how its role in 
mnemotechnical or philosophical texts is not merely rhetorical, but instead 
clearly perceived as part of the interpretation with the function of clarifying 
and furthering mnemonic rules and precepts. Alberto criticises the metaphor 
of inner writing because he believes it implies that one must use a limited 
number of images, as is the case with letters; instead, countless images must 
be used 
‹18› One then also studies the rules Tullius gives for the images to be deposited in the 
places he spoke of. In fact, Tullius says, “the places are very similar to wax tablets or sheets 
of paper, and the images similar to letters, the arrangement or place of the images similar to 
writing, and pronunciation to reading.” But this does not appear to be true. In fact, there are 
few letters if the elements are counted, and depending on the order in which they are 
arranged, they are able to express everything that has to be pronounced, as Democritus said 
was the case in the comedies and tragedies; on the other hand, countless images are 
required otherwise reality cannot be suitably expressed.236 
‹21› (…) This also shows quite clearly that, to acquire artificial memory, application is 
necessary in the images and in the objects and in the words, and furthermore that the 
images are rare and noteworthy; and it therefore appears that there are no determinant 
																																								 																				
235  Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, XI. II, 17, op. cit., pp. 220 – 221: “This 
achievement of Simonides appears to have given rise to the observation that it is an 
assistance to the memory if localities are sharply impressed upon mind, a view a truth of 
which everyone may realise by practical experiment.” 
236 Albertus Magnus, De bono, IV.2, 475, op. cit. (translation mine). 
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images, which we can use to remember everything or occurrence, as we do with letters to 
express everything or fact in writing.237 
I believe that this criticism is of great importance to my argumentation 
because it shows the fundamental value that his metaphor had in the 
understanding of the mnemonic arts and its philosophical principles. 
Thomas of Aquinas, on the other hand, evokes the analogy used in 
Rhetorica ad Herennium and does not criticise the implications as Albertus 
Magnus had done. 
Tertio, oportet ut homo sollicitudinem apponat et affectum adhibeat ad ea quae vult 
memorari: quia quo aliquid magis fuerit impressum animo, eo minus elabitur. Unde et 
Tullius dicit, in sua Rhetorica [3 Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet., c. 19], quod “sollicitudo 
conservat integras simulacrorum figuras.”238 
 
5. The metaphor of inner writing as an absolute metaphor 
The aforementioned examples illustrate the thesis according to which 
the metaphor of inner writing is the one that allows one to penetrate the 
understanding of the ars memoriae more fruitfully. In fact, every since Plato 
philosophy has entrusted the understanding and description of memory to 
the metaphor of inner writing, and the analogical tie between the 
functioning of writing and the understanding of memory is still so close and 
																																								 																				
237 Albertus Magnus, De bono, IV.2, 477, op. cit. (translation mine). 
238 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, II, II, Quaestio XLIX. De singulis partibus 
quasi integralibus. Articulus 1, Utrum memoria sit pars prudentiae, op. cit., p. 63: “Third, a 
person should put his care and concern into the things he wants to memorize, because the 
more deeply stamped they are on the mind the less likely are they to disappear. And so 
Cicero remarks that taking trouble keeps the shapes of images intact.” 
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topical today. It suffices to think of how biologists explain DNA: the 
genetic memory of every living being is the genetic code. In other words, 
the information is in DNA like the words of a code.239 
In the analysis I will carry out in the following two chapters I will not 
interrogate two authors, that is, I will not carry out a differential analysis, 
but will limit myself to an analysis that highlights what Blumenberg calls 
the “translation” 
Faced with an artificial structure of speculative statements, the interpretation will only 
‘dawn’ on us once we have succeeded in entering into the author’s imaginative horizon and 
reconstructing his ‘translation’.240 
The “translation” is what Blumenberg defines as “background 
metaphorics”241 in the same passage 
Metaphorics can also be in play where exclusively terminological propositions appear, but 
where these cannot be understood in their higher-order semantic unitywithout taking into 
account the guiding idea from which they are induced and‘read off’.242 
My decision to proceed in this way rather than with differential 
analysis is motivated by the fact that Giordano Bruno is obviously aware of 
																																								 																				
239 I believe, but am formulating this idea as a further research hypothesis, that the 
increase that has taken place in the understanding of how DNA functions, and which has 
led from the genetic to the epigenetic, can be understood as a chapter of the development of 
the history of the metaphor of writing. Once again, as in the sixteenth century, this 
deviation was produced by a redefinition of the order of the relation that introduces the 
metaphor: whilst in genetics the moment of reading the code is favoured, in epigenetics 
attention is drawn to what happens at the moment the code is being written, and, once 
again, one lingered on man’s active role – this time “in the writing” of the genetic code. 
240 Hans Blumenberg, Paradigms for a Metaphorology, op. cit., p. 62. 




the role that the metaphor of inner writing as a background metaphorics has, 
not only in the understanding of the mnemonic arts and memory, but also in 
his contribution to its improvement, as this programmatic extract from De 
umbris idearum shows 
Hinc et eadem serie progressum facere dicitur ars quam manus ducit. Ideo – ut ad 
propositum intentionis nostrae spectat – cultris in arborum corticibus prior scripsisse 
perhibetur vetustas. Cui successit aetas in lapidibus celte excavatis inscribens; quam 
sequuta est papyrus sepiarum succis exarata. Inde pergamenaer membranae atramento 
artificioso magis intinctae. Proinde charta et inchaustum, praeloque premendae in usum 
longe omnium patissimum literae. A cultris, inquam, ad stilos, a stilis ad spongia, a 
spongiis ad calamos, a calamis ad pennsa, a pennis ad fusilia tandem elementa perventum. 
Haud secus in iis, quae ad scripturam pertinere videntur internam, contigisse arbitrarum, 
dum ab antiquo humanum studium sive a melico Simonide sive ab alio sumpserit 
exordium; qui <usu?> locorum et imaginum proportionalium chartae atque scripturae, 
actuque phantasiae et cogitativae locum scriptoris et calami subeuntibus, species/rerum 
memorandarum in interno libro inscribere studuerunt. Quorum industriae quid et quantum 
addiderimus, ipsorum, qui haec nostra cum illorum monumentis conferre potuerunt, esto 
iudicium. 243 
																																								 																				
243 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Pars prima, XV – XVI, OMN I, op. cit., pp. 134 – 135: 
“It is said that it is from these same foundation and in the same succession that the art that 
guides the hand proceeds. Hence – going back to the aspect that concerns our study – in 
ancient antiquity they used knives to write on the bark of tree. This was followed by the age 
of letters engraved with a chisel on stone; then came papyrus with black sepia ink. Then 
came the parchments that were marked more clearly using artificial ink. Then paper and the 
encaustic technique; finally letters were imprinted with a press, using an immensely more 
efficient technique. From knives to nibs, from nibs to sponges, from sponges to inkwells, 
from inkwells to pens, one finally arrived at – and this is what I mean – letters melted in 
lead. We believe that the same thing happened for the techniques of inner writing, from the 
period in which this form of human activity was started for the very first time by the poet 
Simonides or by another author: in fact, by adopting places and images instead of paper and 
letters of the alphabet, and replacing the work of the writer and quill with the activity of 
fantasy and the cogitative faculty, they contrived to write the images of the things to be 
remembered in an inner book. Which and how many innovations we have been able to add 
to their work, will be judged by those who set about comparing our treatises with their 
works.” (translation mine). 
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In the following chapter I shall present Giordano Bruno’s Ars 
Memoriae, making sure to offer a concrete demonstration of what he 
affirmed regarding his contribution to the improvement of the art similar to 
the perfection of the technique of writing in printing with mobile characters. 
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Chapter six  






Perge liber. Neque enim ingoras eundem solem, eamdemque artem 




ABSTRACT The analysis will now focus solely on Giordano Bruno and on the analysis of 
the metaphor of inner writing. I will concentrate on the presentation and clarification of 
Bruno’s ars memoriae, demonstrating consistency, continuity and excess in the wake of 
mnemotechnic tradition. This textual analysis will clearly show how the metaphor of inner 
writing aids the understanding of these three features and, with particular reference to 
excess, shows how the ars memoriae communicates with the Nolanus philosophy. 
 
 
I shall now illustrate how Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae fits in the 
tradition of the mnemonic arts. In particular, with the presentation of 
Bruno’s ars memoriae and reference to the technique as it is explained in 
De Umbris Idearum, I shall demonstrate both the consistency of the ars and 
the novelty it introduced in mnemonic tradition. Furthermore, with the 
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analysis of the role of the metaphor of inner writing in works on the 
mnemonic arts, with particular reference to De umbris idearum and the 
Sigilli cycle, I shall show how these two features of Bruno’s ars memoriae 
(consistency and novelty as regards the tradition of mnemonic arts) are 
clarified further by the particular weight that Bruno gives this analogy; as 
we have seen, this analogy not only has a lengthy history in the tradition of 
mnemonic arts, but it also plays a key role in the explanation of its rules and 
principles. 
Highlighting these two features of Bruno’s ars from a 
metaphorological perspective allows me to explain the third aspect, that is, 
its excess as regards tradition. It is precisely this third aspect that lets us 
understand how Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works communicate 
philosophically with some of the central themes of the “Nolanus muse.” 
In the expressions “consistency”, “novelty” and “excess” I therefore 
synthesise the following thesis: a. Bruno has no intention of either amending 
the precepts of mnemotechnics or of placing himself outside this tradition; 
b. Bruno perceives his ars memoriae as the soundest answer to the question 
of the precepts and the principles of the mnemonic arts that were proposed 
by the numerous critics of ars; c. Bruno sees this clarification as an epochal 
task; d. by carrying out this task and, more specifically, endowing the 
mnemonic arts with a metaphysics that underlines its principles and thus 
makes them comprehensible in greater depth by inserting them in a broader 
gnosiological framework, Giordano Bruno gives his ars memoriae a feature 
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of excess as regards tradition, because the ars memoriae will no longer be 
conceivable as an ars amongst the others, but instead should be understood 
as a unique ars, in other words, the technical level of the ars memoriae will 




1. Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae (1): consistency, novelty and excess 
as regards the tradition of the mnemonic arts 
In Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae there are elements of significant 
continuity with the mnemotechnic tradition, both regarding its precepts and 
the principles it refers to. What makes it different is the introduction of two 
technical novelties: on the one hand, a terminological reform of the 
elements with which the artificial memory system is constructed, that is 
locus and imago, which Bruno calls subiectum and adiectum or forma and, 
on the other, the introduction of a new element in addition to these two, the 
organum. 
As far as the first novelty is concerned, it might seem to be a simple 
linguistic exercise because all the characteristic features and rules that have 
the locus and imago in mnemonic tradition are applied to the subiectum and 
adiectum. On the other hand, the lexical novelties that Bruno introduces are 
the result of a profound rethinking of the modalities in which places and 
mnemonic images are combined together to create a memory, as can be seen 
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clearly when the organum is introduced and its applications are shown. 
Furthermore, it is with the terminological reform of the fundamental 
elements of mnemotechnics that Bruno lays the ground where he is to add 
and justify the second novelty: the introduction of a third element, the 
organum, which is the element that makes it possible to explain how the 
soul can evoke what is stored in the artificial memory, that is, in that system 
of places and images that has been created with the first two elements. This 
is therefore a summary of the innovation that Bruno has entrusted with his 
contribution to perfecting the ars memoriae: an improved technical 
explanation of how the soul goes from the construction of an artificial 
memory system to retrieving the data it has stored there.244 
Bruno understands that much of the criticism directed at the 
mnemonic arts regards its artificial feature, as was always the case since the 
beginning of its existence, and as we have seen, already testified in the most 
ancient rhetoric source, Rhetorica ad Herennium. 245  The heart of the 
criticism is that the mnemonic arts do not act directly on the natural 
																																								 																				
244 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Pars prima, XVI, OMN 
I, pp. 140 – 141: “Unde nobis ita successisse presumimus, ut quidquid ab antiquioribus hac 
de re fuit consideratum, praeceptum et ordinatum – quatenus per eorum scripta, quae ad 
nostras devenere manus, extat explicatum -, non sit conveniens pars inventionis nostrae, 
quae est inventio supra modum praegnans, cui appropriatus est liber Clavis magnae,” “This 
is why we believe we have brought the technique to such a degree of perfection that 
everything has been theorised, prescribed and ordered by the most ancient authors – at least 
as far as we know from the documents at our disposal – and cannot be legitimately 
accepted as part of our method: indeed, it was a highly fruitful discovery to which the book 
Clavis Magna is dedicated.” (translation mine). One must not let oneself be deceived by the 
peremptoriness with which Bruno presents the importance of the novelties he introduced to 
mnemonic arts. As we shall see, Bruno has to make sure the novelties he introduces are in 
the wake of tradition to demonstrate their innovative power; it is also true, however, that if 
Bruno’s ars memoriae is regarded as the fulfilment of mnemonic tradition, the latter is 
preserved by transforming it, and it is the product of this transformation that I call the 
excess of Bruno’s mnemonic arts compared to the mnemonic tradition. 
245 See here, Chapter one, § 2. 
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memory, but through the construction of an artificial ordo, the validity of 
which and correspondence with the ordo rerum has never been explained, 
meaning that it has always remained unclear how the transition from one 
level to another takes place, and what actually guarantees the correctness of 
this transition. In other words, it has never been explained, neither from a 
technical nor from a philosophical perspective, how it is possible to 
recognise the things or words that are to be evoked in the images stored in 
the artificial places of memory once the sensorial stimulus has already 
produced the mental image. The epochal contribution that Bruno is 
preparing for the development of the mnemonic arts is to show how it is 
possible that the two levels of order correspond, that is, the ordo idearum 
and the ordo rerum. 
The first step of his strategy is firstly to establish the correspondence 
and internal consistence of the orders of the artificial memory, that is, 
between the ordo locorum and the ordo imaginum. The aim of Bruno’s new 
terminology is to criticise mnemonic tradition for not having explained the 
fundamental connection between the order of the places and the order of the 
images in the artificial memory system.246 Bruno clarifies this important 
																																								 																				
246 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Pars prima, XVI, OMN 
I, pp. 140 – 141: “Ex adnexionis defectu accidit infirmitas illa, qua utentibus arte multoties 
collocata species non occurrit; non tamen ex hoc capite rem ipsam perpendisse videntur 
praedecessores nostri. Hic est qui interim visus sensum refringit magis quam lumen 
excellentius, densior obscuritas, magna celebritas, distantia dispergens et id genus alia, 
quae locis, quibus uti consueverunt, solent accidere. Hinc, veluti percussi canes lapidem 
mordentes vel baculum, verum discriminis huius authorem minime percipientes, alium 
incusant,” “An error in how such a connection is established [the connection between the 
objects and images for the objects] results in the defect that those using the art are unable to 
remember an image that has been stored more than once. But the authors before us do not 
appear to have taken the problem into consideration from this perspective. And this is the 
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relationship between the two elements by replacing the old terminology 
with terms that are a semantic reference to the concept of the relationship: 
the subiectum is where the adiectum is placed, but it is also what the 
adiectum is predicated on, and the latter can only be in relation to something 
on which is placed or predicated, in other words, its subiectum. These 
redefinitions are functional to the second novelty introduced by Bruno, the 
organum, which is the scrutiny, that is, the instrument that allows the soul, 
through the cogitative function, to order the mnemonic images, referring 
them correctly to the things they represent. Through scrutiny, operating 
semiotically in a similar way to the one in which each sign is given a 
meaning in language and writing, the cogitative function is able to carry out 
the transition from the ordo idearum to the ordum rerum. 
The second step, which explains what guarantees the correctness of 
the transition from the ordo idearum to the ordum rerum, consists in basing 
the ars on a kind of a “Platonic metaphysics,”247 that is able to justify the 
correspondence not only from a gnosiological perspective but also from an 
ontological one. However, with this second step, with this attempt to embed 
the justification even further from a sounder theoretical perspective, Bruno 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
error that can temporarily blur the sense of sight more than a light of images that is too 
close up or too distant so they are dispersed, and all the other incidents one comes up 
against when using mnemonic places. As a result, like beaten dogs biting a stone or stick, 
they accuse someone else, without realising who is really to blame.” (translation mine). 
247  Giordano Bruno, De umbris, op. cit., pp. 34 – 35: “Istam eruditorum pauci 
intelligant, intelligentibus autem omnibus usu veniat; sitque quam omnes, sive rudes sive 
eruditi, facile scire et exercere possint, quamque sine doctore, tantum in metaphysicis et 
doctrinis Platonicorum bene versati, possint intelligere,” “Let us admit it. Instead, this art 
can only be understood by few polymaths: it can still be practised by anyone who 
understands it; and thus, in addition, everyone, whether learned or not, will easily be able to 
recognise and apply it, even without the aid of a teacher, as long as they are good judges of 
Platonic metaphysics.” (translation mine). 
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twists the ars memoriae until it assumes a position that is excessive as 
regards mnemonic tradition, because he not only makes it become a theory 
of the memory within a philosophy of nature, but pushes it until it coincides 
with the same philosophy of nature, thus carrying out that revolution of the 
mediaeval order that we saw Cusano start. 
Let us now look more closely at how Bruno carried out this 
convergence of the ars memoriae and the theory of memory. 
 
 
2. Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae (2): consistency and novelty in 
comparison to the mnemonic arts 
2.1 The subiecta 
The first significant difference compared to the mnemonic tradition 
therefore lies in the redefinition of the fundamental terms of the ars. Bruno 
speaks of “substrate” (subiectum) instead of “place” (locus) and of “added 
image” (adiectum or forma) instead of “image” (imago). 
Redefining the elements of mnemotechnics, Bruno gives them each 
two definitions, one operative and the other theoretical. The operative 
definition can easily be inserted into the trail of the tradition, also without 
explaining the theoretical novelties it entails; it can, therefore, be quickly 
understood and used in mnemonic practice. The theoretical definition refers 
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to the one explained in Clavis Magna248 and is more difficult for those who 
are only interested in having a more efficient set of rules to learn the ars, 
without going into its theoretical significance in detail. By proposing two 
definitions, Bruno is still trying to keep separate the memory’s two levels of 
interpretation, the technical part on the one hand, and the theoretical part on 
the other. 
In the first definition of subiectum Bruno does not appear to stray too 
far from the traditional definition 
Primum ergo subiectum est technica extensio, sive sinus in phantastica facultate ordinatus, 
ex speciebus receptaculorum consitus, quae ex animae fenestris influxere, diversis 
distinctum partibus, visa omnia atque audita suo recipiens ordine et ad animae libitum 
reti/nens.249 
We recognise all the elements of the classical definition of locus: locus or 
subiectum is an artificial space (technica extensio) that reaches the soul 
through sensorial perception (ex animae fenestris influxere) and is made up 
																																								 																				
248 Clavis magna is a paper by Bruno, which he refers to frequently in his early 
mnemotechnic works, in particular in De Umbris Idearum, naming it as the main text for 
the presentation of his ars memoriae. Not one copy of this work has survived. In his early 
works Bruno uses the expression clavis magna, not necessarily in reference to a text, but to 
his mnemotechnics. Nicoletta Tirinnanzi, who analysed in detail the occurrences of the 
expression in De Umbris Idearum and in Cantus Circaeus, hypothesised that the text of 
Clavis Magna was never actually published as a book and that it only circulated amongst 
Bruno’s students in the form of a manuscript and lesson handbook, before converging in 
different sections of his later mnemonic works such as Explicatio Triginta Sigillorum, 
Sigillus Sigillorum and De imaginum compositione: Nicoletta Tirinnanzi, Introduzione, in 
Giordano Bruno, OMN I, pp. XIV – XIX.  
249 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Secunda pars, De 
subiectis, I, OMN I, pp. 148 – 149: “The first substrate is therefore an artificial extension, or 
rather a pre-arranged bosom in the fantastic fantasy, occupied by the figures of the 
receptacles that have arrived through the windows of the soul, distinguished into different 
parts, able to understand all the seen and heard realities according to their order, and to 
keep them in accordance with the wish of the soul.” (translation mine). 
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of the images of real places, which can, in turn, contain everything that has 
been seen or heard in the same order they occured. 
In the second definition, however, referring to his detailed explanation in 
Clavis Magna, Bruno defines the subiectum as “fantastic chaos” 
(phantasticum chaos). Fantastic chaos is a highly plastic material that can 
take on countless forms, like a “nubes ab externis impulsa ventis, quae pro 
impulsum differentiis atque rationibus infinitas omnesque subire valet 
specierum figuras.”250 
If we now go back to the first definition in the light of the second, one 
understands that Bruno is already introducing an emphasis that marks a 
conceptual difference with tradition, when he says that the artificial memory 
system is in the fantastic faculty: the subiectum is “sinus in phantastica 
facultate ordinatus.”251 The novelty lies in the fact that, as we shall see 
straight away, identifying the site of the artificial memory system in the 
fantastic faculty means that the faculty memory is no longer understood as 
something passive, but as something that is able to operate on images in 
what is a potentially infinite manner. However, this potentiality is ordered, 
																																								 																				
250 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Secunda pars, De 
subiectis, I, OMN I, pp. 148 – 149: “clouds buffeted by external winds, which, depending on 
the variety and intensity of the impulses received, can receive infinite figures of all kinds.” 
(translation mine). 
251 This novelty had been declared in advance in the first part of Ars Memoriae 
Iordani Bruni, Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Pars prima, XVI, 
OMN I, pp. 140 – 141: “Nobis autem cum datum est illam invenisse et / perfecisse, nec locis 
materialibus – verificatis scilicet per sensus exteriores – ultra non indiguimus, nec ordini 
locorum memorandum ordinem adstrinximus, sed puro phantasiae architecto innixi, ordini 
rerum memorandarum locorum ordinem adligavimus”, “But since we have been allowed to 
discover and perfect that technique, we no longer had any need of material places – that is, 
places that have been verified by the external senses – neither have we had to connect the 
order of the concepts to be memorised to the order of the places; relying purely on the pure 
architecture of fantasy, we have made the order of the places dependent on the order of the 
things to be remembered.” (translation mine). 
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that is, it is stemmed and governed by the organum, by scrutiny, which is 
the way in which the cogitative faculty takes part in the formation of the 
artificial memory system and therefore memory formation.    
If we are to understand the conceptual different to tradition, it is 
necessary to clarify that here Bruno’s controversial target is the conception 
of the locus according to the most important treatises in the Renaissance. 
All treatise writers had devoted countless explanations and numerous 
recommendations for the choice of the most suitable places to be used as 
memory systems. They could be either real places or structures taken from 
literature,252 but they always had to have a direct, concrete reference to 
reality. If we think of the guiding image for the conceptual formulation of 
these mnemonic loci, it is clear that it was the metaphor of the ark: the 
artificial memory was thus perceived as being made up of a receptacle, in 
which images were placed of the things that were later to be summoned in 
the memory.253 
The idea of the memory as a receptacle, as a container, imposed 
significant limits on the application of the technique: the form of the 
																																								 																				
252  Like, for example, the shops along a road in a city or like the Inferno and 
Paradise, see figg. 5, 6 and 7.  
253  In Johannes Romberch’s famous illustration of Congestiorum artificiosae 
memoriae (fig. 1), also revived by Cosma Rosselli in Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae 
(figg. 2, 3), we can see the collocation of the functions of the soul in the skull. In this 
portrayal memory occupies the last place. This portrayal is perfectly coherent with the 
conception of the natural memory as an ark, as a thesaurus, that is, as a place where the 
facts of sensible experience that have been elaborated by the other faculties of the soul are 
deposited. As regards this portrayal I cite the list of cogitative faculties from Giordano 
Bruno, De mon. num. et fig., in Jordani Bruni Nolani, Opera latine conscripta. Faksimile-
Neudruck der Ausgabe von Fiorentino, Tocco und anderen. Neapel und Florenz 1879-1891. 
Drei Bände in acht Teilen, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Friedrich Fromman Verlag Günther 
Holzboog, 1962, I, II, p. 455.: ‟Novem sunt cognoscitivae potentiae in homine: VISS, 




container was defined and established once and for all, because it was taken 
from reality and transported to the natural memory. This not only meant that 
the mnemonist had to pay great attention to the choice of the most suitable 
place to store what was to be remembered but also to make sure it was 
suitable for any possible system developments. An example should help 
clarify this. If I want to memorise the seven cardinal virtues, I will have to 
choose, for example, a house with an equal or greater number of rooms. The 
number of rooms equal to the number of cardinal virtues guarantees the 
memorisation of what I want to send to the memory now; however, if I 
know that in the future other elements will be added to this memory system 
– I could decide, for example, to look in more detail at the conception of the 
seven theological virtues in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth century - , 
it would be better to have a larger locus from the very start, so that there is 
room for other successive knowledge. In fact, restructuring a memory 
system after its initial creation could lead to errors or create difficulties for 
the memory, of the kind that one tries to avoid with the rules of the 
composition of the loci. 254  This difficulty comes from the fact that the 
mnemonic locus, in the form it is understood in in the artificial memory 
systems that are guided by the image of memory as an ark, is a place that is 
already excessively defined.  
The first definition of subiectum, which Bruno presents as the one that 
is most respectful of tradition, already suggests a possible solution, with the 
																																								 																				
254 See here, Chapter one, § 2. 
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modification of the image-guide for the formulation of the concept of 
“receptacle” or locus. The subiectum is a container (sinus) but it is governed 
(ordinatus) by the fantastic faculty. What this actually means is explained in 
the second definition, which says how the sinus is to be understood: the 
receptacle of the artificial memory is a fantastic primordial material 
(chaos). 255  The subiectum is therefore not only retentive, as it was in 
Renaissance mnemonic tracts, but it preserves by working on what is to be 
remembered,256 and the extent of its action is due to it being a material that 
is without order and form. 
It is interesting to look more closely at what Nolanus is trying to do 
here because it is a method that we find in all his works. Bruno does not 
want to reform the mnemonic tradition so radically that it is transformed or 
disfigured. On the contrary, he believes that it is his task to fulfil this 
																																								 																				
255 This evokes Plato’s Timaeus and an analogy between the Demiurge and the soul 
that forges the memory system. Both are working with material that has not been ordered 
and what they do is shape this material, transforming it from chaos to order (kósmos), 
following the model of the world of ideas. One should bear in mind this evocation and 
analogy he suggests because it allows to better understand the transition from the 
gnosiological justification of the correspondence between ordo idearum and ordo rerum to 
its ontological justification. 
256 As confirmation of the productivity of the primordial fantastic material, Bruno 
explains that the subiectum is made up of material parts that can be seen, as the fantastic 
faculty only works on images: “quatenus eadem suo ordine phantastica facultas valeat 
contemplari, vel ipsis utens tanquam partibus atque principiis, in monstra novasque 
innumeras metamorphoses digerere et digestas velut orbi adfixas intueri;” “because the 
fantastic faculty – according to its own order – can either contemplate them as they are or, 
using them as parts and principles, arrange them into extraordinary configurations and 
countless metamorphoses, and contemplate them in this arrangement, almost as if they 
were affixed to a circle,” (translation mine), Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae 
Iordani Bruni, Secunda pars, De subiectis, II, OMN I, pp. 150 – 151. Bruno refers to Clavis 
Magna for the interpretation of the subiecta that have no material characteristics. These 
were meant to be subiecta that were schematically or geometrically constructed, like, for 
example the seals of the “square encyclical” and “circular encylical” of the Explicatio (see 
Giordano Bruno, OMN II, pp. 88 – 89 and 141 – 142; but also the comment in Giordano 
Bruno, OMN I, p. 481). 
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tradition, implementing it to the full.257 In fact, if one reads and compares 
the two definitions of subiectum, one understands that at first Bruno 
continued to define the subiectum, working on the guiding idea of a 
container; but one also perceives that by defining the locus as subiectum, 
and thus giving a central role to fantasy in the memorisation process, the 
guiding image of memory as a container, in the sense of an ark or stomach, 
is no longer sufficiently effective for Bruno to reach the objective he has set 
himself. Now Bruno needs an image for the container that is as 
indeterminate as possible so that fantasy can elaborate (order) it as it likes, 
albeit under the control of reason (the cogitative faculty). Indeed, it is only 
in this fashion, only by working simultaneously on both the images and the 
places housing them that one can construct a memory system that is totally 
coherent and consistent so that it can also guarantee the retrieval of what has 
been deposited there.258 
																																								 																				
257 The theme of the Mercuries can be perceived in the background here, with which 
Bruno explained this epochal meaning of his contribution to the history of the mnemonic 
arts and the history of philosophy in general. Like Mercury, the messenger of the gods, who 
knows divine will and whose task is to communicate it to men, Bruno sees himself as a 
messenger of truth, forced to pilgrimage from one place to another, confronting 
conflictually those who are not ready to accept his message. On this subject see: Michele 
Ciliberto, La ruota del tempo. Interpretazione di Giordano Bruno, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 
1986; Michele Ciliberto, Umbra prufunda. Studi su Giordano Bruno, Roma, Edizioni di 
Storia e di Letteratura, 1999, pp. 160 – 161; Michele Ciliberto, L’occhio di Atteone. Nuovi 
studi su Giordano Bruno, Roma, Edizioni di Storia e di Letteratura, 2002, pp. 17 – 18; 
Michele Ciliberto, Pensare per contrari. Disincanto e utopia nel Rinascimento, Roma, 
Edizioni di Storia e di Letteratura, 2005. 
258  In the following paragraph we shall see the image that is guiding the new 
conceptual formulation that Bruno is proposing. Here I would like to underline the internal 
dynamism in Bruno’s text, because it is an aspect that makes his method of philosophical 
work on concepts and theories stand out. I am referring to the fact that Bruno’s thought has 
never been completely resolved in a theory that can be defined or explained systematically. 
Reading Bruno’s work, each time one has the impression one is entering an alchemical 
laboratory just when the alchemist is trying to give material a new form. The alchemist 
never really knows what form the material will take, because it develops independently in 
his hands and he has no choice but to follow its transformations, pursuing them and trying 
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As I shall show in the rest of the chapter, the guiding image that 
Bruno has in his mind is clearly that of a sheet of paper upon which the 
printer printed characters, which have the characteristic of being images that 
represent letters. I ask the reader to bear this image in mind through the 
remaining explanation of the technical aspects of Bruno’s ars memoriae.259 
 
 
2.2 The adiecta or formae 
Also in his interpretation of the adiecta or formae260 Bruno starts with 
two definitions, one that is easier to use and of more immediate use, because 
it is based on that of the imagines, and one that refers to clavis universalis, 
and is therefore more difficult and is aimed at those who wish to understand 
the deep reasons of the ars. 
As we have already seen for the subiecta, with the exception of 
linguistic novelties, in the first definition we also find all the traditional 
elements that define the imagines 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
to take them into account, but at the end of the process what he finds in his hands is always 
unexpected. 
259 I shall complete the explanation of the subiecta with a note about their rules that, 
as I mentioned earlier, are the traditional ones, in accordance with mnemonics Renaissance 
literature. For example, the basic model of mnemotechnic architecture is given by the 
measurements of the human body with raised, open arms, as recommended, for example, 
by Johannes Romberch: Giordano Bruno, Cant. Circ., Capitolo secondo, § 2, OMN I, pp. 
674 - 675. For the portrayal of this rule in Romberch, see fig. 4; each successive space is 
constructed proportionally to this module, so that the distances are respected so as to allow 
real movement in the interior. Furthermore, there must also be a proportion between the 
subiecta and the intermediary spaces, so that the internal eye is not fatigued; for the same 
reason, the subiecta have to be clearly dislocated in space, but not too distant from one 
another. 
260 Bruno specifies here that the term form is used “restricted to mnemotechnics.” It 
is true, however, that there is also an analogy with the form of the physical world. This 
aspect will be dealt with in the following chapter. 
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Adiectum vero seu forma in genere isto definitur subiecto sive physico sive technico sive 
phantastico appositum, ad aliquid per solertem cogitationis apparatum, presentando, 
effigiendo, notando vel indicando ad picturae scripturaeque similitudinem, exprimendum 
vel significandum.261 
The aspect by Bruno that should be underlined is that the image is added to 
the subiectum, thus meaning that the subiectum and adiectum cannot be 
indifferent to one another, if one wants to guarantee memorisation, but there 
has to be a sort of relationship of reciprocal involvement.  
The definition of the Clavis Magna concentrates even more 
effectively on the intrinsic belonging of adiectum and subiectum, because 
here the adiectum or forma (form) define the order of the portrayals in the 
substrate. The forma acts under the guidance of the fantastic chaos, that is, 
the subiectum, to write everything that has to be said with language. 
Primordial chaos can therefore be formed and ordered, and then reordered 
infinitely and by anyone. 
Forma vero, ut ex radicibus Clavis magnae elicitur, est depromptus et explicatus ordo 
cogitabilium specierum, in statuas vel microcosmon vel in aliam generaliter architecturam 
dispositus, ad quodlibet dicibile interius notandum vel figurandum ex ductu phantastici 
chaos metamorphoses omnes admittentis. Cuius typum non tanquam hic declarandum, sed 
ut et hic inspiciendum apponimus.262 
																																								 																				
261 Giordano Bruno, De Umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Secunda Pars, OMN I, 
pp. 168 – 169: “We define added image of form – limited to the genre of this treatise – each 
element that is given to a physical, artificial or fantastic substrate to express or mean 
something thanks to the diligent artifices of the cogitative faculty, presenting or outlining 
figures, marking with characters, or indicating, as is the case in painting and writing.” 
(translation mine). 
262 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Secunda pars, OMN I, 
pp. 168 – 169: “However, the form – as far as can be seen from the origins of Clavis 
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It is therefore in the fantastic faculty that the semiotic process that 
structures the artificial memory system takes place: if the subiectum is like a 
white sheet of paper upon which one places the adiecta, which represent 
things in reality, in the same way that words represent things, it is in the 
fantastic faculty that the semiotic correspondence between internal images 
and the objects of external reality263 takes place. However, what guarantees 
the correctness of the semiotic process and therefore the correspondence 
between ordo rerum and ordo idearum in the artificial memory? 
 
 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
Magna, is the order of the portrayals that can be object of thought, established and made 
visible, arranged in accordance with a series of statues, or rather, in a micro-cosmos, or 
rather, in general, inside any other architectural structure, to write or depict internally – 
under the guidance of the fantastic chaos, susceptible to every metamorphosis – all of 
which can be expressed through language. We present an image, now with the intention of 
illustrating it, but because it is useful to observe it as an example here, as well.” (translation 
mine). The figure, which is commented in the following paragraph, has been lost. It is 
interesting, however, because what Bruno suggests is perfectly in line with a philosophy of 
images: observing an image helps understand something complicated, like a definition of 
the Clavis.  
263 When Bruno goes on to define the rules of the composition of the adiecta, he still 
preserves the precise reference to the mnemonic precepts in this section. The difference as 
regards tradition aims at underlining the nexus of reciprocity between subiectum and 
adiectum, from prescription, according to which, for example, the dimensions of the 
adiecta have to be proportional to the volume of man and follow natural relationships. The 
images have to be splendid because they need to awaken the fantasy, even if it is the 
cogitative faculty that is guiding the entire process and opens up access to the memory 
through the senses and fantasy. Furthermore, if the attention is to be kept awake, the 
aadiecta have to carry out an action on the subiecta, or in their interior, or they have to be 
the object of an action by the subiecta or in their interior. Avoiding uniformity of the 
adiecta used and seeking a difference in the interior of the same subiectum, without using 
the same adiecta, also helps attention. Finally, one can use the same adiecta in the same 
memory system, but it is better that they are very far from one another and that they carry 
out different actions on different subiecta. This is because one must try as much as possible 




2.3 The organum 
The other great novelty that Bruno introduces to mnemonics tradition 
is that of a new element, the organum, which explains how the soul creates 
the ars, that is, how the facts in the subiecta and in the adiecta can be 
retrieved. Bruno believes that clarifying the instrument that the soul uses to 
create the ars can help overcome all the criticism directed at it, most of 
which regards its effectiveness and practical feature. A perfect knowledge 
of the ars is only possible if one also understands the essence of the 
instrument through which “ab agente in subiectum formae vehiculum,”264 its 
characteristics and the method used to acquire it. 
If one is to know and understand the essence of the organum, one 
must have all the stages comprising the reminiscence and memory and 
establish which of these stages corresponds to the organum.  
Novem concurrunt ad rememorationem faciendam et memoriam. Intentio antecedens, qua 
primum aliquis sensus extrinsecus vel intrinsecus fit in actu ex hoc, quod movetur ab 
obiecto. Provocatio imaginationis, ubi sensus commotus iam mediate vel immediate 
expergefacit imaginationem. Imaginationis motus passivus, quo pellitur ad investigandum. 
Imaginationis activus motus, quo iam investigat. Scrutinium, quo intendens imaginatio 
investigat. Imago, utpote species memorabilis. Intentio imaginis, nempe ratio qua 
memorabilis efficitur in praesentiarum, aliis exclusis. Praesentatio illius intentionis, quod 
scilicet intentio illa praesens efficiatur. Et iudicatio, qua apprehenditur eam esse 
intentionem illius imaginis.265 
																																								 																				
264 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Secunda pars, I, OMN 
I, pp. 180 – 181: “the form is transmitted from the agent to the substrate.” (translation 
mine). 
265 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Secunda Pars, II, OMN 
I, pp. 182 – 183: “Nine elements converge to make reminiscences and memory possible. 
The preliminary intention, in virtue of which one of the external or internal senses carries 
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Evoking Avverroè’s comment about Aristotle’s De Memoria et 
Reminiscentia, Bruno both partially follows and modifies it, dividing the 
reminiscence process into nine stages. The starting point is the desire and 
will to activate a memory (I want to remember the landline number of a 
friend in Berlin) followed by the activation of the fantasy by a stimulus (the 
prefix for landline numbers in Berlin is “030”) and the start of fantasy’s 
search amongst the various memories (all the telephone numbers that have 
been memorised). The cogitative faculty now searches consciously, using 
scrutiny (selecting the German landline numbers with the prefix “030”). 
Through scrutiny, the cogitative faculty identifies an image, which is the 
one that contains the meaning one wants to remember (I gradually exclude 
the telephone numbers of other friends in Berlin) and I characterise it as a 
significant unit; it will be reason’s task to establish whether the attribution 
of this meaning to the image is correct (the friend’s number I was looking 
for was a permutation of the figures of his wife’s date of birth, who was 
born on the same day as me). 
The organum with which the soul creates the ars is scrutiny. 
According to Bruno, it corresponds to the moment in which the cogitative 
faculty is searching and distinguishing, like a stick in a pile of acorns 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
on following the impulse of an external object. The stimulus impressed on the imagination, 
when the sense, touched in this fashion, immediately or indirectly awakens the imagination. 
The impulsive reaction that drives the imagination to investigate. The conscious act with 
which the imagination immediately begins its study. The scrutiny with which the 
imagination searches, understanding. The imagination, or rather the memorable species. 
The content of the image, or rather the peculiar character in virtue of which it can become 
the specific object of memory, separating itself from all the others. The portrayal of that 
content, in such a way, as is natural, that content makes itself present. Finally, judgement, 
through which one understand that such is the content of that image.” (translation mine). 
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looking for a chestnut. In this image that Bruno uses the pile of acorns is the 
fantastic fantasy, the stick is the scrutiny, which is the instrument reason 
uses, knowing how to reconstruct the process that led to the attribution of 
chestnuts to several acorns. In fact, the scrutiny alone is not sufficient to 
explain how the soul associates the thing to the adiectum. The instrument 
has to be used by reason, which knows how to recognise a significant 
relationship such as the one between meaning and significant.266 
 
 
2.4 A technique of inner writing for images: the metaphor of inner writing 
as a leading paradigm of conceptual formulation 
A new conceptual paradigm, that of inner writing, emerged in the 
analysis of the three technical novelties introduced by Giordano Bruno in 
																																								 																				
266 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Pars prima, XV, OMN 
I, pp. 138 – 141: “Istis consideratis, memento huic arti media alia usu venire non posse ad 
suum finem consequendum quam sensibilia, formata, figurata, tempori locoque contracta, 
quemadmodum et in omnibus aliis technicis animae operibus accidere in primo volumine 
Clavis magnae fuit expressum. Nihilo tamen minus non uti intelligitur omnibus tanquam 
imaginibus, siquidem multa, quorum debet esse memoria, imaginabilia non sunt neque 
effigiabilia neque simili quodam insinuabilia, cuiusmodi sunt termini usia, ypostasis, mens, 
caeteraque id genus, sed ut signis significabilium, imaginibus imaginabilium. Et cum hoc 
illud non est mente praetereundum, quod non minus sunt alligatae signis imagines, quam 
signa imaginibus sunt adnexa;” “In the light of these considerations, he remembers that to 
achieve its own objective, this art does not avail itself of other means other than those of 
sensible realities, formed, shaped, contracted to a specific time and place, as is the case – 
we demonstrated it in the first volume of Clavis Magnae – also for all the other artificial 
works of the soul. However, with this the intention is not to claim that all things must be 
used as images, since many of the things to be remembered are not susceptible to fantastic 
portrayal, neither can they be reproduced in the form of effigies, or presented allusively 
with a similar ploy: terms such as ousia, hypostasis, mind and other similar concepts belong 
to this genre. Instead, all things have to be used as signs of significant reality, images of 
imaginable reality. Furthermore, one must not forget that images are no less tied to signs 
that signs are connected to images.” (translation mine). 
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ars memoriae. More specifically, we saw how Bruno’s treatise goes from 
the absolute metaphor of the ark to that of inner writing. 
Let us turn to the metaphor of “inner writing” and let me underline 
my thesis now, i.e. Giordano Bruno’s mnemonic works best represent the 
philosophical awareness of the relation between the development of writing 
techniques and the development of memory theories. In this part I will 
explain why the “inner writing” metaphor is an absolute metaphor in Bruno 
and to illustrate it I will take three examples. 
We have seen that the “inner writing” metaphor has a very long 
history in mnemonics. Already the anonymous author of the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium and Cicero in the De Oratore used this metaphor to illustrate the 
basic rules of the ars memoriae. If you want to remember a speech you are 
going to say, first of all you have to choose an image that represents the 
concept or the word that you intend to keep in mind, and secondly you have 
to lay out this picture in a location, but this process must be done by 
following the order of the words of your speech. Only by respecting this 
order, can you be certain that, when you have to recall your speech, every 
object laid out and organised in that order will restore the word that you had 
originally put in. Both Cicero and the anonymous author say that this 
memorising technique is similar to what happens when we write: we draw 
signs in an order, and we allocate a meaning to each sign that we will be 
able to recall later, when we read that text. 
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At this point, at the beginning of this metaphor’s history, it was not 
yet an absolute metaphor, because it was used as a mean of comparison to 
explain something. It is true that without the “writing metaphor” it would 
have been difficult to understand and to use this technique, but it would not 
have been impossible. The metaphor had begun to shape the conceptual 
understanding of memory, but had not yet become a substitute for the 
concept itself as it would then appear in Bruno. 
An example of this can be found in the frontispiece of the De Umbris 
Idearum, which is the first book Bruno published on the ars memoriae. The 
title and subtitle show that Bruno uses “inner writing” as an absolute 
metaphor and not as a metaphor, as a comparison. Bruno writes 
DE UMBRIS IDEARUM  
Implicantibus artem, quaerendi, inveniendi, iudicandi, ordinandi, et applicandi  
Ad internam scripturam, et non vulgares per memoriam operationes explicates.267 
It is evident that here the expression “inner writing” is used in a technical 
sense: it is not a metaphor, a comparison, but it is a kind of proper name. 
The second example is paragraph XI of the part titled “Ars memoriae” 
in De Umbris Idearum.268 It is quite a long quotation, but we will hear in 
Bruno’s own words how he understands the value of his contribution in the 
history of the art of memory, and we will see that this value can only be 
																																								 																				
267 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, OMN I, pp. 2 – 3: “The Shadows of Ideas, in which 
is implied the art of searching, invention, judging, ordaining and connecting and that are 
explained for the ‘inner writing’ and extraordinary mnemonics.” (translation mine). 
268 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Ars memoriae Iordani Bruni, Pars prima, XV – XVI, 
OMN I, pp. 134 – 135. 
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understood in reference to the connection between the development of the 
writing techniques and the “inner writing” technique. I need to summarize 
two statements that Bruno provides at the beginning of it, because we will 
need them when we come to drawing our conclusions: there is only one 
principle that explains everything and we can call it “nature”, and the work 
of hand belongs to this principle too, that means that by working with hands 
nature is expressing itself. And now let us listen to Bruno speak about his 
contribution in the tradition of the art of memory 
Hinc et eadem serie progressum facere dicitur ars quam manus ducit. Ideo – ut ad 
propositum intentionis nostrae spectat – cultris in arborum corticibus prior scripsisse 
perhibetur vetustas. Cui successit aetas in lapidibus celte excavatis inscribens; quam 
sequuta est papyrus sepiarum succis exarata. Inde pergamenaer membranae atramento 
artificioso magis intinctae. Proinde charta et inchaustum, praeloque premendae in usum 
longe omnium patissimum literae. A cultris, inquam, ad stilos, a stilis ad spongia, a 
spongiis ad calamos, a calamis ad pennsa, a pennis ad fusilia tandem elementa perventum. 
Haud secus in iis, quae ad scripturam pertinere videntur internam, contigisse arbitrarum, 
dum ab antiquo humanum studium sive a melico Simonide sive ab alio sumpserit 
exordium; qui <usu?> locorum et imaginum proportionalium chartae atque scripturae, 
actuque phantasiae et cogitativae locum scriptoris et calami subeuntibus, species/rerum 
memorandarum in interno libro inscribere studuerunt. Quorum industriae quid et quantum 
addiderimus, ipsorum, qui haec nostra cum illorum monumentis conferre potuerunt, esto 
iudicium.269 
Bruno concludes by saying that the reader should judge for himself 
whether his achievements in the ars memoriae are equal in importance to 
the invention of the printing press. What Bruno says about the relations 
between the development of writing techniques and the development of 
																																								 																				
269 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, Pars prima, XV – XVI, OMN I, pp. 134 – 135. 
 
 228 
“inner writing” techniques is evident, but, what is very significant here is 
that he is aware of the fact that his mnemonics will change the way we 
configure the book of memory. We have seen that the absolute metaphor of 
the book of nature defined the order in which man, nature and God where 
related, and the book of memory was seen as a speculum, a mirror of that of 
nature. Bruno understands that stressing the importance of the work of the 
hand and understanding the memory as “a printed inner writing” would 
change the idea of order engraved in the book of memory, and therefore in 
the book of nature: the relation would no longer be passive, but active and 
productive. 
This will be made clear in the third example, which is taken from the 
Explicatio triginta sigillorum.270 In this work Bruno gives a selection of 
images that can be used as mnemonic pictures, but he also analogically 
describes his contribution in the art of memory. The images go from very 
natural and material ones to the more symbolic and abstract. What he does 
is to describe the passage that goes from the metaphor of the book of nature 
to the one of the inner writing, the first being a passive metaphor and the 
second being an operative one. He achieves this thanks to the 
metamorphosis of two lullian images: the tree of knowledge and the steps. 
In fact, if we list the first ten images, they are: the field, the sky, the chain, 
the tree, the forest, the steps, the grafter, the farmer, the tablet, the 
typesetter. The first seven images are the disassembling the two lullian 
																																								 																				
270 Giordano Bruno, Expl. trig. sig., OMN II. 
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images. Starting from the 8th image, Bruno changes the configuration of the 
understanding of the idea of order, introducing an operative action: the 
grafter cuts and grafts the tree that no longer gives fruits in order to get a 
productive tree. But what the grafter does is similar to what we do when we 
write on the bark of the tree with a knife. In the same analogical way, the 
farmer ploughs the earth and signs or leaves a mark on it, as if it were 
writing on a wax tablet. From the tablet to the table of the typesetter.  
These examples show what I have claimed so far: one, the inner 
writing in an absolute metaphor in Giordano Bruno’s mnemonics, because it 
leads and shapes the conceptual understanding of the ars memoriae; two, 
using this absolute metaphor, Bruno changes the meaning of the concept of 
order from a passive meaning to an operative one. 
 
 
3. Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae (3): an excess in the wake of the 
tradition of the mnemonic arts 
Summarising what has been said so far, Bruno’s ars memoriae 
originates from the attempt to make more intelligible the mnemonic 
technique by explaining the most obscure point of each treatise: in virtue of 
what does the soul that is working with the artificial memory associate to 
the image placed in the mnemonic locus the thing or word it has been 
assigned during the construction of the memory system? The first step that 
Bruno takes in this direction is a redefinition of locus and imago to show – 
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or at least to let one sense through this terminological redefinition – their 
essential connection, that is, the fact that from the very beginning they are 
chosen in a one-to-one relationship. The second step consists in the 
identification of the different stages in the memory process that corresponds 
to the instrument with which the soul orders the artificial memory system. I 
underlined that in this redefinition stage of the ars memoriae Bruno is using 
a conceptual paradigm that has a long history in the mnemonics, that of 
inner writing but that, unlike the tradition, which concentrates more on the 
passive-receptive aspect of the metaphor of the book, he exalts the operative 
aspect. 
I explained earlier that, from a strictly technical point of view, Bruno 
makes functional changes to the classical structure of mnemonics, with the 
sole aim of making it easier and more practical to use. In this sense I believe 
that Bruno’s ars memoriae is consistent in the wake of mnemonic tradition: 
Bruno is not working on its destruction or radical reformation; he only 
wants to provide strong arguments that make mnemonic critics to review 
their positions. What I intend to explain on the following pages, is that, by 
following this objective, the form Bruno gives to his ars memoriae results in 
it representing an excess in the same wake of the tradition. The excess is a 
gnosiology that is based on the idea that there is only one ars of which the 
ars memoriae is a phenomenal expression. This gnosiological approach is to 
have a strong impact on the philosophical works in which Bruno goes on to 
develop further the reflection on the ordo that he began in his mnemonic 
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works, going on to the ontological justification of the correspondence 
between ordo rerum and ordo idearum, thus completing the theoretical-
philosophical justification of the mnemonic arts in the system of knowledge. 
 
 
3.1 Criticism of ars memoriae 
Giordano Bruno began his study of the mnemonic arts very early, 
already when he was studying in Naples and perhaps before he entered the 
convent of San Domenico Maggiore.271 If one bears in mind the importance 
of the mnemonic tradition in Dominican circles, one could even hypothesise 
that his actual decision to enter the convent was motivated by the possibility 
of carrying out the studies which make someone expert and skilful in 
discussion. We must therefore bear in mind that the Dominican friar 
Giordano Bruno studied in an environment in which mnemonics played an 
important role, above all in regards to his ethical treatise.272  However, we 
must also bear in mind that, if it is true that it was the Augustinian friar 
Theophilus Vairanus who introduced him to Llull’s works, Bruno must have 
also had extensive preparation in the Franciscan mnemonic tradition.273 
																																								 																				
271 Michele Ciliberto, Introduzione a Giordano Bruno, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2010 
(1996), p. 7: in all likelihood it was the Augustinian friar Teophilus Vairanus who 
introduced Bruno to Llulls’ work. See also the aforementioned: Saverio Ricci, Giordano 
Bruno nell’Europa del Cinquecento, op. cit. 
272 See here, Chapter one, § 2. 
273 This hypothesis is also supported by the importance of the figure of Theophilus 
Vairanus in Bruno’s studies. It was Theophilus Vairanus who introduced him to Neo-
Platonism and Augustine, which was to prove to be of fundamental importance for Bruno’s 
views in relation to the Trinitarian dogma, the term ‘person’ and also the conception of 
memory. For more about the importance of Theophilus Vairanus in reference to Bruno’s 
conception of the Trinitarian dogma and the term ‘person’ and, more generally, the 
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Furthermore, Bruno’s literary production is testimony to an interest that, 
although it changed over the years, remained constant during his lifetime, so 
much so that his fame as a philosophy teacher equalled his fame as a 
mnemonics teacher, as can be seen in the famous passage from the Costituti 
Veneti 
Acquistai nome tale che il re Henrico terzo mi fece chiamare un giorno, ricercandomi se la 
memoria che havevo et che professava era naturale o pur per arte magica; al quale diedi 
soddisfattione; et con quello che li dissi et feci provare a lui medesmo, conobbe che non era 
per arte magica ma per scienzia. Et doppo questo feci stampar un libro de memoria sotto il 
titolo De umbris idearum, il qual dedicai a Sua Maestà; et con questa occasione mi fece 
lettor straordinario et provisionato; et seguitai in quella città a legger, come ho detto, forsi 
cinqu’anni.274 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																	
Vairanus’ philosophical influence on Bruno, see: Michele Ciliberto, Introduzione a 
Giordano Bruno, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 2010 (1996), p. 7. 
274  Luigi Firpo, Il processo di Giordano Bruno, op. cit., pp. 161 – 162: “Such 
renown did I acquire that King Henry III summoned me one day, wanting to know whether 
the memory I had and what I professed was natural or magical art; my reply gave him 
satisfaction; and with what I told him and made him also experience, he admitted it was not 
magical arts, but science. And after this I had a book on memory published with the title De 
Umbris Idearum, which I dedicated to His Majesty; and on this occasion I was made 
extraordinary, waged lecturer; and I went on to read in that city, as I have already said, 
perhaps five years.” (translation mine). See also the testimony of Johan von Nostiz, 
Bruno’s pupil: “Annus nunc agitur tertius et trigesimus cum Lutetiae Parisiorum primum 
Iordanum Brunum, Nolanum, arte Lulliana et Mnemologica sive memorativa magnifice 
sese ostentantem, multos ad se discipulos atque auditores privatim allicere, memini. Quo 
factum, ut quia eo ispo tempore, peregrinationis et studiorum aliorumque exercitiorum 
causa illic agebam, ego quoque quid illud esset mirificae artis cogniturus, non semel 
auditorio eius interfuerim. Ac ipsius quidem Iordani peritiam et promtitudinem, quam 
postulato quovis disputandi et ex tempore copiose de eo perorandi argumento nonnunquam 
ostentabat, vehementer admirabar. Caeterum, cum paucos admodum ab hoc artifice 
artifices prodire animadverterem, sive quidem id docentis invidia, sive artis obscuritate, aut 
tarditate discentium accidebat, risi, et contemsi aliorum in arte difficilori quam utiliori 
inanes operas et sumtus; magis interea brevitati et perspicuitati Rameae favens,” Johan von 
Nostiz, Artificium Aristotelico-Lullio-Rameum, in Giovanni Aquilecchia, Schede bruniane 
(1950-1991), Roma, Vecchiarelli, 1993, pp. 283 – 285. For an analysis of Bruno’s 
experience in Paris in the European context of the sixteenth century, see: Saverio Ricci, 




It was in Paris that Giordano Bruno’s work as a teacher of ars memoriae 
acquired particular importance and it should be seen in the context of lively 
debate on the utility of ars, as can be seen from the writing of De Umbris 
Idearum, which followed his successful cycle of lessons on the mnemonic 
arts. 
The numerous characters with imaginary names that Bruno introduced in 
the “Dialogo prelibatorio” reveal the vivacity of a debate that Bruno 
embraced, so much so that he made it the centre of the first work that he 
printed in Paris. The people he was indirectly replying to with this 
publication of De Umbris Idearum were men of letters, grammarians, 
theologians, physicians and legal experts. These were all people who, owing 
to their professional experience or studies, had experienced the mnemonic 
arts and judged it negatively. 
The criticism directed at the technique to reinforce natural memory by 
creating an artificial memory was the usual: they were the impossibility of 
assessing the real fruits of mnemonics and the conviction that natural 
memory can be reinforced only by a healthier lifestyle or medical 
prescriptions; but also the observation that the study of mnemonic classics 
had yielded no fruits and that, if had been otherwise, all scholars would 
have been students of mnemonics, too; and the conviction that it is only 
useful for those who already have a good memory by nature, or the 




In the first part of Ars Memoriae Iordani Bruni in De Umbris Idearum, 
Bruno explains the reason why his ars memoriae is a novelty in 
mnemotechnic tradition and why this novelty places it on a higher level than 
other mnemonic arts. The novelty lies in explaining the platonic 
metaphysics upon which the ars is founded. Making explicit and dwelling 
on the theoretical premises of the ars make it possible to place 
mnemotechnics in a broader context than the simple theory for reinforcing 
the natural memory: in fact, the ars memoriae belongs to what Bruno calls 
that unique science that Bruno compares to the sun   
Perge liber. Neque enim ingoras eundem solem, eamdemque artem.275 
 
3.2 A unique ars. Metaphor of the shadow and metaphor of inner writing 
The metaphor of the unique sun, which the book is asked to reveal by 
opening itself is certainly a reference to the Copernican conception of the 
universe but only marginally. Bruno does not reduce his philosophical 
understanding of the reality to the philosophy of nature that originates from 
the Copernican revolution; instead, he understands that the conceptual 
meaning of Copernicanism can be expressed philosophically, as an 
expression of a unique principle that pervades each level of reality.  
 In other words, in this stage Bruno, instead of placing his 
philosophical conception in the bosom of Copernicanism, shows that two 
																																								 																				
275 Giordano Bruno, De umbris, OMN I, p. 16 – 17: “Do come forward, book. Indeed, 
do not ignore that the selfsame is the sun, the same art.” (translation mine). 
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ancient absolute metaphors, that of the light and that of the world as a book, 
are still operative in Copernicanism. Carrying out another epochal 
conceptual increase, what Bruno does is decline them operatively and no 
longer passively – a move that can already be seen in the decision not to 
speak of a “unique philosophy” but rather a “unique ars” where ars is the 
expression of Nature’s productivity. 
Bruno begins the introductory section of De Umbris Idearaum on the 
mnemonic arts in what appears to be a traditional fashion: mnemotechnics is 
able to stimulate a dull nature or direct it, correct it, or support it. This is 
possible – and here is the twist that Bruno makes in the ars memoriae -  
because it emulates the same diligence of perfect Nature. The soul is able to 
understand the ars because, on the one hand the ars memoriae is an 
expression of the unique ars in which Nature expresses itself and on the 
other, because man understands himself metaphysically as a shadow of 
ideas. This is the twofold metaphysical foundation of Bruno’s 
mnemotechnics. 
The Platonic metaphysics that Bruno refers to for a more detailed 
understanding of the ars memoriae is a metaphysics of the shadow. The 
concept of umbra, which is one of the central motifs in Giordano Bruno’s 
philosophical reflection, refers to the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition and 
the absolute metaphor of light as the metaphor of truth.276 As Nicoletta 
																																								 																				
276  See Hans Blumenberg, “Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit. Im Vorfeld der 
philosophischen Begriffsbildung,” op. cit. 
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Tirinnanzi277 explained in such detail, whilst in these traditions shadow had 
a negative connotation, underlining the limits of the human condition – 
which is an umbral one – compared to the divine – which is comparable to 
light -, Bruno is able to reassess the strong points in the umbral nature of the 
human condition. Nolanus exalts the positivity of esse in umbra with an 
interpretation of the biblical image of Shulamite sitting in the shadow of her 
beloved. Shulamite is in perfect condition, not because she has risen above 
the natural umbra, but because she sees the shadow as a place of absolute 
stability since it is the shadow of her beloved. One therefore sees that for 
Bruno the concept of umbra is one of medium that not only allows an 
exchange at various levels of reality, but one that guides reasoning upon the 
limit and the communication between divinity, men and nature.278 
The faculty that allows this communication between diverse levels of 
reality, which are able to combine the umbrae naturae in new, endless 
ways, is the phantasia (fantasy).279 By virtue of its analogy with Nature, the 
fantastic faculty is not only able to combine the external umbrae with the 
internal ones, but it is also able to elaborate them as infinitely as the 
productivity of Nature. Phantasia and Nature are expressions of that unique 
																																								 																				
277  Nicoletta Tirinnanzi, Umbra naturae. L’immaginazione da Ficino a Bruno, 
Roma, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2000. 
278 Nicoletta Tirinnanzi, Umbra naturae, op. cit., p. 215. 
279  In Acr. Cam. Bruno says that fantastic activity is umbra naturae emulatrix: 
Giordano Bruno: “Non enim plus debet habere imaginatio naturalis, vel naturaliter posse 
debet, quam natura: quinimo quid aliud crediderim esse imaginativam potentiam, 
praeterquam naturae umbram aemulatricem?”, in Jordani Bruni Nolani, Opera latine 
conscripta, I, I, op. cit., p. 117. 
 
 237 
principle creator that pervades the universe and manifests itself in the 
infinite production of aggregates. 
The unique ars that the metaphor of the sun refers to in the opening of 
De Umbris Idearum is therefore the infinite productive activity of the 
principle creator of the universe. The ars memoriae is therefore not just a 
mere manifestation of the unique ars, but is the manifestation that represents 
it analogically more accurately, because the artificial is constructed in the 
phantasia, umbra naturae emulatrix. In fact, we have seen that Bruno places 
the artificial memory system in the sinu phantastico280 and not in the natural 
memory. 
This is what I have called the “excess of Bruno’s ars memoriae”. The 
problem Bruno is tackling is a technical one: justifying the correspondence 
between ordo idearum and ordo rerum, to convince the critics of 
mnemotechnics of the validity of the use of an artificial memory system. 
Bruno’s first move is to identify the metaphor of inner writing as a more 
effective conceptual paradigm than that of the ark and thus guide it towards 
solving the problem. In fact, by using the metaphor of inner writing, Bruno 
can explain that whatever is deposited in the artificial memory can be used 
to recall the facts of the sensible experience in the memory because when 
constructing the artificial memory, the soul uses an ars that is based on the 
same semiotic principles of writing. 281  His second step consists in the 
																																								 																				
280 See here, Chapter six, § 2.1. 
281  I am referring to the introduction of the organum amongst the constitutive 
elements of the mnemonic system and the redefinition of locus and imago. See here, 
Chapter six, § 2.3. 
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ontological justification of the ars memoriae, by explaining how it is part of 
the unique ars that is represented by the metaphor of the sun, giving to the 
book of the world the fruits of its production. 
What the first and second step of this defence of mnemonics282 have 
in common is the metaphor of inner writing. The metaphor of inner writing 
belongs to a family of writing metaphors that also includes that of the world 
as a book (the metaphor of the world as a book is an example of the 
metaphor of writing). Now, if it is true that the world is the book in which 
God – the principle creator – writes, according to Bruno it is also true that 
the artificial memory is the book in which man writes. The communicability 
and the analogical correspondence between the two is guaranteed by the fact 
that both are the expression of an infinite productive force that in man, is 
placed in the phantasia, umbra naturae emualtrix.283 
Offering a brief summary and coming to the conclusion of this 
analysis of the use of the metaphor of inner writing in Giordano Bruno’s ars 
memoriae, I would like to go back to my initial hypothesis: the metaphor of 
writing, which has a lengthy history in the tradition of mnemotechnics, was 
given the function of a paradigm in the configuration of Nolanus’ 
mnemotechnics. In fact, we have seen that it was none other than Bruno 
who placed both the comprehension of the history of mnemotechnics and 
																																								 																				
282  Which shows its excess compared to mnemotechnics because it exceeds the 
limits of the mnemonic and gnosiological technique, shifting the discussion horizon to 
ontology. 
283 From this perspective the aforementioned image of the exhortation to the book to 
advance, open and reveal the unique sun, that is the only productive principle of the 
universe that the entire treatise of De Umbris Idearum presents as re-elaboration of the 
metaphor of the book in the metaphor of inner writing. 
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the comprehension of the innovation that he is striving to introduce in it in 
the wake of the history of the development of the technique of writing. 
Bruno believes that mnemotechnics is scriptura interna and his contribution 
to its development has the same epochal value as the invention of mobile 
character printing. 
The analysis of several key passages in the early works on 
mnemotechnics is sufficient to demonstrate that this analogy is an operative 
one, and one that Bruno uses to let himself be guided, not only in the 
redefinition of the terminology and the precepts of mnemotechnics, but also 
to give the ars memoriae an ontological foundation. Nolanus exploits the 
familiarity of the metaphor of the world as a book with the metaphor of 
writing to rethink the relationship between man, nature and God, thus 
managing to give the praxis a positive value that goes beyond the finite 
condition of man. The transition from the gnosiological to the ontological 
level is made possible by the interweaving of the themes of the metaphor of 










Less than a year after I entered medical school in 1952, the 
structure of DNA was being elucidated. […] How did the 
Viennese past leave its lasting traces in the nerve cells of my 
brain? How was the complex three-dimensional space of the 
apartment where I steered my toy car woven into my brain’s 
internal representation of the spatial world around me?  
Eric R. Kandel, In Search of memory: The Emergence of a New 
Science of Mind, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2006 
 
The recent discoveries about neuroplasticity make the essence of 
the intellect more visible, its steps and boundaries easier to mark. 
They tell us that the tools man has used to support or extend his 
nervous system (…) have shaped the physical structure of the 
human mind. 
Nicholas Carr, The Shallows. What the Internet Is Doing to Our 




1. I decided to begin this analysis of Giordano Bruno’s ars memoriae 
after my experience of reading an e-book, because it puts us in a similar 
situation to the one both Bruno and the mnemonists we have encountered on 
these pages found themselves in. Exercising one’s memory using mnemonic 
precepts meant, on the one hand a theoretical exertion at understanding how 
memory works, with the aim of mastering its functions of retention and 
recall better; on the other hand, it meant a more or less conscious reflection 
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on the experience of reading and writing, since the entire tradition of the ars 
memoriae rests on the image of the soul that reads and writes.  
This aspect of the history of the ideas about the comprehension of 
memory presents us with a subject that I deliberately left in the background 
as I preferred to concentrate here on the methodological aspects of the 
history of the mnemonic arts and memory theories. The subject is that of the 
impact of the use of instruments in the understanding of the relationship 
between man and the world: the instruments we use redefine our 
relationship with the world, our understanding of it and, according to the 
neurosciences, even our brain is modified on the basis of which instruments 
we use. 
This also applies to our understanding of memory and, of all the 
instruments we use, it is particularly true of reading and writing, both of 
which are activities that are connected to the collection and production of 
highly singular phenomena that go by the name of information and, more 
generically, meanings. 
This long course of the history of the mnemonic arts therefore makes it 
clear that there is a conceptual link between the experiences of reading and 
writing with techniques for data storage (mnemonics). What I wanted to 
demonstrate is not only that the history of the mnemomic arts cannot be 
understood if it is not seen in relation to the history of memory theories, and 
if one does not show that both fields of study fuelled one another 
reciprocally, but the same can also be said of the conceptual formation of 
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memory theories. If the history of memory theories is not related to the 
history of the mnemonic arts, certain key connections that are decisive for 
the same modern and contemporary development of the theories are 
neglected. 
How we understand memory, however, both from the mnemonic and 
theoretical point of view, cannot be understood unless we make continuous 
reference to the analogy with writing, in its diverse forms – this premise 
also applies to the other modern scientific theories on memory, as the 
neuropsychiatrist Eric Kandel who was awarded the Nobel Prize for his 
studies on the physiology of memory shows himself with the question he 
asks at the beginning of his autobiographical essay. The conceptual 
paradigm of writing is still active in the scientist’s mind that is wondering 
how the traces of the memories are deposited in the nervous cells of the 
brain. It is not very different from what Aristotle stated in De Anima as 
regards sensation, which was like the shape imprinted on wax by a ring. 
After having evoked the hermeneutic hypothesis that I tried to discuss, I 
would like to conclude by highlighting several discussion points and 
indicating possible developments for this research. 
 
 
2. Just in what depth Bruno carried out his philosophical reflections 
on memory can not only be seen in the argumentative skill that we saw in 
action in De Umbris and that is a prelude to the redefinition of the order of 
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the elements of the man-world-God relationship. Rather it is the awareness 
with which Bruno links his philosophical reflection with that of the 
development and history of writing techniques that tells how profound and 
radical his rethinking of the mnemonic tradition actually was. 
It was therefore owing to the radical nature of reflections that I thought it 
was opportune to concentrate the discussion of what I called the 
hermeneutic hypothesis in the introduction on him, that is, that the leading 
paradigm for the understanding of memory is writing. It was for the same 
reason that I chose to carry out an analysis on several parts of Giordano 
Bruno’s mnemonic works that reduced the historical-philosophical 
contextualisation of his thoughts to a minimum. In this phase my aim was to 
draw the reader’s attention towards both the paradigmatic function of the 
metaphor of inner writing in Bruno’s ars memoriae and to the construction 
of what Blumenberg called the “metakinetic” of the horizons of meaning,” 
that is, that almost imperceptible shift of meanings that results in concepts 
also having a history. Finally, this was why I insisted considerably with the 
definition of how Bruno’s mnemonic arts compare to mnemonic tradition. 
 
 
3. I chose Hans Blumenberg’s metaphorology as the research 
methodology I would be using to identify the research object. However, 
despite having started and oriented myself in this field, my interpretation is 
in contrast with Blumenberg’s. My criticism of Blumenberg is that he 
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interpreted absolute metaphors one-dimensionally, whereas I believe that 
absolute metaphors should always be studied bearing in mind that a 
metaphor, which is precisely why Blumenberg called it “metakinetic of the 
horizons of meaning”, is multidimensional. I shall offer an example to 
explain. If, for example, we consider the metaphor of the book, we have 
seen that it makes sense as an absolute metaphor if it is related to the 
metaphor of writing, and if this, in turn is related to that of reading. Another 
example is that of the metaphor of light that has to be related to the 
metaphor of shadow (or vice versa) if it is to show its paradigmatic strength. 
Despite his attempt to restore to historical-philosophical reflection the 
wealth and stratification of the meanings of concepts and ideas by reviving 
the metaphors that guided the formation, Blumenberg therefore also tends to 
reduce absolute metaphors to a single dimension of meaning. 
This reductive form does not work if one wants to understand the thought 
of a philosopher such as Giordano Bruno; and the fact that it does not 
function is owing to reasons that are intrinsic to his own thought, which is 
not extraneous to the problems of language and with which, on the contrary, 
it is densely interwoven.284 According to Bruno, it is permissible to believe 
that there is more than one language and that philosophy itself can be 
expressed with different languages. Hence the belief that different 
philosophical traditions can equally refer to the same truth. But not only; 
each individual must take part in philosophical research and contribute with 
																																								 																				
284 Michele Ciliberto La ruota del tempo. Interpretazione di Giordano Bruno, Roma, 
Editori Riuniti, 1986, p. 208; Id., Umbra prufunda. Studi su Giordano Bruno, Roma, 
Edizioni di Storia e di Letteratura, 1999, p. 109. 
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their own words, also using the linguistic contamination between the 
different philosophies. 
More generally speaking, this polymorphic characteristic of language 
also concerns the relationship between signs (between letters and symbols, 
between poiesis and pictura) and can be understood clearly in the 
construction of the ars memoriae already in the introduction of the three 
technical novelties (subiectum, adiectum e organum). From this theoretical 
perspective, the image of printed writing, in which the letters are also 
geometrical figures, has the twofold function of guiding comprehension and 
guiding the conceptual formation. 
When the metaphor of inner writing is related to the metaphor of shadow, 
Bruno analogically transfers the polymorphism of language to the 
polymorphism of nature, thus finding the justification of the memory 
process. The productivity of nature is analogically transferred to man as 




4. This now opens up two paths. One is still moving within the highly 
intricate territory of Giordano Bruno’s thought. What could still be done, 
now that the importance of the metaphor of inner writing and the “dialogue” 
with the other highly important metaphor of shadow has been demonstrated, 
is on the one hand to undertake an intensive study of Bruno’s corpus to 
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further the analysis of the texts in which this metaphoric interaction guides 
the development of Bruno’s thought; on the other hand, one should also 
study an aspect of Bruno’s biography that has been neglected so far, that is, 
his experience with printing houses and his relations with the world of 
printers. In fact, I am convinced that the awareness of the artificial memory 
– inner writing connection arose in Bruno not only as a result of his 
experience in Dominican circles, but also as a result of direct experience 
when he spent hours in contact with the realities of printing houses. Even 
the very idea that letters are images and that they are composed by moving 
them from one house to another was, in all likelihood, the result of his 
observation of workers in a printing house. 
On the other hand, an ulterior path is a history that runs parallel to the 
development of writing techniques, philosophical and scientific theories on 
memory and the mnemonics. This historical reconstruction should not, 
however, have either archaeological or antiquarian aims. In fact, the two 
quotations that I placed at the beginning of this conclusion show how the 
paradigm of writing is still in use in scientific fields. Our experience of 
reading and writing is, however, changing profoundly. As I explained in the 
introduction, reading an e-book, or even reading on a computer or tablet, 
creates a sense of disorientation because the concept of order is modified. I 
believe that the preceding developmental stages of writing have never 
resulted in such a radical change of the concept of spatial order and this is 
why I believe that a metaphorological study on the conceptual paradigm for 
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memory would provide historians with ideas to draw attention to and make 
people reflect on what is happening today in the field of an instrument that 































Figure 1. Johannes Romberch, Congestiorum artificiose memorie, 1520. Diagram of the 
faculties of the soul arranged in cells within the brain.  
 




















Figure 2. Cosma Rosselli, Theasurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579. Diagram of the faculties 
of the soul arranged in cells  within the brain. 
 























Figure 3. Cosma Rosselli, Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579.  
 




















Figure 4. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. Illustration of the 
rule for choosing the loci, according to which the proportions of the human body should be 
respected to ensure that the mnemonic locus is suitable for its use. 
 





















Figure 5. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. The shops in a city 
as a set of loci for the creation of an artificial memory system. 
 
Credits: Rare Book Division, The New York Public Library. "Barbitonsor, bellator, abatia, 





































Figure 6. Cosma Rosselli, Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579. Hell as a set of loci for 
the creation of an artificial memory system.  
 





































Figure 7. Cosma Rosselli, Thesaurus artificiosae memoriae, 1579. Heaven as a set of loci 
for the creation of an artificial memory system. 
 


















Figure 8. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. An example of 
images that may be used to count or assign an order to both the loci and imagines. For 
example, if my memory system uses the rooms in a flat as loci and I wish to remember a 
speech divided into three parts, I can assign a part of the speech to each room and label it 
with the number of windows that correspond to the progressive number of the part of the 
speech that I wish to recall. 
 
Credits: Rare Book Division, The New York Public Library. "Avla, biblioteca, capella." 


















Figure 9. Johannes Romberch, Congestorium artificiose memorie, 1520. The letter “V” is 
an example of the rule for the choice of images that recommends using what is most 
impressed on the mind, so that one remembers more easily something that is funny, 
horrible or grotesque, for example. In this case it is the amusing image of a man falling 
back with his legs in the air which helps to remember the letter “V”. 
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